Luzerne County v. Glennon

Decision Date25 May 1885
Citation109 Pa. 564
PartiesLuzerne County <I>versus</I> Glennon.
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court

Before MERCUR, C. J., GORDON, PAXSON, TRUNKEY, STERRETT and CLARK, JJ. GREEN, J., absent

ERROR to the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne county: Of January Term 1885, No. 449.

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R. D. Evans, for the plaintiff in error.—The case stated admits the fact that, at the time the officer in question assumed the duties of his office, Luzerne county contained a population greater than one hundred and fifty thousand, but states that the last preceding decennial census showed a population less than that amount. It also shows that the population given for 1884 is not determined by a census. The question, therefore, is whether, for purposes of classification under the various Salary Acts, a county is not to remain in the same class in which a census places it until another census removes it to another class. The question is entirely a new one. The only light we have is derived from certain analogies in the Constitution of the state, which show how the fundamental law disposes of similar questions. The legislative and judicial apportionments are both based on the population of the several districts to be formed, and it is directed that the last preceding decennial census shall be taken as the only guide to determine such population: Art. II. Sec. 16, 17 and 18, Schedule, Sec. 14.

It is also provided that "Whenever a county shall contain forty thousand inhabitants it shall constitute a separate judicial district." Yet it was held in Commonwealth ex rel. Chase v. Harding et al. (6 Norris, 351), that it is only after a decennial census which shows the requisite population that such district can be formed.

The decennial census of the United States is the only official determination of population, and the inconvenience and injustice that must arise from accepting any other guide to the classification of counties for salary purposes are great and manifold. If the claim of this officer is sustained, then whenever a county reaches a population requisite to pass it into a higher class, an officer elected after such time acquires a right to the larger salary. Yet he may unjustly be deprived of his rights because the County Commissioners refuse to concede them, or the margin above the requisite population may be so small that both the commissioners and a jury before which he might bring his claim would be justified in declining the responsibility of allowing it. In a case where such margin is small, injustice must always result. Interminable janglings and litigation would follow the affirmance of the rule adopted by the court below. One board of County Commissioners may pay an officer a certain salary; a new board, elected while he is still in office, may refuse it and he may be without remedy against their action. Officers will in many cases be at the mercy of the commissioners and auditors of the county, and a wide door is thus opened to corruption. The classification of counties for this purpose ought to be fixed by an unquestionable guide. In view of these considerations, we respectfully submit that it must have been the design of the framers of the Constitution when they provided that officers in counties having a population greater than one hundred and fifty thousand, should be paid by salaries, (Art. XIV., Sec. 5,) that such population should be ascertained only by the decennial census.

Wm. S. McLean and E. P. & J. Vaughan Darling, for the defendant in error.—Because in the matter of legislative and judicial apportionment the Constitution expressly declares the population of counties shall be determined by the last United States decennial census, it does not follow, as argued by the plaintiff in error, that that shall be the sole test in the matter of the Salary Acts. Rather the contrary, for if it had been so intended it would have been so expressed in both cases. In the former there was good reason for so declaring because the Constitution provided for apportionment "immediately after each United States decennial census, and not oftener," while the terms of county officers may begin and end in the interim between two decennial censuses. For many purposes it would be intolerable to fix the population by one census and then hold it, irrespective of the fact, to be the same for every purpose for another ten years. Thus, in the creation of new counties — whilst the constitution of the judicial district remains unchanged until the next decennial census — the status of the newly erected county must depend, in other respects, upon its population — and that fact cannot be determined by the last decennial census. So also as to the salaries of officers. Nothing could be more unjust than to regulate them upon the basis of what once had been the population of the particular county. In pursuance of Section 5 of Article XIV. of the Constitution, the legislature has passed a number of Acts adjusting the compensation of salaried officers upon the basis of the actual...

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7 cases
  • City of Twin Falls v. Koehler
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • March 14, 1942
    ... ... OF TWIN FALLS, a Municipal Corporation and Body Politic and Corporate, within Twin Falls County, State of Idaho, upon and out of the Relationship of H. L. CANNON, Appellant, v. JOE KOEHLER, ... Appellant cites and relies on (Commonwealth v ... Walter, 274 Pa. 553, 118 A. 510; Luzerne County v ... Glennon, 109 Pa. 564; Wolfe v. City of ... Moorhead, 98 Minn. 113, 107 N.W. 728; ... ...
  • Commonwealth ex rel. Attorney General v. Samuels
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Supreme Court
    • July 12, 1894
    ... ... warranto. Reversed ... Quo ... warranto to oust respondents from office of county auditors ... Before WEIDMAN, J ... From ... the record it appeared that Thomas E ... Com., 102 ... Pa. 364; Com. v. Harding, 87 Pa. 343; Com. v ... Handley, 106 Pa. 245; Luzerne Co. v. Glennon, ... 109 Pa. 564; Davis v. Clark, 106 Pa. 385; ... Scranton v. Silkman, 113 Pa ... ...
  • Reid v. Smoulter
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Supreme Court
    • October 7, 1889
    ...for present purposes must be taken as the standard, we must assume that the county now has less than 150,000 inhabitants: Luzerne Co. v. Glennon, 109 Pa. 564. The of April 13, 1887, P.L. 22, amends the fifth section of the act of 1874, reciting the section at length, "so as to read: Section......
  • Bethel Township Veterans Home Association Liquor License Case
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    • Pennsylvania Superior Court
    • January 17, 1956
    ...of the courts as well as of the Liquor Control Board. Zeltner Liquor License Case, 174 Pa.Super. 98, 101, 100 A.2d 132. In Luzerne County v. Glennon, 109 Pa. 564, 571, involving the classification of counties for purposes, according to population, the Supreme Court said: "The only legally r......
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