Luttrell v. Department of Corrections

Decision Date01 April 1985
Docket NumberDocket Nos. 70188,No. 6,70189,6
Citation365 N.W.2d 74,421 Mich. 93
PartiesBrenda S. LUTTRELL, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Defendants-Appellants, Percy A. EDMOND, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Defendant-Appellant. Calendar
CourtMichigan Supreme Court

Martin A. Geer, Ann Arbor, William Burnham, Wayne State University Law School, Detroit, for plaintiffs-appellees.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., Thomas L. Casey, Michael J. Moquin, Asst. Attys. Gen., Appellate Division, Lansing, for defendants-appellants.

WILLIAMS, Chief Justice and BOYLE, Justice.

I. INTRODUCTION

The narrow issue to be decided in this case is whether the Legislature intended to preclude the Department of Corrections from denying certain classes of offenders, "drug traffickers" in this case, eligibility for placement in community residence programs. We hold that the plain language of the statute does not preclude a construction that the Department of Corrections is authorized to define eligibility for community placement by category, in addition to the two categories for which the Legislature has explicitly defined eligibility. The legislative history of the statute also indicates that the Legislature intended to vest the department with broad discretion in deciding which offenders should be eligible for placement. In addition, the Legislature has acquiesced in the department's long-standing policy of excluding drug traffickers from eligibility. Lastly, our duty to avoid unreasonable constructions of the statute, in light of the large number of offenders seeking access to the program, supports our finding that the Legislature did not intend to preclude the department from denying the class of drug traffickers eligibility for community placement. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of questions raised but not decided there.

II. LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND

Before discussing the specific claims of the offenders challenging the Department of Correction's eligibility rule, we shall describe the evolution of the department's community residence program and the statutory and administrative rules which govern its implementation.

The Department of Corrections began placing offenders who did not pose an unreasonable risk to the public in their home communities prior to parole as early as 1963. The goal of such placement was, and continues to be, to ease an offender's transition from incarceration to life outside prison by facilitating the pursuit of educational goals or the development of job skills.

The Department of Corrections initiated the community residence program in 1963 on the authority of 1956 P.A. 6, Sec. 193, and 1958 P.A. 215, Sec. 193. Under that legislation and 1937 P.A. 255, ch. 4, Sec. 4 (M.C.L. Sec. 791.264; M.S.A. Sec. 28.2324):

"The assistant director in charge of the bureau of penal institutions shall have authority and it shall be his duty to classify the prisoners in the several penal institutions."

Pursuant to the above authorization, Departmental Directive No. 43, of March 15, 1966, established a work-pass program including the following criteria:

"Any inmate so selected must meet the following criteria:

* * *

* * *

"4. Persons involved in the narcotics traffic will be excluded." (Appellant's Appendix, pp. 163a-165a.)

As the Department of Corrections' program expanded to encompass work- and study-pass programs and to include women offenders, eligibility continued to hinge, in part, on an offender's non-involvement in organized crime or narcotics trafficking.

In 1973, the department revised its eligibility criteria for placement in the work/study-pass program. The new criteria stated that an offender

"Must have no involvement in organized crime or narcotics traffic. Inmates with histories of substance abuse are eligible so long as there is no history of involvement in narcotics traffic beyond personal use and limited sale to support the offender's own addiction." (Policy Directive SPF-8, Appellant's Appendix, pp. 181a-182a.)

The following year, the Legislature explicitly authorized these community placement programs in 1974 P.A. 68. The proper construction of this statute is at issue in this case; the relevant provisions state:

"(1) The director may extend the limits of the place of confinement of a prisoner as to whom there is reasonable cause to believe the prisoner will honor his trust, by authorizing the prisoner, under prescribed conditions, to,

"(a) Visit a specifically designated place or places for a period not to exceed 30 days....

"(b) Work at paid employment or to participate in a training program in the community on a voluntary basis while continuing as a prisoner of the institution or facility to which he is committed.

"(2) The director shall promulgate rules to implement this section.

