Lyle v. Desert Springs Hosp.

• Decision Date: 14 December 2012
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:11-CV-00641-KJD-CWH
• Parties: ARDONNA LYLE, Plaintiff, v. DESERT SPRINGS HOSPITAL, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Nevada

ARDONNA LYLE, Plaintiff,

v.DESERT SPRINGS HOSPITAL, Defendant.

Case No. 2:11-CV-00641-KJD-CWH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA

Dated: December 14, 2012

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment(#24).Plaintiff has filed an opposition (#27) and Defendant has filed a reply (#29).

I.Background

PlaintiffArdonna Lyle is an African-American female employed by Desert Springs Hospital ("DSH"), which is part of the Valley Health System.She has been employed since 2006 as a Respiratory Therapist.On October 1, 2008, DSH posted a vacancy for a position as a Supervisory Respiratory Therapist.Plaintiff's supervisor, Richard Savage, Director of Cardiopulmonary, encouraged Plaintiff and other employees to apply.Plaintiff, along with about ten others, applied for the position.The field was narrowed to three candidates, including Plaintiff.Savage asked these three candidates to perform an assignment as part of the selection process.Ultimately, Savagedetermined that the three candidates were not equally qualified and selected Dawn DeYoung.Savage has testified that he selected Ms. DeYoung over Plaintiff because, unlike Plaintiff, DeYoung had a bachelors degree, had prior experience as an EMT that demonstrated certain skills, and had been proactive in her previous position at DSH.DeYoung was offered the job in December, 2008.

About nine months later, on September 21, 2009, Lyle complained to the CEO and a human resources official that she was subjected to disparate treatment and a hostile work environment¹ after being denied the promotion.On September 25, 2009, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC.In addition to not receiving the promotion, Plaintiff alleged that certain conduct by Savage was motivated by racial discrimination, including an audit of her paid time off, removal from various shifts, and denial of a committee assignment.Savage was not aware of Plaintiff's complaints or her EEOC charge.In July, 2010, Savage met with Plaintiff and informed her of complaints made against her by co-workers.One of the complaints was that she"brings up the race card."

Larren Wallace was promoted as Director of Cardiopulmonary in September, 2010.On September 21, 2010, DSH opened a Respiratory Therapist Shift Supervisor position.The position was opened for at least seven days, in accordance with DSH policy.On September 24, 2010, Keirsten Jackson applied for the supervisory position.On October 5, 2010, Wallace selected Ms Jackson for the position.Ms. Jackson had twenty years of experience as a respiratory therapist and had worked at DSH for over five years.After the selection had been made, on October 11, 2010, Plaintiff submitted her application.Wallace was unaware of Plaintiff's Charge of Discrimination or any other complaints of harassment or discrimination until the commencement of this lawsuit.

Between October 2008, and the date the Motion was filed, there have been five Respiratory Therapist Shift Supervisor positions available at DSH.Plaintiff only applied for two of these positions.Further, there have been sixteen Respiratory Therapist Shift Supervisor positions open in other Valley Health System hospitals.Plaintiff has not applied for any of these positions.

II.Discussion

A.Legal Standard for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact.SeeCelotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323(1986).The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts demonstrating a genuine factual dispute for trial.SeeMatsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587(1986);Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

All justifiable inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.SeeMatsushita, 475 U.S. at 587.However, the nonmoving party must produce specific facts, by affidavit or other evidentiary materials similar to those described in Rule 56, to show that there is a genuine dispute for trial.SeeAnderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256(1986).Summary judgment motions can only be defeated by admissible evidence.In re: Oracle Corporation Securities Litigation, 627 F.3d 376, 385(9th Cir.2010)."[U]ncorroborated and self-serving testimony," without more, will not create a "genuine issue" of material fact precluding summary judgment.Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1061(9th Cir.2002)."A conclusory, self-serving affidavit, lacking detailed facts and any supporting evidence, is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact."Nilsson v. City of Mesa, 503 F.3d 947, 952 n. 2(9th Cir.2010)(citation omitted).An affidavit that contradicts the plaintiff's own deposition testimony is not sufficient to defeat summary judgment.Orr v. Bank of America, 285 F.3d 764, 780 n. 28(9th Cir.2002).Furthermore, "when opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment."Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380(2007) Summary judgment shall be entered "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial."Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.Summary judgment shall not be granted if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.SeeAnderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

B.Employment Discrimination

Title VII prohibits employee discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.See42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).To prevail on her Title VII discrimination claim, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination by presenting evidence that "gives rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination."Cordova v. State Farm Ins. Co., 124 F.3d 1145, 1148(9th Cir.1997);seealsoMcDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668(1973).A plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of discrimination through the burden shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas.

Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff carries the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.To establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff must show that: (1)she belongs to a protected class; (2)she was qualified for her position and was performing her job satisfactorily; (3)she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated individuals outside of her protected class were treated more favorably.Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 1089(9th Cir.2008)(citingChuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, 225 F.3d 1115, 1126(9th Cir.2000));seealso, Bodett v. Coxcom, Inc., 366 F.3d 736, 743(9th Cir.2004).The proof required to establish the prima facie case is "minimal and does not even need to rise to the level of a preponderance of the evidence."Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889(9th Cir.1994).

If the plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its allegedly discriminatory conduct.McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.If the defendant provides such a justification, the burden shiftsback to the plaintiff to show that the defendant's justification is a mere pretext for discrimination.Id. at 804.

C.Prima Facie Case

Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff is a member of a protected class, was minimally qualified for the positions for which she applied, and did not obtain the two promotions.Defendant argues that Plaintiff was not treated less favorably than similarly situated individuals outside her class.

"That a non-African-American was ultimately selected for the position and thus treated more favorably than Plaintiff is not, by itself, suggestive of discrimination absent some evidence that Plaintiff and the person selected were similarly situated in material respects."Harris v. City of Fresno, 625 F.Supp.2d 983, 1003(E.D.Cal.2009)(citingMoran v. Selig, 447 F.3d 748, 755(9th Cir.2006))."[I]ndividuals are similarly situated when they have similar jobs and display similar conduct."Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 641(9th Cir.2003).The employees need not be identical; they must simply be similar "in all material respects."Moran, 447 F.3d at 755.

Defendant does not cite, and the Court has not found, any case where a court has analyzed the relative education levels, prior career experience, or leadership factors of co-applicant employees who are otherwise minimally qualified, at this stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework.Generally, cases finding failure to establish a prima facie case demonstrate a stark and recognizable disparity between the employees.SeeNicholson v. Hyannis Air Service, Inc., 580 F.3d 1116, 1126(9th Cir.2009)(reversingdistrict court's determination that employees were not similarly situated based on factors including "personality").Even where courts examine these factors at the prima facie stage, they generally still analyze whether the defendant had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its action.See, e.g.Moran447 F.3d at 756.

Plaintiff argues that she is minimally qualified, held similar position, and did similar work to the employees that were ultimately promoted.Plaintiff claims that this shows she was "similarlysituated" for purposes of establishing a prima facie case.Accordingly, the Court...