Lutz v. Intern. Ass'n of Machinists, Aerospace

Citation121 F.Supp.2d 498
Decision Date22 November 2000
Docket NumberNo. C.A. 00-148-A.,C.A. 00-148-A.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
PartiesAnthony D. LUTZ, Janet Cope, Donna M. Courain, Shareon S. Montague, Cara A.L. Behrens, Wendell L. Choo, and all others similarly situated. Plaintiffs, v. INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS, Defendant.
121 F.Supp.2d 498
Anthony D. LUTZ, Janet Cope, Donna M. Courain, Shareon S. Montague, Cara A.L. Behrens, Wendell L. Choo, and all others similarly situated. Plaintiffs,
v.
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS, Defendant.
No. C.A. 00-148-A.
United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Alexandria Division.
November 22, 2000.

Page 499

Raymond J. LaJeunesse, Jr., c/o National Right to Work, Legal Defense Foundation, Inc., Springfield, VA, for Plaintiffs.

Susan Rebbeca Podolsky, Jenner & Block, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ELLIS, District Judge.


This is a class action brought against the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers ("IAM") by airline employees who are nonunion members but who are nonetheless represented by the IAM for collective bargaining purposes, as required by the Railway Labor Act ("RLA").1 These employees, as permitted by law,2 object to paying the union any fees or dues that are unrelated to the costs of collective bargaining.3 At issue on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment is whether the IAM, consistent with the RLA and the First Amendment, may refuse to allow nonmembers of the union to file a continuing objection to the payment of union dues unrelated to the costs

Page 500

of collective bargaining and require them instead to file an annual objection.

I

The material facts are not disputed. The named plaintiffs are all employees of United Airlines who, although not members of the union, are nonetheless represented by the IAM for collective bargaining purposes under the RLA. They represent a certified class of plaintiffs that includes all nonmembers of the IAM employed by carriers within the meaning of Section 1 or Section 201 of the RLA, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151, 181, who are subject to collective bargaining agreements under the RLA that require the nonmembers to pay dues or fees to the IAM as a condition of employment. See Lutz v. IAM, 196 F.R.D. 447, 2000 WL 1528292 (E.D.Va. Oct.12, 2000) ("Lutz I").

The IAM is the exclusive bargaining representative of approximately 141,500 employees of various railway and airline carriers covered by the RLA. Of this number, approximately 140,000 are members of the IAM, while 1,039 are nonmembers. IAM members pay dues to the union in an amount calculated to defray the costs of collective bargaining plus an additional amount to fund union expressive or political activities. Nonmembers, pursuant to law and various collective bargaining agreements,4 must pay the IAM a fee equal to the full amount of dues paid by members, unless a nonmember objects, in which event the objecting nonmember need only pay the IAM a fee that covers the nonmember's pro-rata share of the collective bargaining costs. An objecting nonmember is not required to pay the IAM the fee surcharge, namely the difference between the full fee or dues amount and the nonmember's pro-rata share of collective bargaining costs. Nonmembers who wish to object to paying the fee surcharge must comply with the IAM's established procedures for this purpose. Specifically, objecting nonmembers must submit their objections annually during the month of November. Continuing objections are not permitted. Thus, if a nonmember submits an objection in November, he or she will be required to pay only a fee to cover the costs of collective bargaining, but not the fee surcharge. And, this will continue to be true for subsequent years provided the nonmember submits a timely objection each subsequent November. Failure to do so will result in the objection lapsing and the nonmember being assessed the full fee amount, including the fee surcharge.

The central feature of the IAM's objection procedure is the requirement of an annual submission asserting the objection. In this regard, the IAM publishes annually a "Notice to Employees Subject to Union Security Clauses" ("Notice"). This is a quarterly publication distributed via mail and the IAM's website to all employees the IAM represents. The Notice explains the procedure nonmembers must follow to object to the collection of the fee surcharge and thereby pay a reduced union fee in the next calendar year. In addition, the Notice informs the employees of the amount of the fee surcharge. This amount varies from year to year.

