Luther Soper v. Lawrence Brothers Company

• Decision Date: 02 April 1906
• Docket Number: No. 206,206
• Citation: 201 U.S. 359,26 S.Ct. 473,50 L.Ed. 788
• Parties: LUTHER H. SOPER, Plff. in Err. , v. LAWRENCE BROTHERS COMPANY
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

201 U.S. 359

26 S.Ct. 473

50 L.Ed. 788

LUTHER H. SOPER, Plff. in Err.,

v LAWRENCE BROTHERS COMPANY.

No. 206.

Argued March 9, 12, 13.

Decided April 2, 1906.

Messrs. William Frye White, Taber D. Bailey, and John B. Cotton for plaintiff in error.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 360-364 intentionally omitted] Messrs. Orville Dewey Baker and Amos K. Butler for defendant in error.

[[Argument of Counsel from page 364 intentionally omitted]] Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an action of trover for logs, brought by the plaintiff in error in the supreme judicial court of Maine. The defendant admitted carrying off the logs, but set up title to the land on which they were cut, one half in itself and one half in its licensors. At the trial the plaintiff proved a prima facie title to an undivided interest in the land. The defendant relied upon the Maine Public Laws of 1895, chap. 162, § 1. With regard to that, the chief justice, presiding, instructed the jury that if the defendant and its licensors, respectively, had satisfied the conditions of § 1, it was entitled to a verdict. A verdict was found for the defendant on that ground. The ruling was taken to the full court on exceptions and a motion for a new trial. At the argument there it was urged that the statute, if applicable to the plaintiff, was contrary to the 14th Amendment, and void. But the court, adverting to the question, decided the contrary, and the defendant had judgment. 98 Me. 268, 99 Am. St. Rep. 397, 56 Atl. 908. The case then was brought to this court.

The material sections of the act of 1895 are as follows:

'Sec. 1. When the state has taxed wild land, and the state treasurer has deeded it, or part of it, for nonpayment of tax, by deed purporting to convey the interest of the state by forfeiture for such nonpayment, and his records show that the grantee, his heirs or assigns, has paid the state and county taxes thereon, or on his acres or interest therein, as stated in the deed, continuously for the twenty years subsequent to such deed; and when a person claims under a recorded deed describing wild lands taxed by the state, and the state treasurer's record shows that he has, by himself or by his predecessors under such deed, paid the state and county taxes thereon, or on his acres or interest therein, as stated in the deed, continuously for twenty years subsequent to recording such deed; and whenever, in either case, it appears that the person claiming under such a deed, and those under whom he claims, have, during such period, held such exclusive, peaceable, continuous, and adverse possession thereof as comports with the ordinary management of wild lands in Maine, and it further appears that during such period no former owner, or person claiming under him, has paid any such tax, or any assessment by the county commissioners, or done any other act indicative of ownership, no action shall be maintained by a former owner, or those claiming under him to recover such land, or to avoid such deed, unless commenced within said twenty years, or before January 1, 1900. Such payment shall give such grantee or person claiming as aforesaid, his heirs or assigns, a right of entry and seisin in the whole, or such part, in common and undivided, of the whole tract, as the deed states, or as the unmber of acres in the deed is to the number of acres assessed.

'Sec. 4: This act shall not apply to actions between cotenants, nor to actions now pending in court, nor to those commenced before January 1, 1900.'

The defendant and his licensors claimed under the second branch of the statute. They held under recorded warranty deeds describing wild lands taxed by the state, running back for more than twenty years, and, although it must be taken that the first deed of the series was executed by owners of a part interest only, that deed naturally was held by the state courts to be a repudiation of the tenancy in common and to lay a foundation for the working of the act. With that question we have nothing to do. The state treasurer's record showed that the defendant, its licensors, and those under whom they claim had paid the taxes thereon continuously down to the bringing of this suit. The same persons had held such exclusive, peaceable continuous, and adverse possession of the land as comports with the ordinary management of wild lands in Maine, and during the same period no former owner had paid any tax or done any other act indicative of ownership. These facts are admitted or must be assumed to be established by the verdict. This action was brought in 1902 for acts done from 1900 to 1902, after the time allowed by § 4 had run. The question is whether the statute is constitutional as applied to such a case.

Before considering the construction of the statute we will deal with an objection which seems to be made to it, even if solely prospective, as we subsequently shall explain. Suppose that the law gives no effect whatever to acts done before its passage, still it is suggested that when it went into operation the plaintiff, but for its provision, would have been in constructive possession, and the statute purported at once to disseise him and to put him to an action to recover the land. But so far as the statute is prospective it merely enacts, subject to the qualification in § 4, of which we shall speak in a moment, that certain acts, if done in the future, shall constitute a disseisin, and that the disseisin, if continued for the due time, shall ripen into title. The distinction between trespass and disseisin may be modified by statute as properly as it may be established by common law. Also statutes of limitation may be passed where formerly there were none. So far as the 14th Amendment is concerned, there is nothing to hinder a state from enacting that in future the doing of such overt acts of ownership as are possible on wild land, under a recorded deed which shows that the actor claims title, coupled with payment of the taxes, the owner meantime not paying them, and doing no act indicative of ownership, shall constitute a disseisin, or that such disseisin, if continued long enough, shall bar an action for the land. We think it unnecessary to cite the state decisions on similar statutes, or to argue that proposition at greater length. See Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black, 599, 17 L. ed. 261.

The main argument for the plaintiff is that if, as was the fact, the defendant had maintained the statutory occupation for...