Lyall v. City Of Los Angeles, Case No. CV 09-7353 PSG (MANx)
| Decision Date | 06 January 2011 |
| Docket Number | Case No. CV 09-7353 PSG (MANx) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of California |
| Parties | James Duff Lyall, et al. v. City of Los Angeles, et al. |
Attorneys Present for Plaintiff(s):
Not Present
Attorneys Present for Defendant(s):
Not Present
Proceedings: (In Chambers) Order GRANTING Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment; and DENYING Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment
Pending before the Court are Plaintiffs' and Defendants' cross-motions for partial summary judgment. A hearing on the motion was held on January 3, 2011. After considering the moving and opposing papers and arguments presented at the hearing, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment and DENIES Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment.
This action arises from an incident at a warehouse in downtown Los Angeles (the "warehouse") involving Plaintiffs James Duff Lyall, Javier Cortez, D'Angelo Jones, Magnolia Becerra, Sasha Costanza-Chock, Joseph Holliday, and Benjamin Wood (collectively, "Plaintiffs") and two law enforcement officers, which culminated in the arrest of one plaintiff, and an investigatory detention, including a pat-down search, of the other six.
On the night of November 16, 2008, Plaintiffs attended a musical and artistic event at the warehouse. The event was held to raise money for the upcoming Los Angeles Anarchist Book Fair. Plaintiffs' Statement of Uncontroverted Facts ("PUF") ¶ 12. At about 9:00 pm, Defendants LAPD Officers Cho and Cervantes arrived on the scene. The officers were investigating an alleged beer theft from a nearby convenience store which had taken place earlierthat evening. PUF ¶¶ 24-26. The theft suspects were described as "six male Hispanic juveniles, [wearing] 'rocker type' clothing." Id. Having seen a vehicle with a license plate matching that of the suspect's vehicle parked around the corner of the warehouse, and noticing people in "rocker-type" clothing entering the warehouse, the officers decided to approach the warehouse. PUF ¶ 29; Cervantes IA Interview, Ex. N, 6:8-25.
At the time the officers arrived, approximately 100 persons were inside the warehouse, though the bands were still setting up and the event had not "officially" begun. PUF ¶ 23; Compl. ¶¶ 1, 18; Defendants' Statement of Uncontroverted Facts ("DUF") ¶ 22. The warehouse door was ajar, but the officers soon encountered Plaintiff Cortez ("Cortez") who was standing in the doorway. DUF ¶¶ 24-25; PUF ¶¶ 37-38. The officers explained the purpose of their investigation, but Cortez refused to let the officers enter the premises, telling them that it was a private party and they needed a warrant to enter. PUF ¶ 41.1 He forcefully attempted to shut the door, but Officer Cervantes pushed it open, followed Cortez into the warehouse, and eventually took him into custody.2 PUF ¶ 45; DUF ¶ 26. Defendants assert that a "crowd" had gathered around Cortez, and followed the officers as they escorted Cortez out of the warehouse, "yelling and raising their fists at the officers." Defendant's Statement of Genuine Issues, Including Defendants' Additional Facts ("SGI") ¶ 123.
By this time, more officers had arrived on the scene. PUF ¶¶ 55-56. After Cortez had been handcuffed and placed in the back of a police car, Defendant Sergeant Ross, the acting supervisor for Officers Cho and Cervantes, ordered all of the event's attendees out of the warehouse. PUF ¶¶ 59-63. Once outside, the attendees were all subjected to a pat-down search to check for weapons at Sergeant Ross's direction. PUF ¶¶ 79-84. Plaintiffs assert they were then "forced to submit to a field line-up" in connection with the alleged beer theft, 3 PUF ¶¶ 75, 79, even though none of six matched the description of the theft suspects.4 PUF ¶ 96. Multiple attendees were taken into custody for allegedly violating Cal. Penal Code § 148 (A)(1) () as a result of this encounter, including Plaintiffs Cortez and Holliday who were later formally charged.5 PUF ¶¶ 104, 107.
Subsequently, on October 9, 2009, Plaintiffs filed a class action complaint (the "Complaint"), naming as defendants the City of Los Angeles, the Los Angeles Police Department, Police Chief William Bratton, and individual police officers David Ross, Johnny Cervantes, Nicholas Cho, Angel Guerra, and Jinho Kang (collectively, "Defendants"). The Complaint asserts two causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: one for violations of Plaintiffs' First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association, and a second alleging violations of Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. In addition, the Complaint asserted a third cause of action under Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(b) for interference with Plaintiffs' federal and state constitutional rights by threats, intimidation, or coercion.
Defendants moved for partial summary judgment on November 23, 2010. Defendants' motion argues the following: (1) the evidence against Defendants Police Chief Bratton, Officer Kang, and Officer Guerra is insufficient to proceed with any of Plaintiffs' claims; (2) Plaintiff Javier Cortez's conviction for disturbing the peace under Cal. Civ. Code § 415 precludes him from challenging the contemporaneous search or detention, and thus bars his second and third causes of action (under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1); and (3) that all Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment challenges based on the warrantless entry into the warehouse fail because no Plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy. Defendants' Notice of Mot. 2:4-13.
Plaintiffs also filed a motion with the Court seeking summary adjudication of the following claims: (1) that the LAPD Officers' warrantless entry into the warehouse violated the federal and state constitution; (2) that the LAPD Officers' pat-down searches and seizures of Plaintiffs including were without reasonable suspicion or probable cause; (3) that the LAPD Officers' entry into the artists' space and seizures of Plaintiffs were pursuant to a custom, policy and/or practice of the City of Los Angeles and the LAPD Los Angeles Police Department; and (4) that Plaintiffs are entitled to recover from defendants City of Los Angeles and the Los Angeles Police Department damages proximately caused by the officers' violations of Plaintiffs' state and federal constitutional rights. Plaintiffs' Notice of Mot. 2-1:18.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) establishes that summary judgment is proper only when "the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party has the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of fact for trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). If the moving party satisfies the burden, the party opposing the motion must set forth specific facts showing that there remains a genuine issue for trial, and "may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of his pleading." See id. at 248, 257 (citations omitted).
A non-moving party who bears the burden of proving at trial an element essential to its case must sufficiently establish a genuine dispute of fact with respect to that element or face summary judgment. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). Such an issue of fact is a genuine and material issue if it cannot be reasonably resolved in favor of either party and may affect the outcome of the suit. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 250-51.
If the moving party seeks summary judgment on a claim or defense for which it bears the burden of proof at trial, the moving party must use affirmative, admissible evidence. Admissible declarations or affidavits must be based on personal knowledge, must set forth facts that would be admissible evidence at trial, and must show that the declarant or affiant is competent to testify as to the facts at issue. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
Plaintiffs' second cause of action in this lawsuit is a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") based on Defendants' alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment right against unlawful searches and seizures.6 Compl. ¶ 33-35; U.S. Const. Amend. IV (). This cause of action is predicated on multiple separate incidents, each of which Plaintiffs contend independently suffices to establish a constitutional violation. Id. Defendants now seek summary adjudication on three specific issues relating to Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claim. Plaintiffs also seek summary adjudication on four issues presented by their second and third causes of action. In evaluating the parties' cross-motions for partial summary judgment, the Court will proceed by analyzing the discrete issues raised in both sets of moving papers in the order that factual events underlying such issues unfolded.
Plaintiffs' first argument in moving for partial summary judgment is that Defendants' warrantless entry into the warehouse violated Plaintiffs Javier Cortez's ("Cortez") and Joseph Holliday's ("Holliday") federal and state constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure. Plaintiffs' Mot. 7:23-8:22. Defendants contest this, arguing...
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