Lynam v. Foot First Podiatry Centers, PC

• Decision Date: 12 March 1996
• Docket Number: No. 94 C 6789.,94 C 6789.
• Citation: 919 F. Supp. 1141
• Parties: Julie LYNAM, Robin Schmulbach, and Jenny Lucchesi, Plaintiffs, v. FOOT FIRST PODIATRY CENTERS, P.C., Foot First Podiatry Centers, III, P.C., Foot First Podiatry Centers, IV, P.C., Foot First Podiatry Centers, V, P.C., Keith Sklar, Arthur Wilhelm, and Daniel Stojanovski, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

919 F. Supp. 1141

Julie LYNAM, Robin Schmulbach, and Jenny Lucchesi, Plaintiffs, v. FOOT FIRST PODIATRY CENTERS, P.C., Foot First Podiatry Centers, III, P.C., Foot First Podiatry Centers, IV, P.C., Foot First Podiatry Centers, V, P.C., Keith Sklar, Arthur Wilhelm, and Daniel Stojanovski, Defendants.

No. 94 C 6789.

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

March 12, 1996.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Clare Marie Kralovec, Nash, Lalich & Kralovec, Chicago, IL, Aram A. Hartunian, Futterman & Howard, Chtd., Chicago, IL, James Gerard Bradtke, Jennifer Kay Soule, Soule & Bradtke, Chicago, IL, Stephen G. Seliger, Mary Lane Mikva, Seliger & Mikva, Ltd., Chicago, IL, for Julie Lynam, Robin Schmulbach, Jenny Lucchesi.

Carmel M. Cosgrave, Michael S. Loeffler, Andrew S. Nadolna, Querrey & Harrow, Ltd., Chicago, IL, Thomas P. Carney, Jr., Querrey & Harrow, Ltd., Chicago, IL, for Foot First Podiatry Cleaners, P.C., Foot First Podiatry Centers III, P.C., Foot First Podiatry Centers, IV, P.C., Foot First Podiatry Centers V, P.C., Keith Sklar, D.P.M., Arthur Wilheim, D.P.M., Daniel Stojanovski, D.P.M., Timothy Lantvit, D.P.M., Ronald Lieb, D.P.M.

Michael T. Roumell, Tracey Lynne Truesdale, Murphy, Smith & Polk, Chicago, IL, Carmel M. Cosgrave, Michael S. Loeffler, Andrew S. Nadolna, Thomas P. Carney, Jr., Querrey & Harrow, Ltd., Chicago, IL, for Foot First Podiatry Centers II, P.C.

Michael T. Roumell, Tracey Lynne Truesdale, Murphy, Smith & Polk, Chicago, IL, for Michael Warheit, D.P.M.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

CASTILLO, District Judge.

This is a sexual harassment case in which plaintiffs Julie Lynam ("Lynam"), Robin Schmulbach ("Schmulbach"), and Jenny Lucchesi ("Lucchesi") allege violations of Title VII against defendants Foot First Podiatry Centers, P.C., Foot First Podiatry Centers, III, P.C., Foot First Podiatry Centers, IV, P.C., and Foot First Podiatry Centers, V, P.C. (collectively referred to herein as "corporate defendants"), (Count I). In addition, plaintiffs Lynam and Schmulbach bring a state-law assault and battery claim against individual defendants Keith Sklar ("Sklar"), Arthur Wilhelm ("Wilhelm"), and Daniel Stojanovski ("Stojanovski") (collectively referred to herein as "individual defendants"), alleging unlawful touching by these defendants during the plaintiffs' employment (Count II). Before the Court are two motions for partial summary judgment, one brought by the corporate defendants as to Count I (sex discrimination), and the other brought by the individual defendants as to Count II (assault and battery). For the reasons set forth below, the corporate defendants' motion for partial summary judgment as to Count I is denied and the individual defendants' motion for partial summary judgment as to Count II is granted.

BACKGROUND

The following undisputed facts are gleaned from the parties' respective Local General Rule 12 statements of material facts and accompanying exhibits.¹ Plaintiffs Lynam, Schmulbach, and Lucchesi were employed as medical assistants at various Foot First Podiatry Centers in the Chicago suburban area during the relevant time period of August of 1990 to May of 1993. Plaintiffs bring this action against their former employer's corporate form and three of its medical doctors.

The facts surrounding this lawsuit have already been reviewed by this Court in Lynam v. Foot First Podiatry Centers, P.C., 886 F.Supp. 1443 (N.D.Ill.1995) ("Lynam I") and will be repeated here only to the extent they are relevant to this opinion. Plaintiff Lynam was employed with the Foot First enterprises from July 26, 1990 through November 3, 1992. During her employment, Lynam primarily worked at Foot First I in Schaumburg.² (Ind.Defs.' Facts ¶ 3). Schmulbach was employed from November of 1990 through May of 1993 and worked at both Foot First I and III locations. (Id. ¶ 4). Lucchesi was employed from October of 1992 through March of 1993 and worked at the Foot First III location. (Id. Facts ¶ 5). All three plaintiffs allege that they were discharged from Foot First Podiatry Centers because they would not participate in or encourage the sexually offensive behavior of the individual defendants.

