Lyebrook v. Hall

• Decision Date: 03 February 1896
• Citation: 19 So. 348,73 Miss. 509
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: J. A. LYEBROOK ET AL. v. O. V. HALL

19 So. 348

73 Miss. 509

J. A. LYEBROOK ET AL. v. O. V. HALL

Supreme Court of Mississippi

February 3, 1896

October 1895

FROM the chancery court of Copiah county HON. H. C. CONN Chancellor.

This was a proceeding by Mrs. O. V. Hall for the cancellation of a deed made by one Fugate to the defendant, Mrs. J. A Lyebrook, then Mrs. J. J. Cason, on April 8, 1885, as a cloud upon her title to the land in controversy. The bill alleges that complainant's father, in 1857, was seized and possessed of the land; that he died some time during the civil war, at which time he still owned the land, which descended to complainant as his only heir at law; that she the complainant, was in possession at the institution of suit, and had been for some time previous thereto; and that the pretended conveyance of Fugate vested no title in defendant, but was a cloud upon complainant's title. Mrs. Lyebrook answered, denying that complainant was ever in possession, and averring possession by herself from the year 1884 to the date of her answer. She denied that Fugate was without title, and alleged that he acquired a valid title under a sale to the state for taxes in 1882, and further averred that Robinson, the father of complainant, died in 1862, and that his widow, complainant's mother, who became Mrs. Burgess by a second marriage, moved off the land shortly afterwards, and that neither she nor complainant had ever been in possession of the same since; that said land was sold to the state for taxes on May 10, 1875, and that, on March 15, 1878, Z. T. Cason purchased the same from the state, receiving the auditor's deed thereto; that said Cason owned and occupied the land from that time until his death in 1882, after which, J. J. Cason, his brother, took possession of it as one of the heirs of Z. T. Cason, the other heirs releasing all interest in his favor; that, on J. J. Cason's death, the defendant, now Mrs. Lyebrook, with Hooker Cason, the only child of J. J. Cason, inherited the land from him; that J. J. Cason, in his lifetime, allowed the land to be sold for taxes, when Fugate acquired, and afterwards transferred to her, the tax title assailed by the bill. She relied on the tax titles acquired by both Z. T. Cason and Fugate, and also upon the statutes of limitations-- §§ 2669, 2696, code 1880; § 1709, code 1871; § 539, code 1880. Complainant filed an amended bill, making Hooker Cason a defendant, and alleging that the deed of the state to Z. T. Cason conferred no title upon him, for the reason that, in 1871, Mrs. Nancy Wilson bought the land from Mrs. Burgess, complainant's mother, and took possession by virtue of whatever title she might have acquired from her, and remained in possession until January 1, 1877, when she executed a three-year lease to Z. T. Cason, one of the provisions of which was that he should redeem the lands which had been previously sold to the state for taxes and reimburse himself out of the rent; that Z. T. Cason failed to comply with this agreement, and, on March 15, 1878, purchased the land from the state, taking a deed thereto in his own name; that he acquired no title by this purchase, which was a mere redemption inuring to the benefit of Mrs. Wilson and the heirs of J. L. Robinson, complainant's father; that Mrs. Burgess died in 1879, and the title to the land then vested in complainant as the only heir at law of Robinson, the deed of Mrs. Burgess to Mrs. Wilson having only imparted the life estate of the former as dowress. Complainant prayed the cancellation of both the state's deed to Cason and Fugate's deed to Mrs. Lyebrook.

The defendants answered, repeating the answers to the original bill, and relying on the statutes of limitation, already set up, by way of defense. The evidence, though voluminous, relates chiefly to matters not discussed in the opinion, there being little controversy about the facts upon which the decision rests. Decree for complainant, and defendant appealed.

Affirmed.

A. C. McNair, for the appellant.

After his purchase from the state, in 1878, Z. T. Cason held the title as trustee ex maleficio for Mrs. Wilson, but did not so hold it for the complainant, whose tenant he was not, and had never been. Chiles v. Gallegher, 67 Miss. 422; Joor v. Williams, 38 Ib., 546; Brockett v. Richardson, 61 Ib., 766. He could not terminate the relation of landlord and tenant existing between himself and Mrs. Wilson, but she could, and did, by abandoning her estate for the life of Mrs. Burgess, the dowress, who had conveyed to her. Cason did not, at the death of Mrs Burgess, become the tenant at sufferance of complainant, and the statute of limitations having begun to run at the time of his hostile assertion of title in the lifetime of Mrs. Burgess, who was of full age, it did not cease to run against complainant at her death. Cason's possession became adverse when he bought, in 1878, and the statute ran from that date. Holman v. Bonner, 63 Miss. 131; Meridian Land, etc., Co. v. Ball, 68 Miss. 135. Z. T. Cason, after his purchase, claimed to own the land, and it was assessed to him, and his brother, J. J. Cason, who took possession at his death, was under no duty to the complainant, and not disqualified to purchase. Certainly, no privity existed between his widow, Mrs. Lyebrook, and the complainant. The case of Robinson v. Lewis, 68 Miss. 69, does not conflict with the view here presented.

C. E. Hooker, on the same side,

Filed a brief discussing the facts at length, and arguing therefrom that neither the appellant nor Z. T. Cason were under any disqualification to acquire the state's title.

R. P. Willing, for the appellee.

Z. T. Cason, by the plain terms of his lease, being under a duty to redeem the land, his purchase from the state, in 1878, operated as a redemption merely. Black on Tax Titles, §§ 145, 146, 148. The same result would have followed had there been no such provision in view of the relation of landlord and tenant. The same principle governs the title acquired by appellant from Fugate, for both she and her husband, J. J. Cason, were tenants at sufferance, and any purchase by her inured to the benefit of appellee as a redemption. McGehee v. Holmes, 63 Miss. 50. Appellee never had notice of defendant's adverse claim, nor was possession ever surrendered to her by those whose possession was permissive in its inception. Green v. Mizelle, 54 Miss. 225; Holman v. Bonner, 63 Ib., 131; Day v. Cochran, 24 Ib., 261; McGehee v. Holmes, supra. Clearly, the defendants could avail of no statutory limitation of actions. The case of Foster v. Gulf Coast Canning Co., 71 Miss. 624, has no application to the present controversy.

OPINION

WHITFIELD, J.

It might be sufficient to say as to the sale on May 10, 1875 under the abatement act, that the amended bill avers that the lands were not delinquent for any year prior to 1874, and hence not of the class of lands subject to sale under that act; and that the answer to the amended bill does not deny this, and there...