Lydon v. Boston Sand & Gravel Co.

• Decision Date: 13 July 1998
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 98-10664-EFH.
• Citation: 15 F.Supp.2d 150
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts
• Parties: Joseph LYDON, Plaintiff, v. BOSTON SAND & GRAVEL COMPANY, Defendant.

15 F.Supp.2d 150

Joseph LYDON, Plaintiff, v. BOSTON SAND & GRAVEL COMPANY, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 98-10664-EFH.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

July 13, 1998.

James T. Masteralexis, Boston, MA, for Joseph Lydon.

Robert P. Corcoran, Gleeson & Corcoran, Boston, MA, for Boston Sand & Gravel Co.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

HARRINGTON, District Judge.

This case presents novel issues surrounding the interplay between the scope of federal labor policy and the jurisdiction of district courts to entertain certain union employee claims filed in state court. This civil action was originally filed in Massachusetts Superior Court. The Complaint contains two counts alleging violations of Mass.Gen.L. ch. 152, §§ 75A and 75B, the Massachusetts Workers' Compensation Statute, for failing to reinstate plaintiff with his accrued seniority rights and for failing to give him preference for hiring after a period of disability. Defendant removed the case to federal district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) on the basis of federal preemption under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Plaintiff filed a motion to remand the case to state court. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment. At the core of both parties' motions is the jurisdiction of this Court to decide plaintiff's claims: without preemption there is no federal subject matter jurisdiction and without jurisdiction the Court lacks power to decide.

I. FACTS

Plaintiff Joseph Lydon was hired as a mixer driver by Defendant Boston Sand & Gravel in May, 1984. It is undisputed that as a mixer driver he was covered under a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") between defendant and Teamsters Local 379 ("Local 379"), of which he was a member. Plaintiff sustained a work related neck injury on July 23, 1991 which disabled him. He received weekly workers' compensation benefits pursuant to Chapter 152 of the Massachusetts Workers' Compensation Statute until May, 1993. On May 4, 1993, plaintiff entered into a "lump sum" settlement agreement in the total amount of $97,500 which was to cover the projected four years of his disability.

In the Fall of 1993 plaintiff went to work for a different employer, Sherman Concrete, as a mixer driver. In April, 1995, plaintiff contacted defendant and requested that he be permitted to return to work for defendant. On May 9, 1995, plaintiff met with Daved McNeil, Vice President of defendant, regarding his re-employment. McNeil told him that defendant believed plaintiff had voluntarily quit his job and that by accepting employment with Sherman Concrete he had forfeited his accrued seniority. On September 14, 1995 Local 379 demanded by letter that plaintiff be reinstated with seniority. Defendant replied by letter that any grievance pursuant to the CBA was untimely filed.

Both parties held further discussions between December, 1995 and February, 1996 regarding the reinstatement rights of workers who enter into lump sum settlements. They agreed that no language regarding seniority rights of employees who entered into lump sum settlements was present in Article VII of the CBA. They further agreed that reinstatement rights would be determined by the Workers' Compensation Statute and not by the CBA.

On May 5, 1997, plaintiff demanded that he be reinstated pursuant to the preferential right of re-hire afforded by the workers' compensation statute. Plaintiff returned to work on August 7, 1997. He was given seniority above the other workers who were hired during that summer, but was not reinstated with his accrued seniority dating from 1984.

On August 17, 1997, Local 379 filed a grievance against defendant claiming that reinstating plaintiff without his accrued seniority violated the CBA. After a hearing the Arbitrator found that the grievance was not arbitrable pursuant to the CBA and the grievance was denied on December 11, 1997.

Plaintiff filed the present civil action in Massachusetts Superior Court on March 31, 1998. Plaintiff seeks reinstatement of accrued seniority rights and lost wages due to his lower seniority position. With his present seniority date plaintiff is fifty-eighth on the list as opposed to his original seniority date which would have placed him at position seventeen. The seniority ranking affects plaintiff's contractual wage rate, vacation allowance, and work opportunities. On April 17, 1998 defendant removed the case to the federal district court on the basis of Section 301 preemption.

