LWK v. ERC

Decision Date01 May 2000
Citation735 NE 2d 359,432 Mass. 438
PartiesL.W.K. & another v. E.R.C., executrix, & others.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Present: (Sitting at Worcester): MARSHALL, C.J., ABRAMS, GREANEY, IRELAND, SPINA, & COWIN, JJ. Burton Chandler (Darragh K. Kasakoff with him) for the defendants.

Margot A. Clower (Karen Dean-Smith with her) for the child.

MARSHALL, C.J.

Pursuant to G. L. c. 215, § 13,4 and Mass. R. Dom. Rel. P. 64, a judge in the Probate and Family Court reserved and reported four questions concerning the financial obligations of a deceased father's estate to his minor child:

"1. whether a testator, survived by a minor child to whom he owed ... support pursuant to a court order, may disinherit that child pursuant to the [omitted child statute,] G. L. c. 191, § 20;
"2. whether the child's claim for support is in the nature of a preferred creditor's claim;
"3. whether a posthumous support obligation includes assets of an inter vivos trust; and
"4. whether an order to secure postmajority educational support may be made in the circumstances of posthumous support."

We discuss the background facts and applicable law before answering the questions.

1. Background. The father died on November 20, 1994, at the age of fifty-five. He was divorced at the time of his death. He was survived by two children, an adult daughter from his only marriage, and a minor child (child) born on September 10, 1990, to the mother, L.W.K. (mother), to whom he was not married. The mother was forty-two years old at the time of the child's birth. Prior to the father's death, the mother brought a paternity action to establish him as her child's father. On June 11, 1992, after a hearing, a judge in the Probate and Family Court so determined, and ordered the father to pay child support of $100 a week to the mother, the order to remain in effect "until further order of the Court."5 The father paid the required child support until his death.

On June 3, 1994, the father executed a will that disinherited his minor child, leaving to her the amount of one dollar. He further directed that she "shall not be considered as an heir-atlaw of mine" nor "a child of mine or issue of mine for any purpose under this will."6 The will provided that, after the payment of specific monetary bequests and disposition of certain tangible property, the remainder of the estate be devised and bequeathed to a trust (trust) that the father had previously established on February 3, 1977. On the same day the father also signed a final amendment to the trust that restated all of the trust terms.7 The trust instrument authorized the trustees, on the father's death, to collect various life insurance policies and any devises and bequests made by the father to the trust. The trust named the father's sister (sister) and his adult daughter (the only child from his quondam marriage) as the sole beneficiaries. After the father's death, the sister was appointed executrix of his estate. She filed a Federal estate tax return that listed the father's total gross estate as $800,398, and a taxable estate of $648,722.

On the death of the father, the mother filed a claim for Social Security benefits on her child's behalf based on the father's participation in the Social Security system. It was determined that the child, as a qualified minor, was entitled to receive at that time $849 a month in Social Security benefits.8 The child is entitled to receive these benefits until she turns eighteen or until her nineteenth birthday if she has not finished high school. The child is now ten years old. Her mother has the sole responsibility for her care and upbringing. The child's only source of income is the Social Security benefits, in addition to support from her mother.9

A guardian ad litem, appointed to represent the child's interests in the father's estate, filed a complaint for modification of the child support order entered in 1992, and a notice of claim against the estate seeking further support payments for the child.10 Some time later, a petition for authority to compromise was filed in the estate probate proceeding in which the mother and the sister (executrix of the father's estate) agreed to a settlement of all claims of the child in the amount of $10,000. A second guardian ad litem, appointed to represent the child's interests, filed an opposition to the compromise.11 After a hearing, the compromise was dismissed and an attorney was appointed to represent the child in the modification action. The judge allowed a joint motion filed by the mother and the executrix to amend the complaint for modification to add the trustees as defendants.

