Lyman v. Baker

• Decision Date: 07 December 2018
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 18-10327-PBS
• Citation: 352 F.Supp.3d 81
• Parties: Richard J. LYMAN, William F. Weld, and Robert D. Capodilupo, Plaintiffs, v. Charles D. BAKER, in His Official Capacity as Governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and William Francis Galvin, in His Official Capacity as Secretary of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

352 F.Supp.3d 81

Richard J. LYMAN, William F. Weld, and Robert D. Capodilupo, Plaintiffs,

v.Charles D. BAKER, in His Official Capacity as Governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and William Francis Galvin, in His Official Capacity as Secretary of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 18-10327-PBS

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

Filed December 7, 2018

Allison Vissichelli, James R. Martin, Jennifer Duncan Hackett, Zelle LLP, Amy J. Mauser, Amy L. Neuhardt, Hamish P.M. Hume, James P. Denvir, Karen L. Dunn, Lisa Barclay, Samuel Hall, Boies Schiller Flexner LLP, Joe Robert Caldwell, Jr., Matthew J. Herrington, Roger E. Warin, Zachary B. Schreiber, Steptoe & Johnson LLP, Michael B. DeSanctis, Munger Tolles & Olson, LLP, Washington, DC, David H. Fry, Jacob Max Rosen, Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP, San Francisco, CA, Jack A. Simms, Jr., Karen Shafrir Vladeck, Katherine P. Chiarello, Maria Amelia Calaf, Ryan A. Botkin, W. Reid Wittliff, Wittliff Cutter Austin, PLLC, Marco Guerrero, Mary Whittle, Guerrero and Whittle PLLC, Austin, TX, David Boies, III, Boies Schiller Flexner LLP, Armonk, NY, James D. Gotz, Kreindler & Kreindler LLP, Boston, MA, Seth V. Jackson, Zelle LLP, Framingham, MA, for Plaintiffs.

Robert E. Toone, Jr., Juliana deHaan Rice, Amy Spector, Office of the Attorney General, Boston, MA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Patti B. Saris, Chief United States District Judge

INTRODUCTION

The plaintiffs, two Republicans and one Libertarian, challenge the constitutionality of Massachusetts's system for allocating electors in presidential elections. The plaintiffs have voted and plan to continue voting in Massachusetts for presidential candidates who are not members of the Democratic Party. They allege that their votes for these candidates are effectively discarded because Massachusetts has adopted a "winner-take-all" ("WTA") system for selecting electors. In this system, the candidate receiving the most votes in Massachusetts is awarded all of the Commonwealth's electors, with the other candidates receiving no electors. The plaintiffs seek a declaration that this system violates the United States Constitution -- both the "one person, one vote" principle rooted in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (Count I) and the voters' freedom of association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments (Count II). In their view, the Constitution requires a "more equitable" method for distributing electors, one that allocates electors proportionately to parties.

The Complaint seeks a declaration that the WTA system is unconstitutional and a corresponding injunction. It also asks the Court to impose a deadline by which state authorities must implement a valid method of selecting electors.

The defendants have moved to dismiss based on Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. After hearing, the Court concludes that the Massachusetts winner-take-all system of selecting electors in presidential elections is constitutional. The motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 21) is ALLOWED.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are drawn from the Complaint.

I. The Parties

Plaintiff William F. Weld is a registered Libertarian and the former Republican Governor of Massachusetts. Plaintiffs Richard J. Lyman and Robert D. Capodilupo are registered Republicans. All three plaintiffs are Massachusetts residents. They have consistently voted for non-Democratic candidates for president, and they intend to continue to do so in future presidential elections.

Defendant Charles D. Baker is the Governor of Massachusetts. Defendant William Francis Galvin is the Secretary of the Commonwealth, and his office administers elections. Both are sued in their official capacities.