II. JURISDICTION

A federal court may not, of course, address the merits of a claim without first determining whether it has jurisdiction. Accordingly, when a case is removed to federal district court under 8 U.S.C. § 1441(b), the Court must be assured that the claim arises under the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States. Unlike state courts, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). Only after a court rules that it has jurisdiction may it reach the merits of the case.

Plaintiff argues that 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c) bars removal of this case because plaintiff's causes of action arise under the Massachusetts Workers' Compensation Statute. Section 1445(c) reads in relevant part:

A civil action in any State court arising under the workmen's compensation laws of such State may not be removed to any district court of the United States.

When a case is removed from state court, the burden is on the party who removed the action to prove that the federal court has jurisdiction. Therefore, even though it is the plaintiff's motion to remand before the court, defendant has the burden of proving that Section 1445(c) does not bar removal.

There is little case law on the scope of Section 1445(c) in the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. See generally Armistead v. C & M Transport, Inc., 49 F.3d 43, 46-47 (1st Cir.1995). Under the plain meaning of the statute, where a state legislature enacts a provision within its workers' compensation laws and creates a specific cause of action, a civil action brought to enforce that cause of action is, by definition, a civil action arising under the workers' compensation laws of that state and therefore Section 1445(c) applies. Humphrey v. Sequentia, Inc., 58 F.3d 1238, 1246 (8th Cir.1995). It is undisputed that plaintiff has filed a civil action under Mass. Gen.L. ch. 152, §§ 75A and 75B, the Workers' Compensation Statute. Defendant raises two arguments as to why Section 1445(c) does not strip this Court of subject matter jurisdiction: one procedural and the other substantive.

A. Motion to Remand Untimely Filed

First, defendant argues that plaintiff's motion to remand was untimely filed. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c),¹ a motion challenging subject matter jurisdiction may be made at any time, but objections based on a "defect in removal procedure" must be made within thirty days of the removal. This statute makes a distinction between procedural defects in removal and the lack of subject matter jurisdiction. If a plaintiff finds fault with a procedural element in removal, he has only thirty days in which to make a motion to remand. On the other hand, if he asserts that the federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, he may move to remand at any time before final judgment. The notice of removal was filed on April 17, 1998. Plaintiff's motion to remand was made on May 26, 1998. Defendant argues that plaintiff waived any objection to the lack of removal jurisdiction due to Section 1445(c) by failing to move for a remand within this thirty-day period.

There is disagreement among the courts of appeals on the effect of the Section 1447(c) waiver rule on Section 1445(c). Compare Williams v. AC Spark Plugs Div. of Gen. Motors Corp., 985 F.2d 783, 786 (5th Cir. 1993) (Section 1445(c) should be treated as the embodiment of a procedural defect and, thus, subject to Section 1447(c)'s thirty-day waiver rule) with Hurt v. Dow Chem. Co., 963 F.2d 1142, 1145 (8th Cir.1992) (determining that a failure to object to lack of removal jurisdiction under Section 1441(b) did not operate as a waiver). The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Armistead raised this precise issue as to whether the Section 1447(c) waiver rule governs Section 1445(c), yet declined to rule on it. 49 F.3d at 46-47. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit acknowledged that there was disagreement in the other circuits as to whether Section 1445(c) is subject to the thirty-day waiver rule, but did not reach the issue because the district court in Armistead lacked removal jurisdiction and original diversity jurisdiction. Id. Similar to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Armistead, the Court need not choose between these contradictory views because the Court finds defendant's second argument more persuasive.

B. Complete Preemption Bars Section 1445(c)

Plaintiff argues that so long as a claim arises under a state's workers' compensation laws, as is the case here, Section 1445(c) applies and the action is per se nonremovable. Defendant contends that Section 1445(c) does not operate to preclude federal district court jurisdiction in cases of complete preemption.² There is no controlling authority on this point. However, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and other courts of appeals have hinted that Section 1445(c) does not apply under the complete pre-emption doctrine. See generally Smith v. WGBH Educational Foundation, Inc., 1993 WL 375816 (1st Cir.1993) (unpublished disposition); Humphrey, 58 F.3d at 1246, f. 11. The Court adopts the reasoning of these cases and applies it to the present facts.

The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Smith, an unpublished per curiam opinion,³ discussed a factual situation very similar to the one present in this case. The causes of action in Smith were brought under Sections 75A and 75B, the same sta...