Lyman v. Lyman

• Decision Date: 30 June 1928
• Docket Number: 198
• Citation: 143 A. 200,293 Pa. 490
• Parties: Lyman, Appellant, v. Lyman et al
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

143 A. 200

293 Pa. 490

Lyman, Appellant, v. Lyman et al

No. 198

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

June 30, 1928

Argued May 8, 1928

Appeal, No. 198, Jan. T., 1928, by plaintiff, from declaratory judgment of C.P. Potter Co., Sept. T., 1927, No 33, for defendants, in case of W. L. Lyman v. Arthur M. Lyman et al. Reversed.

Petition for declaratory judgment. Before HECK, P.J.

The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.

Judgment for defendants. Plaintiff appealed.

Error assigned was judgment, referring to record.

The judgment entered by the court below is set aside, at cost of plaintiff.

A. N Crandall, for appellant. -- The devise to the appellant in this case comes within the rule in Shelley's Case as adopted by the courts of this State: Stout v. Good, 245 Pa. 383; Swank's Est., 270 Pa. 395; Martin v. Grinage, 289 Pa. 473; Garver v. Clouser, 218 Pa. 611; Lee v. Sanson, 245 Pa. 392; Harrison v. Harris, 245 Pa. 397; Grimes v. Shirk, 169 Pa. 74; Criswell's App., 41 Pa. 288.

The words "legal representatives," as descriptive of the remaindermen here, are synonymous with "heirs": Lesieur's Est., 205 Pa. 119; Ware v. Fisher, 2 Yeates 578; Com. v. Bryan, 6 S. & R. 81; Bair's Est., 255 Pa. 169; Troxell's Est., 90 Pa.Super. 533; Conrow's App., 3 Penny. 356; Shapley v. Diehl, 203 Pa. 566; Stout v. Good, 245 Pa. 383; Physick's App., 50 Pa. 128; Reiff v. Pepo, 290 Pa. 508; Yarnall's App., 70 Pa. 335.

No printed brief for appellee.

Before MOSCHZISKER, C.J., FRAZER, WALLING, SIMPSON, KEPHART, SADLER and SCHAFFER, JJ.

OPINION

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE MOSCHZISKER:

The court below entered a judgment under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act of June 18, 1923, P.L. 840; plaintiff has appealed.

Lewis W. Lyman died testate in August, 1900; by his will he gave certain real estate to plaintiff as follows: "I give, devise and bequeath to my son, William L. Lyman [several properties, describing them]. All of said lots are devised to my said son William L. Lyman, for and during the term of his natural life, and from and after his death, I devise and bequeath the same to his heirs or legal representatives."

William L. Lyman, the plaintiff, has no children or issue; the petition prayed that a judgment be entered declaring that the above item of his father's will vests in him a fee simple title to the properties described. The right to such an order was denied by other children of testator, defendants in this proceeding, who, in the absence of issue of William L. Lyman, may become his heirs, and who alleged that the testamentary clause in question creates a life estate only.

It is well established in Pennsylvania that, "When a life estate is devised to a person, and in the same will an estate is limited 'mediately or immediately to his heirs in fee or in tail, . . . "the heirs" are words of limitation, not of purchase,' and the devise to the first taker is enlarged to a fee": Stout v. Good, 245 Pa. 383, 385. "Technical words shall be taken to have been used according to their proper technical sense, unless the other parts of the will imperatively require a different one": Doebler's App., 64 Pa. 9, 15. We held in Lesieur's Est., 205 Pa. 119, 122, that the phrase "legal representatives," when used with reference to real estate, is "to be construed as equivalent to the word 'heirs'"; and, as just noted, that word, in a will, is presumed to be meant in its technical sense, as one of limitation, unless there is something else in the instrument which shows that it was intended in another sense: Swank's Est., 270 Pa. 395, 396. Here, the will not only lacks an indication that the word "heirs" was meant in other than its legal sense, but followed as it is by the expression "or legal representatives," these latter words reinforce the presumption, flowing from the use of the technical word "heirs," that testator intended the ancestor of such heirs as a source of inheritable succession, the heirs representing by succession their ancestor, the first devisee.

The court below, however, took another view, and, in holding that plaintiff had but a life estate, said: "If, as is contended by the petitioner, the words 'heirs or legal representatives,' are . . . words of limitation, and, under the rule in Shelley's Case, vest in William L. Lyman a fee in the land, then [the] provision [containing them] . . . could have been omitted entirely from the will, in so far as it is taken as expressing any purpose on the part of the testator." The answer to this position is: The same thing might be said of every devise to a man and his heirs, -- that, unless the "heirs" were treated as purchasers, the word could be eliminated "so far as expressing any purpose on the part of the testator." But, as already suggested and as held in the authorities, the purpose expressed by such words as are here used is that testator intends the first devisee, even though named by him as a life tenant (Grimes v. Shirk, 169 Pa. 74, 89), to take as a source of inheritable succession; and, under the rule in Shelley's Case, the expression of such a purpose creates a fee. This rule, as said in Bassett v. Hawk, 118 Pa. 94, 107, is "so thoroughly fixed in our law, and upon it depends so many valuable land titles, that it would be a very serious breach of our judicial duty to even hesitate to enforce it." The court below concluded that the testamentary clause before us expressed an intention that those who may hereafter be ascertained to be the heirs of William L. Lyman should take a remainder directly from the testator, and that Lyman himself possessed only a life estate, having previously inserted in its opinion the following excerpt from Stout v. Good, supra: "If the words of the will show that the testator intended the remainderman to take directly from him and not by inheritance from the devisee of the life estate, then the rule [in Shelley's Case] has no application (Kemp v. Reinhard, 228 Pa. 143); on the other hand, if they show a contrary intention, the rule applies (Lauer v. Hoffman, 241 Pa. 315)."

The Kemp Case, cited above, is typical of other cases of its kind; there the will showed that the word "heirs" was used to express an intention that definite persons were to take, after the first devisee, directly from the testator in order to start a new line of succession. Both the particular devise there before the court for construction and other parts of the will showed testator's intention not to give a fee to the individual named as life tenant, and that, at the end of the life estate, the remainder should pass directly from testator to a designated class; the words of devise and the will as a whole were essentially different from those now before us. Under the present will, the heirs of the first named devisee...