Lux v. Lockridge

• Decision Date: 30 June 1944
• Docket Number: 7155
• Citation: 150 P.2d 127,65 Idaho 639
• Parties: JOE LUX, Respondent and Cross-Appellant, v. ORVAL LOCKRIDGE, Appellant and Cross-Respondent
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

150 P.2d 127

65 Idaho 639

JOE LUX, Respondent and Cross-Appellant, v. ORVAL LOCKRIDGE, Appellant and Cross-Respondent

No. 7155

Supreme Court of Idaho

June 30, 1944

1. Automobiles

Where plaintiff agreed with automobile dealer to trade in his trucks on new trucks, plaintiff to retain possession of his trucks until deliveries by dealer, and thereafter plaintiff permitted buyer from dealer to take delivery of one of plaintiff's trucks, and subsequently original transaction was frustrated by government's freezing order, buyer, who did not receive certificate of title, was not a "bona fide purchaser for value" and as against such buyer, the contract between plaintiff and dealer could be shown to defeat buyer's right to retain truck. (I. C. A., sec 48-402-b, as added by Sess. Laws 1941, chap. 144, sec. 3.)

2. Automobiles

All parties to transaction whereby plaintiff turned in his trucks to automobile dealer on new vehicles one of which was subsequently sold by dealer to defendant were charged with notice of statute providing that no person may acquire any right, title, claim, or interest in motor vehicle until issuance to buyer of certificate of title. (I. C. A., sec 48-402-b, as added by Sess. Laws 1941, chap. 144, sec. 3.)

3. Automobiles

Where plaintiff agreed with automobile dealer to trade in his automobiles for new automobiles, plaintiff to retain possession until deliveries by dealer, and before dealer made deliveries plaintiff permitted dealer to sell one of plaintiff's trucks to defendant, and thereafter original transaction was frustrated by government's freezing order, plaintiff, on recovering possession of truck turned in because statutory certificate of title was not delivered to defendant, was not entitled to recover rent for defendant's use of truck. (I. C. A., sec. 48-402-b, as added by Sess. Laws 1941, chap. 144, sec. 3.)

Appeal from the District Court of the Tenth Judicial District, in and for Lewis County. Hon. Miles S. Johnson, Judge.

Affirmed.

P. W Mitchell and Thomas A. Madden for appellant and cross-respondent.

The title to Chapter 144 of the Idaho Session Laws of 1941 contains no reference to and gives no notice of the provisions embodied in such act under sec. 48-402-b and such section is unconstitutional and void. (Art. 3, Sec. 16, Constitution of Idaho; Jackson v. Gallet, 39 Ida. 383; Turner v. Coffin, 9 Ida. 338; Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Sec. 87, p. 94; Katz v. Herrick, 12 Ida. 1; Federal Res. Bank v. Citizens' B. T. Co., 53 Ida. 316.)

Rights based on a violation of law will not be enforced, and if a transaction is illegal because in contravention to a statute, it will not be upheld in any way, but the parties will be left in the situation in which they have voluntarily placed themselves. (Libby v. Pelham, 30 Ida. 614; McFall v. Arkoosh, 37 Ida. 243; McIntyre v. Butterfield L. Co., 45 Ida. 206; Clark v. Utah Con. Co., 51 Ida. 587.)

G. C. Pennell and Durham & Hyatt for respondent and cross-appellant.

Section 48-402-b, as included in Chapter 144 of the 1941 Session Laws, is a valid exercise of police power by the Legislature and is therefore constitutional. (State Ex Rel City Loan & Savings Co. v. Taggart, (Ohio), 17 N.E.2d 758)

The Act provides the only method of acquiring title to an automobile. (Merchants Security Corp. v. Lane, 150 A. 559.)

If Lockridge relied upon the delivery of the truck to the Gray Motor Company as an estoppel, in order to avail himself of this remedy he was required to plead it. (Seat v. Quarles, 31 Ida. 212; Neitzel v. Lawrence, 40 Ida. 26; Jackson v. Lee, 47 Ida. 589.)

