Lyght v. Ford Motor Co., Civ. A. No. 6-72521.
Decision Date | 06 October 1978 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 6-72521. |
Citation | 458 F. Supp. 137 |
Parties | Willis Anderson LYGHT, Plaintiff, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan |
Marvin D. Sharon, Detroit, Mich., for plaintiff.
Kermit G. Bailer, Paul R. Caldwell, Jess Womack, Dearborn, Mich., for defendant Ford Motor Co.
In this suit Willis Lyght, a black man, charges that defendant Ford Motor Company discriminated against him because of his race by failing to promote him from hourly to supervisory status between 1966 and April of 1973.
Until February of 1971 Ford required all supervisors (formerly foremen) to possess a high school diploma or its equivalent. Lyght himself was not considered for promotion for this reason until May of 1970. He claims that because blacks possess high school educations in lesser proportion than whites, this policy operated against him in a prohibited discriminatory fashion.
In May of 1970 Lyght acquired a General High School Equivalency Diploma. In May of 1971 he applied for a foreman's position. He was denied and claims that race was again the reason. Ford counters with the contention that at Lyght's facility, the Northville Valve Plant, no new foremen were hired between the time Lyght applied and April 4, 1973 when he was promoted at the Detroit Engine Plant.
For purposes of this opinion the plaintiff seeks back pay equal to the difference between what he has earned since first being wrongfully denied a promotion and what he would have earned had he been promoted when he should have. However, this case turns upon an important procedural issue that precludes consideration of the merits. The dispositive facts follow.
On January 19, 1973 Lyght filed a complaint (No. 17248-E6) with the Michigan Civil Rights Commission (MCRC) in which he alleged a continuing failure to promote him solely because he is black. The complaint was forwarded by mail to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on January 29 where it received the number TDT3-1035. Pursuant to its standard practice the EEOC deferred the handling of the claim to the MCRC.
The MCRC assigned the case to Maxie Cason, a Field Representative, on March 5, 1973. The Case Chronology reveals that Cason executed his duties diligently, spending many hours interviewing both the claimant and the respondent Ford and engaging in frequent telephone communications with them. It must be concluded that he became thoroughly familiar with the parties' respective desires pertaining to the resolution of the dispute at hand.
With Cason as an intermediary, the plaintiff and defendant worked toward a settlement. Their efforts soon bore fruit. A settlement reflected in the MCRC's adjustment of the dispute was secured. Under its terms Mr. Corsette, Ford's Supervisor of Salary Personnel Training and representative in this matter, agreed on Ford's behalf to allow Lyght to take the test Ford required of and administered to hourly workers who desired to become foremen. Lyght passed the test and on April 23, 1973 was promoted to foreman at the Dearborn Engine Plant, a facility related for some personnel purposes to the Northville plant. Ford also promised to consider Lyght for transfer back to Northville at the earliest opportunity and to increase the number of minority employees in the Northville operation's work force.
The MCRC thereupon prepared a summary and report acknowledging the settlement and closed the case with the notation "Satisfactory Adjustment." A "Notice of Disposition" was written upon which the "Closing Comment" read as follows: The Notice further explained that the value of the adjustment to the complainant was $1710 per annum, the amount of the pay increase attending the promotion.
These comments were, however, for internal use only and did not appear on the copy of the Notice mailed to Lyght. In an affidavit Cason stated that he did not believe that the Closing Comments should necessarily "be interpreted to mean that the claimant considered himself as fully vindicated when the complaint was closed." Lyght makes much of this as indicating that he did not voluntarily settle this claim. He also claims that for this reason he was under no obligation to notify the MCRC that he was not content with the results of its investigation. However, these claims must fail because in the Comments' stead appeared the following excerpt from the Commission's Rules Relating to Reconsideration and Appeal.
Lyght, it is presumed, read these materials, pertaining as they did to a matter of vital concern to him. The record shows, however, that he did not request the MCRC to reconsider its decision to close the case as "adjusted" nor did he manifest dissatisfaction with the settlement either to Ford or to the MCRC.
Illuminating further the circumstances attending the adjustment of Lyght's claim are several other highly pertinent pieces of evidence. On August 24, 1977 Ford deposed Lyght and therein appears the following colloquy. Regarding the results of the MCRC's investigation Lyght stated:
On following pages Lyght makes other statements which inferentially support the conclusion that a final resolution of his case had been effected through the MCRC's efforts and that he viewed it as such.
Lyght contends, however, that he was not satisfied with the adjustment, that he desired back pay at the time the settlement was reached and that this desire continued after the case was closed. Therefore, he claims, he was not party to a voluntary resolution and is not bound by its terms. For the following reasons I conclude that the facts of this case do not support him in this position.
Cason testified that it is the MCRC's standard practice in cases recommended for closing to note the claimant's dissatisfaction with the results of the investigation, if any, on the case file itself. In this case none is so noted; the Closing Comment is directly contrary. The standard practice thus belies his claim in this regard as does the substance of the closing comment itself. Moreover, Lyght's claim that the MCRC is not empowered to award back pay and that this is why he did not pursue the matter further is likewise belied by Cason's testimony that in a proper case the MCRC may order and secure back pay. This testimony is in harmony with Art. 5 § 29 of the Michigan Constitution which gives the MCRC broad powers to remedy claims of race discrimination.
An even more persuasive reason that Lyght's protestations of dissatisfaction with the settlement need not affect my finding that there was a voluntary and final settlement of this claim is apparent in the answer to the following query: What person has not entered into an agreement or bargain with which he was not completely satisfied? The essence of the process of conciliation is that each party must make concessions he wishes were not necessary. In few cases settled before trial do both parties feel complete victory. Though Lyght may have been unhappy with the result of the negotiations, the onus was on him to in some way manifest his dissatisfaction. Without it, his silence for over two years in the face of what appeared to the other parties to be a final and satisfactory resolution of the dispute leads inexorably to the conclusion that Lyght acquiesced in and thereby ratified the adjustment.
The settlement of the first MCRC complaint was not the end of Lyght's efforts through the MCRC to ensure that Ford observed his rights. On October 2, 1973 a second MCRC charge was instituted, alleging Ford had breached one part of its agreement by denying Lyght a transfer from Detroit Engine back to Northville Valve while transferring a similarly situated white employee of lesser seniority. However, Lyght subsequently discovered that the other employee's seniority exceeded his own and that the transfer was therefore proper. Thus, he withdrew the complaint. No mention was made of any unresolved question of back pay stemming from the first complaint. This transaction further evidences that Lyght viewed the adjustment as an agreement to which Ford was required to adhere. It would be inequitable to allow Lyght to enforce the adjustment against Ford but escape its strictures himself.
The only evidence that Lyght manifested any...
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