Lyme Timber Co. v. DSF Investors LLC
| Decision Date | 17 February 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 2003–312.,2003–312. |
| Citation | 842 A.2d 115,150 N.H. 557 |
| Parties | THE LYME TIMBER COMPANY & a. v. DSF INVESTORS LLC & a. |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
Daschbach, Cooper, Hotchkiss & Csatari, P.A., of Lebanon (Joseph F. Daschbach on the brief and orally), for the plaintiffs.
Upton & Hatfield, LLP, of Concord (Russell F. Hilliard and Lauren S. Irwin on the brief), and Todd & Weld LLP, of Boston, Massachusetts (Howard M. Cooper on the brief and orally), for the defendants.
The defendants, DSF Investors LLC and Arthur Solomon (collectively, DSF), appeal an order of the Superior Court (Burling , J.) denying their motion to dismiss an action filed by the plaintiffs, The Lyme Timber Company and Lyme NC LLC (collectively, Lyme), for lack of personal jurisdiction. We affirm and remand.
This action arises out of the negotiation of a proposed real estate development deal between DSF and Lyme. DSF Investors LLC is a real estate investment company based in Massachusetts. Its founder is Arthur Solomon. The Lyme Timber Company, LLC is a New Hampshire limited partnership with its principal place of business in Lyme, New Hampshire. Lyme NC LLC is a Delaware company that was formed to participate in the proposed deal between DSF and Lyme.
The proposed deal involved redevelopment of the New England Confectionary Company (Necco) factory building in Cambridge, Massachusetts. The parties began negotiating in the summer of 2001. Although they now disagree as to its enforceability, they entered into a preliminary agreement entitled, "Term Sheet." The Term Sheet contained a provision which stated that neither party would incur any obligation to the other until definitive, binding legal documents were executed and delivered. Before a final agreement was reached, DSF terminated negotiations with Lyme.
DSF filed a declaratory judgment action in Massachusetts seeking a ruling that the Term Sheet precluded binding legal obligations and claims. DSF's suit was not served on Lyme immediately. Unaware of the pending action, Lyme filed suit against DSF in New Hampshire several weeks later, asserting claims that included misrepresentation and entitlement to a partnership accounting, among others. DSF moved to dismiss the New Hampshire action based upon lack of personal jurisdiction.
After a hearing, the superior court denied DSF's motion, finding that Lyme had met its burden of establishing personal jurisdiction based upon a prima facie evidence standard. This appeal followed.
The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating facts sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. Staffing Network v. Pietropaolo, 145 N.H. 456, 457, 764 A.2d 905 (2000). The plaintiff need make only a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts to defeat a defendant's motion to dismiss. Metcalf v. Lawson, 148 N.H. 35, 37, 802 A.2d 1221 (2002). Where a prima facie evidence standard is employed, we review a trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction de novo . See, e.g., Jet Wine & Spirits, Inc. v. Bacardi & Co. Ltd., 298 F.3d 1, 6–7 (1st Cir.2002).
Determining whether a defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction involves a two-part inquiry. Metcalf , 148 N.H. at 37, 802 A.2d 1221. Id. (brackets omitted). Because we construe the State's long-arm statute as permitting the exercise of jurisdiction to the extent permissible under the Federal Due Process clause, our primary analysis relates to due process. Id.; see also Dagesse v. Plant Hotel, N.V., 113 F.Supp.2d 211, 215 (D.N.H.2000).
"[A] court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant if the defendant has certain minimum contacts with the forum such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Id. (quotation omitted). "Jurisdiction can be ‘general,’ where the defendant's contacts with the forum State are ‘continuous and systematic,’ or ‘specific,’ where the cause of action arises out of or relates to the defendant's forum-based contacts." Staffing Network , 145 N.H. at 458, 764 A.2d 905 (quotation omitted). In this case, Lyme asserts that specific jurisdiction applies. Where specific contacts with the forum are the basis for personal jurisdiction, whether those contacts are constitutionally sufficient requires an analysis of the relationship between the defendant, the forum and the litigation. Alacron v. Swanson, 145 N.H. 625, 628, 765 A.2d 1043 (2000). The inquiry focuses not only upon whether the defendant's contacts might have caused injury in New Hampshire, but whether the contacts should have given the defendant notice that he or she should reasonably have anticipated being haled into court here. Id.
In determining if the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction comports with due process, we examine whether: (1) the contacts relate to the cause of action; (2) the defendant has purposefully availed [him or] herself of the protections of New Hampshire law; and (3) it would be fair and reasonable to require the defendant to defend the suit in New Hampshire.
Metcalf , 148 N.H. at 37, 802 A.2d 1221. Each factor must be evaluated on a case by case basis, and all three factors must be satisfied in order for the exercise of jurisdiction to be constitutional. Id. at 37–38, 802 A.2d 1221.
Lyme asserts that the first due process element is met because its claims arise out of DSF's forum-based contacts. Lyme alleges in its complaint and affidavits that DSF directed many telephone calls, letters, faxes and e-mails regarding the proposed deal to Lyme in New Hampshire, and that the communications encompassed those that form the basis of Lyme's claims, including statements that the parties were very close to a final contract, that a partnership had come into being and that the written agreements were a mere formality.
The second prong is whether DSF purposefully availed itself of the privileges and protections of New Hampshire law. Lyme asserts that DSF's physical presence in New Hampshire was unnecessary as long as its contacts were "sufficient to have reasonably foreseeable consequences within the forum State." See Staffing Network , 145 N.H. at 459, 764 A.2d 905. Lyme argues it was foreseeable that if DSF directed misrepresentations to Lyme in New Hampshire during the course of negotiations, it could be held accountable here. See VDI Technologies v. Price, 781 F.Supp. 85, 89 (D.N.H.1991). Lyme has further alleged that the harm arising from DSF's tortious conduct was felt in New Hampshire where, as DSF knew or should have known, Lyme is principally based. Id. at 90.
In connection with the third due process inquiry, Lyme argues that it is fair and reasonable to require DSF to defend this suit in New Hampshire. Lyme correctly notes that this last inquiry requires the court to consider factors, including:
the burden on the defendant, the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies, and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.
Staffing Network , 145 N.H. at 459, 764 A.2d 905.
Lyme argues that DSF would not be burdened by the amount of travel involved, and that New Hampshire has a significant interest in affording New Hampshire plaintiffs a convenient forum in which to seek redress for their injuries. Phelps v. Kingston, 130 N.H. 166, 175, 536 A.2d 740 (1987). Lyme further notes that it has been based in New Hampshire for twenty-five years, its principal witnesses are located here and that a significant amount of information related to the case is located in New...
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