Lyles v. City of Philadelphia
| Decision Date | 12 July 1983 |
| Docket Number | 3017 |
| Citation | 9 Phila. 473 |
| Parties | Doris Lyles v. City of Philadelphia, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, and Essie L. Francis |
| Court | Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court |
(1) The $250,000.00 limitation on damages against the Commonwealth as set forth in the Sovereign Immunities Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat Ann. § 8528(b) does not violate Article III, § 18 of the Pennsylvania Constitution since the Sovereign Immunities Act grants plaintiffs a cause of action to which originally they were not entitled
(2) The $250,000.00 limitation on damages as set forth in the Sovereign Immunities Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8528(b) bears some reasonable relationship to a legitimate legislative objective and is, therefore, not violative of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the prohibition against special legislation in Article III § 32 of the Pennsylvania Constitution
(3) Since the $250,000.00 limitation on damages as set forth in the Sovereign Immunities Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8528(b) is constitutional, the motion of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to mold the verdict to $250,000.00 is granted
(4) Delay damages pursuant to Rule 238 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure are not recoverable against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in accordance with § 8528 of the Sovereign Immunities Act.
Stephen M. Feldman, Esquire, for Plaintiff
Gary B. Gilman, Esquire and James R. Ingram, Esquire, for Defendant, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation
A. P. Libetti, Esquire, for Additional Defendant, City of Philadelphia
OPINION
On March 11, 1979, at approximately 4:00 a.m., plaintiff sustained serious injuries when an automobile in which she was a passenger struck a pool of water on the Schuylkill Expressway, went out of control and jumped over a guardrail. Plaintiff was rendered a quadriplegic as a result of the accident.
Plaintiff instituted suit against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, various individual Commonwealth employees (who were subsequently dismissed as party defendants) and the City of Philadelphia. The driver of the automobile, Essie L. Francis, was joined as an additional defendant within the statute of limitations. On April 15, 1982, the Commonwealth made a written offer of settlement in the amount of $250,000, after which plaintiff entered into a Joint Tortfeasor release with the City of Philadelphia for the sum of $500,000 prior to trial (N.T. 3.6). On May 24, 1982, trial began before the Honorable MURRAY C. GOLDMAN and a jury. On June 4, 1982, the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff and against the Commonwealth only in the amount of $750,000 (N.T. 9.39).
Presently, defendant, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania comes before the Court en banc seeking to mold the verdict to $250,000 on the basis of limitations created by the Sovereign Immunities Act, 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8528(b). The Commonwealth also seeks to mold the verdict on the basis of the work-loss benefits provisions of The No-Fault Act. 40 P.S. § 1009.101 et seq. In addition, plaintiff moves this Court for an award of delay damages against the Commonwealth pursuant to Pa. R. Civ. P. 238.
The Commonwealth seeks to invoke the statutory limitation on damages recoverable against the Commonwealth pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8528. [1] In opposition to defendant's motion to mold the verdict to $250,000, plaintiff argues that 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8528 is unconstitutional.
Plaintiff advances two arguments to support her contention that 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8528 fails to meet constitutional muster. First, she maintains that the section violates Article III, Section 18 of the Pennsylvania Constitution because it limits the damages recoverable by victims of torts committed by the Commonwealth. Next, she argues that 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8528 violates the prohibition against special legislation contained in Article III, Section 32 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because it establishes classifications which are " unreasonable and arbitrary and do not rest upon any ground having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, and do not treat similarily circumstanced persons alike." Plaintiff's brief, p. 14.
For the reasons set out below, this Court disagrees with plaintiff's arguments and sustains the constitutionality of Section 8528 of the Sovereign Immunity Act (42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8528).
