Lyle v. City of Chicago

• Decision Date: 19 June 1934
• Docket Number: No. 22409.,22409.
• Citation: 357 Ill. 41,191 N.E. 255
• Parties: LYLE, et al., Judges, v. CITY OF CHICAGO et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

357 Ill. 41

191 N.E. 255

LYLE, et al., Judges,

v.CITY OF CHICAGO et al.

No. 22409.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 19, 1934.

Bill by John H. Lyle and others, Judges of the Municipal Court of Chicago, against the City of Chicago and others. Decree for complainants, and defendants appeal directly on a certificate that the validity of a municipal ordinance is involved.

Reversed.

Appeal from Superior Court, Cook County; Denis E. Sullivan, judge.

William H. Sexton, Corp. Counsel, of Chicago (Leon Hornstein, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellants.

James W. Breen, of Chicago, for appellees.

SHAW, Justice.

Appellees, being the chief justice and the associate justices of the municipal court of Chicago, filed their bill and afterwards their amended bill of complaint in the superior court of Cook county seeking by mandatory injunction to compel the city of Chicago, through its mayor, comptroller, treasurer, clerk, and city council, to pay, and to make the necessary appropriations for paying, certain salaries alleged to be due the complainants for the years 1932 and 1933 on the basis of the amounts fixed by statute. It was alleged that the city council had made insufficient appropriations therefor, and that the city officers had neglected, failed, and refused to pay to complainants, and others alleged to have been similarly situated, the full amount due them, ant that, in effect, their salaries had been decreased during the term for which they were elected or appointed, in violation of section 11 of article 9 of the Constitution, General and special demurrers to the bill were overruled, and a decree was entered as prayed. The case is before us on direct appeal; the trial judge having certified that the validity of a municipal ordinance is involved.

It is the first contention of appellants that, where the established distinction between equity and law is still observed, the remedy by injunction and the remedy by mandamus are not correlative and cannot be used interchangeably; that in this jurisdiction there is an adequate remedy at law by way of mandamus, and that, where there is a remedy by mandamus, that remedy must be pursued rather than to seek relief through a court of equity; that an injunction is only called into use to afford preventive relief; and that a mandatory injunction will be employed only in so far as it may necessarily be incident to the granting of affirmative relief to take effect in futuro. If these contentions of appellants are sound and well founded, there can be no possible occasion for considering other errors assigned, and we will therefore give our first consideration to this branch of the case.

Appellees resist the contention of appellants upon this proposition by referring us to the cases of Hunt v. Sain, 181 Ill. 372, 54 N. E. 970;Baumgartner v. Bradt, 207 Ill. 345, 69 N. E. 912;Dorman v. Droll, 215 Ill. 262, 74 N. E. 152;Burrall v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 224 Ill. 266, 79 N. E. 705,8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1091; and Spalding v. Macomb & Western Illinois Railway Co., 225 Ill. 585, 80 N. E. 327. Upon examination we find that the Hunt Case is a case in which a mandatory injunction was issued compelling the removal of an obstruction to drainage, as an incident to enjoining its further obstruction. The Baumgartner Case is the same, and the Dorman Case is similar, in that it requires the reconnection of a tile drain which had been unlawfully disconnected and affirmatively enjoined its future disconnection. The Burrall Case and the Spalding Case are cases in which certain equipment was by mandatory injunction required to be removed from premises claimed by the complainant and its future maintenance thereon enjoined. These cases quite obviously do not reach the point here in question, as complainants are not seeking relief as to a future event, but are seeking only the performance of an act which should have been done, if at all, at a time now gone by. No relief as to the future is asked for or contemplated by the bill in question.

In the case of Cox v. Malden & Melrose Gas Light Co., 199 Mass. 324, 85 N. E. 180, 181,17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1235, 127 Am. St. Rep. 503, the complainant by bill in equity sought to restrain the gas company from continuing to refuse to perform its duty to furnish gas, thus praying, in effect, for a mandatory injunction. It was held in that case that equity had no jurisdiction, and in the course of the opinion Chief Justice Knowlton used the following language: ‘The plaintiffs, upon petition, would be entitled to a writ of mandamus against the defendant, to compel the delivery of gas, in the performance of a quasi public duty under the statute. It does not follow that they can maintain this suit in equity. The remedy at law, already referred to, is perfect. We see no ground for jurisdiction in equity. There is no contract between the plaintiffs and the defendant,...