Page 501

In June 1999, all of the named plaintiffs submitted timely objections to the payment of the fee surcharge. All but one of the named plaintiffs stated in their submissions to the IAM that their objections were continuing in nature and thus applicable to all subsequent years. The IAM rejected these continuing objections because they were contrary to the IAM's policy requiring annual objections from nonmembers who did not wish to pay the fee surcharge. Thus, these named plaintiffs were required to pay the fee surcharge in November 2000. The remaining named plaintiff filed only a standard objection that did not include notice that it was a continuing objection. In November 1999, however, when this named plaintiff filed her next annual objection, she included a statement that her objection was continuing in nature and applicable to all subsequent years. This attempt to assert a continuing objection met the same fate as did the continuing objections submitted by the other named plaintiffs: The IAM rejected it as contrary to the union's policy.

In August 2000, plaintiffs filed a motion to have a class certified of "all nonmembers of Defendant IAM, including new employees, employed by carriers within the meaning of Section 1 or Section 201 of the RLA, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151, 181, who are subject to collective bargaining agreements under the RLA that require nonmembers to pay dues or fees to the IAM as a condition of employment." In October 2000, the proposed class was certified. See Lutz I. The class includes all non-IAM members who are represented by the IAM under the RLA. This group numbers approximately 1,039. Of this number, approximately 315 nonmembers have filed objections to the payment of the fee surcharge during the year 2000.5 Of that number, roughly 26 nonmembers labeled their objections as continuing and applicable to subsequent years.

At issue now are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment.6

II

This fee surcharge objection dispute is only the latest skirmish in the longstanding struggle between the forces represented by the parties at bar: organized labor and the right-to-work movement.7 Given this, a brief summary of the history of the nonmember fee surcharge litigation is a useful preface to the issues presented. This history may be said to begin with the 1934 amendments to the RLA which, inter alia, mandated that the union selected by a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit serve as the exclusive bargaining agent of all the unit employees, including those who elect not to join the union. See 45 U.S.C. § 152, Ninth. This grant of exclusive representative status to the unions gave rise to a concern that unions deal fairly with nonunion members, as well as members. To address this concern and ensure that unions fairly and adequately represent all unit employees, including non-union members, the Supreme Court imposed on unions a judicially created duty of fair representation ("DFR"). See Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 65 S.Ct. 226, 89 L.Ed. 173 (1944).8 Concern about the nonmembers

Page 502

was not the only problem created by the RLA's grant to the union of exclusive representative status. The requirement that the union, as the exclusive bargaining representative, represent all employees in the bargaining unit, including non-union members, coupled with the fact that non-union members paid no union dues, gave rise to a "free-rider" problem. Specifically, unions were required to negotiate on behalf of nonmembers, as well as members, who paid no dues, receiving this benefit free of charge. In this respect, nonmembers were free-riders. To remedy this, Congress, in 1951, enacted Section 2, Eleventh of the RLA, which confers on unions the authority to enter into collective bargaining agreements requiring all employees in the represented bargaining units either to join the union or, alternatively, to pay fees equal to dues. While this provision solved the free-rider problem, it spawned a new problem of constitutional dimensions: A serious First Amendment concern attached to the fact that unions could now use, for political purposes with which nonmembers disagreed, the portion of the non-union members' fees that exceeded collective bargaining costs. The Supreme Court then addressed this concern, ruling in a series of cases that the RLA does not permit unions to use a nonmember's fees for political causes if the employee affirmatively makes his objection known. See, e.g., Street, 367 U.S. at 774, 81 S.Ct. 1784.

Following these decisions, litigation between these factions has focused on aspects of the objection procedure, including, for example, which expenses should be included in the fee surcharge,9 the form and substance of the notice given to nonmembers,10 the procedures by which the fee surcharge was collected,11 and the specificity with which the objection must be made.12 Particularly pertinent here is that four courts have addressed the lawfulness of a union's annual objection requirement. Three courts—the D.C. Circuit, the Sixth Circuit, and a Maryland district court— upheld the annual objection requirement under the DFR standard.13 The fourth court, the Fifth Circuit, reached the contrary result, finding first that the applicable standard is found in the First Amendment, not the DFR, and then that the annual objection requirement fails under that standard. See Shea v. IAM, 154 F.3d 508 (5th Cir.1998). Significantly, Shea involved not only the precise question here in issue, but also the same union.14 Thus, a threshold question is whether the IAM is collaterally estopped by Shea from relitigating the same issue...

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  • Seidemann v. Bowen
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit)
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    ...interference with the employees' exercise of their First Amendment rights." Id.; see also Lutz v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 121 F.Supp.2d 498, 506 (E.D.Va.2000) (analyzing the propriety of annual objection requirements under the First Amendment and concluding because su......
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