Defendant Sklar is President and Secretary of the four Foot First corporate defendants named in this suit. (Corp.Defs.' Facts ¶ 7). In Lynam I this Court, applying Seventh Circuit law, held that the supervisors at Foot First Podiatry Centers could not be found individually liable under Title VII. Lynam I at 1446. See also Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552, 554-55 (7th Cir.1995).

The Court also dismissed plaintiffs' assault and battery claim to the extent that it was premised on sexual touching and thus preempted by the Illinois Human Rights Act. Lynam I, 886 F.Supp. at 1448-50. Plaintiffs were allowed to proceed with Count II (assault and battery claim) based on allegations of non-sexual touching. Id.

ANALYSIS

Summary Judgment Standards

Summary judgment is proper only if the record shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A genuine issue for trial exists only when "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The court must view all evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 822 F.2d 656, 659 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 977, 108 S.Ct. 488, 98 L.Ed.2d 486 (1987), and draw all inferences in the nonmovant's favor. Santiago v. Lane, 894 F.2d 218, 221 (7th Cir.1990). However, if the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative or merely raises "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," summary judgment may be granted. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. at 2510-11; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Flip Side Productions, Inc. v. Jam Productions, Ltd., 843 F.2d 1024, 1032 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 909, 109 S.Ct. 261, 102 L.Ed.2d 249 (1988). In making its determination, the court's sole function is to determine whether sufficient evidence exists to support a verdict in the nonmovant's favor. Credibility determinations, weighing evidence, and drawing reasonable inferences are jury functions, not those of a judge deciding a motion for summary judgment. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513.

Count I: Title VII Claim

The corporate defendants contend that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' Title VII claim because they collectively do not constitute an "employer" for Title VII's purposes. This defense requires this Court to address the single vs. multiple employer concepts under Title VII. Title VII defines an "employer" as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year." 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e(b). A "person" under section 2000e(b) includes corporations. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1988).

This circuit recognizes an "integrated enterprise" theory in defining the term "employer" under Title VII. Under this theory, legally separate corporations or individuals may be treated as one organization when the multiple entities are so interrelated that an aggrieved employee could justifiably believe that an individual or corporation related to the employee's immediate employer was jointly liable for the acts of the employer. See United States E.E.O.C. v. Sen-Pop, Inc., 1994 WL 162611 (N.D.Ill.1994) (citing Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1337 (6th Cir.1983)).

To determine whether several corporations constitute a single employer, the Seventh Circuit in Rogers v. Sugar Tree Products, Inc., 7 F.3d 577 (7th Cir.1993),³ looked to several factors: (1) the interrelation of operations between the entities; (2) the degree of common management; (3) the degree of centralized control of labor relations and personnel; and (4) whether there is common ownership and financial control. Id. at 582 (citing York v. Tennessee Crushed Stone Ass'n, 684 F.2d 360, 362 (6th Cir.1982), which, in turn, borrowed from Radio & TV Broadcast Technicians Local 1264 v. Broadcast Serv. of Mobile, Inc., 380 U.S. 255, 256, 85 S.Ct. 876, 877, 13 L.Ed.2d 789 (1965)). The Seventh Circuit in Rogers also recognized that while the presence or absence of any one factor is not determinative as to whether multiple entities constitute a "single employer" for Title VII purposes, "control over the elements of labor relations is a central concern." Id. See also Richard v. LeSalle Talman Bank, 1995 WL 234633 (N.D.Ill.1995) (citing Mochelle v. J. Walter, Inc., 823 F.Supp. 1302, 1305 (M.D.La.1993), aff'd, 15 F.3d 1079 (5th Cir.1994)).

1. Interrelationship of Operations

First, with regard to the interrelationship of the named corporate defendants, we find that many of the practices cited by other courts to show interrelated operations are present here. These practices include shared management services, shared payroll and insurance programs, the preparation of mutual policy manuals, the use of employees on one payroll for the benefit of another entity, and the shared use of office space. United States E.E.O.C. v. Sen-Pop, Inc., 1994 WL 162611 (N.D.Ill.1994) (citing Stockett v. Tolin, 791 F.Supp. 1536, 1551 (S.D.Fla. 1992)). In this case, all of the Foot First corporate defendants offered the same services (Pls.' Add'l Facts ¶ 15), shared the same profit sharing plan (Id. ¶ 18), and listed the same address on their 1992 and 1993 Federal Income Tax Returns (Id. ¶ 19). Indeed, the same patient could be seen by a doctor at any of the different Foot First locations. (Sklar Dep. at 23). Moreover, the doctors and medical assistants themselves...