II. Winner-Take-All Selection of Electors

Massachusetts, along with 47 other states and the District of Columbia, has adopted statutes under which its electors for president and vice president are appointed on a winner-take-all ("WTA") basis. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 54, § 118 (stating that electors "who have received the highest number of votes ... shall ... be deemed to be elected"). Under this system, the political party of the candidate who receives the most votes in Massachusetts appoints all of the Commonwealth's electors. See id. For example, in 2016, Secretary Hillary Clinton received 60 percent of the votes in Massachusetts and all of its electors. President Donald Trump received 32.8 percent of the Massachusetts vote, but none of its electors.

The end result of the WTA system is that the top vote-getter receives all of the Commonwealth's electors, and the other candidates receive no electors. This is true regardless of whether the winning candidate earns a majority or a mere plurality of the popular vote. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 54, § 118 (requiring governor and secretary of state to collect names of presidential electors who receive more than one-fifth of entire number of votes cast for electors and deeming the highest vote-getter the winner). And it applies regardless of whether the candidate wins by a large margin or a slim one. See id.

The plaintiffs allege that the WTA system weakens the influence of Massachusetts voters in presidential elections. They claim that the WTA system leads candidates to focus disproportionate attention on "battleground" states that represent only 35 percent of eligible voters nationwide. In addition, they allege that the WTA system facilitates outside interference in presidential elections because a small number of voters in predictable battleground states exert undue influence over the presidential election results.

DISCUSSION

I. Standing

Moving to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), the defendants' attack the plaintiffs' standing to bring this case. To satisfy standing, "[t]he party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing [three] elements." Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact" -- that is, an invasion of a legally protected interest which is both "concrete and particularized," and "actual or imminent," as opposed to "conjectural or hypothetical." Id. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130. "Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of." Id."Third, it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’ " Id. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 43, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976) ).

In their brief, the defendants attacked two of these requirements: injury-in-fact and redressability. At oral argument, the parties agreed that the injury-in-fact analysis overlaps with the merits of the plaintiffs' constitutional claims. In other words, if WTA is unconstitutional, then the plaintiffs have suffered an injury-in-fact; otherwise, they have not. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 2.3.2 (4th ed. 2003) (describing how, in some cases, "deciding whether there is an injury to a legally protected constitutional interest ... requires inquiry into the merits of the case").

Accordingly, the Court will proceed directly to analyzing the plaintiffs' constitutional claims under the well-established standard for Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must analyze whether the complaint contains sufficient factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

II. "One Person, One Vote" Claim

The plaintiffs assert that Massachusetts's WTA system for allocating electors violates the "one person, one vote" principle. The defendants argue that this claim is foreclosed by binding Supreme Court precedent. They also argue that even without this precedent, the WTA system does not violate "one person, one vote" because it does not weigh votes in a disparate or arbitrary fashion. The Court agrees with the defendants on both points.

A. Constitutional Backdrop

The United States Constitution provides for election of the president and vice president by electors. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1. It provides that "[e]ach State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors." Id. The number of electors for each state is equal to the sum of its United States Senators and Representatives. See id.

The method by which the electors select the president and vice president is set forth in the Twelfth Amendment. See U.S. Const. amend. XII. The Twelfth Amendment also provides for the election of the president by the House of Representatives and the vice president by the Senate when no majority is obtained in the electoral college. Id. It has long been observed that the "electoral college was designed by men who did not want the election of the President to be left to the people." Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 376 n.8, 83 S.Ct. 801, 9 L.Ed.2d 821 (1963) ; The Federalist No. 68 (Alexander Hamilton) (describing philosophy behind electoral college).

B. The Williams Decision

In Williams v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 288 F.Supp. 622 (E.D. Va. 1968), aff'd, 393 U.S. 320, 89 S.Ct. 555, 21 L.Ed.2d 517 (1969), a three-judge panel of the district court rejected a constitutional challenge to Virginia's WTA system for selecting electors in a statewide general election. 288 F.Supp. at 629. The plaintiffs argued that the WTA system was unfair because it accorded no representation among the electors to the minority of voters. Id. at 623. The plaintiffs in that case specifically pressed the argument, among others, that the WTA system "violates the ‘one-person, one-vote’ principle of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, i.e., the weight of each...