It is a well-settled principle of law that there is a strong presumption in favor of the constitutionality of lawfully-enacted legislation. " An Act of Assembly will not be declared unconstitutional unless it clearly, palpably and plainly violates the Constitution." Daly v. Hemphill, 411 Pa. 263, 271, 191 A.2d 835, 840 (1963) (emphasis in original). " (T)he burden rests heavily upon the party seeking to upset legislative action on constitutional grounds; all doubt is to be resolved in favor of sustaining the legislation." Milk Control Commission v. Battista, 413 Pa. 652, 659, 198 A.2d 840, 843 (1964). This principle was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Singer v. Sheppard, 464 Pa. 387, 346 A.2d 897 (1975), wherein Chief Justice JONES pointed out in a footnote that:
Although this principle is given in the context of a Pennsylvania case and with respect to the Pennsylvania Constitution, it is, of course equally applicable to the federal constitutional consideration of state legislation. See, e.g., Lehnhauser v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 93 S.Ct. 1001, 35 L.Ed.2d 351 (1973). Singer, 346 A.2d 897, 900 n. 4.
Both parties have carefully considered the historical basis for Article III, Section 18 and the Sovereign Immunity Act, 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8521 et seq. [2] This Court agrees that in order fully to understand these sections and the proscriptions contained therein, some historical background is necessary.
Sovereign immunity, the doctrine that the Commonwealth is immune from liability for tortious conduct unless the legislature has consented to suit, was unequivocally adopted by Pennsylvania courts in 1851 -- the seminal case being O'Connor v. Pittsburgh, 18 Pa. 187 (1851) -- though the section used most often as the basis for sovereign immunity first entered the Pennsylvania Constitution in 1790. [3] The most popular theory of its origin is that sovereign immunity is a carryover from the English doctrine that " the King can do no wrong," that is, the King could not be sued without his consent. Mayle v. Commonwealth, 479 Pa. 384, 388 A.2d 709 (1978), reh. denied, 479 Pa. 411, 390 A.2d 181 (1978). Though the doctrine was often criticized [4] it remained the law until the Pennsylvania Supreme Court abolished it in 1978. [5]
Article I, Section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution [6] provides that:
Suits may be brought against the Commonwealth in such manner, in such courts and in such cases as the legislature may by law direct.
For many years the Supreme Court stated that Article I, Section 11 compels the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Freach v. Commonwealth, 471 Pa. 538, 370 A.2d 1163 (1977); Zerby v. Department of Transportation, 464 Pa. 421, 346 A.2d 914 (1975); Williams v. Commonwealth, 460 Pa. 581, 333 A.2d 924 (1975); Sweigard v. Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, 454 Pa. 32, 309 A.2d 374 (1973); Biello v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board, 454 Pa. 179, 301 A.2d 849 (1973); Brown v. Commonwealth, 453 Pa. 566, 305 A.2d 868 (1973); Meagher v. Commonwealth, 439 Pa. 532, 266 A.2d 684 (1970). However, in Mayle, the Court held that it was not precluded by Article I, Section 11 from abolishing the court declared doctrine of sovereign immunity, and abrogated the doctrine and overruled all inconsistent cases.
Subsequently, the legislature passed Act 152 (Act of September 28, 1978, P.L. 788, § § 1 et seq. ) [7] creating partial sovereign immunity. This Act, including 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8528 is enabling legislation that limits the situations in which suits can be brought against the Commonwealth. It is specifically authorized by Article I, Section 11 as indicated by Section 1 of Act 152 (1 Pa. C.S.A. § 2310) which provides:
Pursuant to section 11 of Article 1 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania, it is hereby declared to be the intent of the General Assembly that the Commonwealth, and its officials and employees acting within the scope of their duties, shall continue to enjoy sovereign and official immunity and remain immune from suit except as the General Assembly shall specifically waive the immunity.
The Act delineates eight specific categories in which trespass suits against the Commonwealth are permitted and allows for recoveries up to $250,000 per plaintiff or $1,000,000 per occurrence. The granting of this limited right of recovery was, at least in part, a result of the legislature's recognition of the hardships imposed by total sovereign immunity and is consistent with the general trend of limiting a state's immunity. Currently, sovereign immunity has been waived to some extent by thirty-four states, twenty-two of which have established damage recovery limitations which have been upheld by appellate courts against claims of unconstitutionality. Defendant's supplemental brief, p. 10.
Article III, Section 18 of the Pennsylvania Constitution [8] states in pertinent part that:
The General Assembly may enact (worker's compensation laws) . . . but in no other cases shall the General Assembly limit the amount to be recovered . . . for injuries to persons . . .
Plaintiff argues that Section 8528 of the...
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