Givens, J. Holden, C. J., and Dunlap, J., concur. Budge, J., dissents. Ailshie, J., dissenting.

OPINION

Givens, J.

In the fall of 1941 plaintiff-appellant, Joe Lux, agreed with Mr. Webb of the Gray Motor Company of Craigmont, dealer, to trade a car, pickup, and three trucks for a new car, pickup, and three new trucks, plaintiff to retain possession of his motor vehicles until deliveries by the company. The transaction as to the new car and pickup was completed and is not involved herein. During November, 1941, Mr. Webb brought Mr. Lockridge, the defendant-respondent and cross-appellant, out to look at plaintiff's trucks. (For clarity and convenience we refer to the parties as plaintiff and defendant.) Plaintiff testified that Mr. Webb and the defendant returned a week later to get the Ford truck here in question. Defendant testified one of the dealer's employees drove the truck to the dealer's garage the same day. Before the truck was taken to town, better tires were taken off of plaintiff's other two trucks and put on this truck and the bed thereon taken off. Several days later defendant took the truck from the company's garage and signed an order therefor dated November 18, 1941.

The provisions of chap. 144, 1941 Sess. Laws, p. 282, ^[1] relative to obtaining a certificate of title were not complied with. January 1, 1942, the sale and delivery of all new trucks was forbidden by the United States government, and plaintiff, although he made two applications, was unable to obtain a release for the new truck which the dealer had received. Plaintiff requested the defendant to return the truck, claiming it had been delivered to the dealer and defendant upon the condition that if plaintiff was unable to get the new truck this truck would be returned to him. Defendant, disclaiming knowledge thereof, refused to return the truck (for which he had turned over to the dealer another used truck and his note, which the dealer offered unavailingly to return,) and plaintiff filed this suit, asking for return of the truck and $ 690 for the rental value thereof. Defendant filed an answer and cross-complaint and asked that judgment be entered directing plaintiff to endorse, assign, and transfer the title certificate covering said truck required by the statute, supra.

The trial court found "The plaintiff Lux did not sell the truck to the defendant Lockridge. He sold it to the Gray Motor Company. The defendant Lockridge purchased the truck from the Gray Motor Co. and not from the plaintiff Lux." Also, "Mr. Lockridge denied any knowledge of the agreement between the Gray Motor Company and Lux in reference to having the trucks back in case he did not get new ones, and the Court finds that Mr. Lockridge was an innocent purchaser of the truck and that he neither knew of nor was he a party to any agreement between the plaintiff Lux and the Gray Motor Co." Judgment was nevertheless entered ordering defendant to deliver the truck to plaintiff, and refusing plaintiff damages for the use of the truck by defendant, evidently on the theory that non-compliance with chap. 144, supra, renders the purported sale to defendant void.

The defendant appeals from that part of the judgment which directs him to surrender and deliver the truck to plaintiff, and the plaintiff has appealed from the court's refusal to award damages.

There was a sharp conflict in the evidence as to whether defendant knew plaintiff retained the right to regain possession of his truck in the event the company could not deliver a new truck. There is, however, no dispute in the record that the certificate of title remained at all times in plaintiff's possession and was never transferred by him to the company or defendant and that defendant received no certificate of title from the company or plaintiff. All were equally charged with notice of chap. 144, supra, providing that no person could "acquire any right, title, claim or interest in or to" a motor vehicle until the vendee had issued to him the certificate of title. Without, therefore, determining whether or not a sale without the transfer of the certificate is void, though urged by both parties pro and con to do so, we are impressed with the cogency of the reasoning in Swartz v. White, 80 Utah 150, 13 P.2d 643, to the effect that a purchaser not receiving the certificate of title is not a bona fide purchaser for value and therefore as against defendant the contract existing between plaintiff and the company could be shown, defeating his rights to retain the truck.

As against plaintiff's cross-appeal the trial court was justified in holding he was not entitled to rent for the use of the truck by defendant, because he voluntarily surrendered its possession through the company to defendant to be used by defendant pending delivery of a new truck by the company to him without any expression on plaintiff's part he was to be reimbursed for such use if the deal was not consummated.

Certainly under the offer to...