The parties submitted a statement of agreed facts and made a joint request for rulings. The judge ruled preliminarily that (1) the father could not disinherit his minor child to defeat his support obligations; (2) the assets of the inter vivos trust and the estate are subject to the child's support claim; (3) she had the authority to enter an order against the father's estate for future educational support of the child; and (4) the child's receipt of Social Security benefits did not bar further claims for support. Because the judge determined that the case presented questions of first impression, and that answers to the questions materially affected the merits of the claim for modification, she reserved and reported four questions and stayed the proceedings pending an appellate ruling. We granted the defendants' application for direct appellate review.

2. Questions one and two. For ease of discussion we address in tandem the first two questions.

Testamentary freedom is not absolute, and certain preexisting obligations have priority over all testamentary dispositions. See, e.g., Harrison v. Stevens, 305 Mass. 532, 535 (1940) (testamentary dispositions subject to the "claims of creditors and to administration expenses"); G. L. c. 191, § 15, 16 (spousal elective share takes priority over testamentary dispositions). See also H.J. Alperin & L.D. Shubow, Summary of Basic Law § 22.113, at 565 (3d ed. 1996). A legally enforceable obligation to pay child support, like other financial obligations of the testator, takes precedence over testamentary dispositions and must be satisfied prior to any distribution of assets under the will.12 A parent charged with an obligation to support his13 child cannot nullify that legal obligation by disinheriting his child pursuant to G. L. c. 191, § 20.14 Beyond satisfaction of his support obligation, however, a parent is free to exercise his testamentary discretion with respect to a minor child, as all others, and may disinherit her.15

In order to answer questions one and two, therefore, we must resolve whether the order to the father to support his minor child survived his death. Specifically we must decide whether a child support order, made pursuant to G. L. c. 209C, § 9, during the father's life, creates an obligation on his estate to continue support until his child reaches majority, or whether any obligations for her future support were extinguished by his death.

The duty of a parent to support a minor child is statutory. See, e.g., G. L. c. 208, § 28; G. L. c. 209, § 37; G. L. c. 209C, § 9. The question, therefore, is one of statutory interpretation. We conclude that the death of the father does not extinguish his duty to support his minor child. We do so for several reasons. First, contrary to the dissent, we are not legislating but applying unequivocal policy mandates of the Legislature to the specific facts of this case. For decades extending back into the Nineteenth Century, the Legislature has mandated and this court has recognized that parents have an obligation to support their minor children. The Legislature has expressed that duty in unmistakable terms: "It is the public policy of the commonwealth that dependent children shall be maintained, as completely as possible, from the resources of their parents thereby relieving or avoiding, at least in part, the burden borne by the citizens of the commonwealth." G. L. c. 119A, § 1, as amended through St. 1998, c. 463, § 101 (approved with emergency preamble, Jan. 14, 1999).16 The Legislature has also decreed that the statutes concerning child support enforcement "shall be liberally construed to effectuate" that public policy. Id.

Second, in this Commonwealth there have been recent and profound legislative changes that have increased significantly the obligation of parents to support their children.17 Federal law has also increased significantly the obligations of parents for child support.18 Thus, both State and Federal law are explicit in providing for the broadest possible support of minor children by their parents. Moreover, under the Child Support Enforcement Act an "[o]bligor" is defined as "an individual, or the estate of a decedent, who owes or may owe a duty of support, or who is liable under a child support obligation," plainly suggesting that the Legislature intended liability for child support obligations to survive the death of a parent (emphasis supplied). G. L. c. 119A, § 1A. That the child support order was entered in a paternity proceeding other than a divorce proceeding is of no significance, for the Legislature has mandated that children born out of wedlock are entitled to the same rights and protections of the law as all other children. See G. L. c. 209C, § 1, inserted by St. 1986, c. 310, § 16.19

Third, the Legislature has imposed an explicit duty on parents who divorce and those who give birth to children out of wedlock to support their minor child until they attain their majority. General Laws c. 209C, § 1, imposes child support responsibility on a parent from the child's birth to the age of eighteen, and beyond that period if certain statutory and readily discernible circumstances exist.20 See Doe v. Roe, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 590, 594-595 (1987). See also G. L. c. 209, § 37 (imposing...

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