* * *

* * *

"(5) Prisoners convicted of a crime of violence or any assaultive crime shall not be eligible for the releases provided in this section (1) until such time as the minimum sentence imposed for the crime has less than 180 days remaining, except that where the reason for the release is to visit a critically ill relative, attend the funeral of a relative, or obtain medical services not otherwise available, the director may allow the release under escort for a period not to exceed 30 days.

"(6) Prisoners serving a sentence for murder in the first degree shall not be eligible for the releases under this section prior to initiation of official processing for commutation, and in no case prior to service of 15 calendar years with a good institutional adjustment." (Emphasis added.) M.C.L. Sec. 791.265a; M.S.A. Sec. 28.2325(1).

The departmental policy directive making narcotics traffickers ineligible for community placement remained unchanged until 1977, when it was amended to provide that an offender:

"Must have no involvement in organized crime or extensive TRAFFICKING IN CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES. Individuals with histories of substance abuse are eligible, so long as there is no history of involvement in CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES traffic beyond personal use, or limited sales to support the offender's own addiction." (Policy Directive, PD-DWA-41.01, Appellant's Appendix, p. 186a.)

That same year, the department formally promulgated an administrative rule which included among the eligibility criteria for community placement the following provision:

"Has no involvement in organized crime, professional criminal activities, or narcotics traffic. Residents with histories of substance abuse are eligible so long as there is no history of involvement in narcotics traffic beyond personal use and limited sale to support the resident's own addiction." 1979 AC, R 791.4410.

The Legislature's Joint Committee on Administrative Rules approved this rule. 1977 Journal of the House 2521.

The Department of Corrections has defined "drug trafficker" in its office memoranda and policy directives. The 1980 policy directive at issue here defined a drug trafficker as one whose file indicates:

"a. A conviction for delivery or possession of a controlled substance that involved:

"1. Seven grams or more of any substance containing heroin or cocaine, or

"2. One pound or more of marijuana, or

"3. One hundred units (pills, capsules, etc.) of any other controlled substance.

"b. That local law enforcement officials (police or prosecutor) confirm on the basis of reliable evidence that the individual is considered by them to be a significant trafficker in controlled substances in the community.

"c. Conviction for delivery or possession with intent to deliver controlled substances without any history of personal controlled substance use." (Policy Directive PD-DWA-43.01, Appellant's Appendix, p. 217a.)

III. FACTS

Plaintiffs Brenda Luttrell and Francis Garnica, and all class members they represent, and plaintiff Percy Edmond, are offenders who have been denied eligibility for community placement on the basis of their classification as drug traffickers within the meaning of Policy Directive No. 43.01. The three named plaintiffs were classified as drug traffickers because local law enforcement officials informed the department that they were considered significant traffickers in their communities. Each offender unsuccessfully challenged the drug trafficker designation through the department's administrative grievance process. Plaintiffs Luttrell and Garnica and plaintiff Edmond then filed separate complaints in the Ingham Circuit Court, each claiming that the department's rules and policy directives excluding them from community placement were invalid for a variety of reasons. Circuit Judge Kallman agreed with the contentions of Luttrell and Garnica and granted their motion for summary judgment. Circuit Judge Warren, however, dismissed Edmond's complaint, finding the department had validly exercised its authority. The cases were consolidated in the Court of Appeals, which held for the offenders for the sole reason that "[t]he Department of Corrections' rule and policy directive precluding 'drug traffickers' from consideration for placement in the community program fails to comply with the underlying legislative intent of the act...." 116 Mich.App. 1, 13, 321 N.W.2d 817 (1982). We granted the Department of Corrections' application for leave to appeal on December 6, 1983. 418 Mich. 877 (1983).

IV. LEGISLATIVE INTERPRETATION

The offenders challenge the validity of the Department of Corrections' rules and policy directives under the standard quoted in Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. v. Public Service Comm., 59 Mich.App. 88, 98-99, 228 N.W.2d 843 (1975), lv. den. 394 Mich. 818 (1975):

"Where an agency is empowered to make rules, courts employ a three-fold test to determine the validity of the rules it...

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