Lynch-Davidson Motors v. Griffin, LYNCH-DAVIDSON
Decision Date | 25 February 1965 |
Docket Number | No. F-469,LYNCH-DAVIDSON,F-469 |
Citation | 171 So.2d 911 |
Parties | MOTORS, a corporation, Appellant, v. Norman Delano GRIFFIN, a minor, et al., Appellees. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Howell, Kirby, Montgomery & Sands, Jacksonville, for appellant.
Marion R. Shepard, Mathews, Osborne & Ehrlich, Jacksonville, for appellees.
This appeal is of a summary final judgment rendered in favor of appellees in a suit brought by appellant for indemnity. By its action appellant sought to recover the full amount of a judgment rendered against it as the result of a motor vehicle collision which occurred at a time when the minor appellee was operating a motor vehicle owned by appellant. The facts of the case are not in dispute, nor is the question of law presented for our decision.
From the stipulation of facts signed by the parties and filed in the cause it is agreed that on February 22, 1959, Norman Delano Griffin, then age 16, appeared at the used car lot operated by Lynch-Davidson Motors in Jacksonville, Florida. Young Griffin had saved some money and wanted to buy a car. His purpose in going to the lot was to find a suitable used car which he could afford. He went there without his parents' knowledge or consent but in the hope that if he could find a suitable car he might be able to persuade his parents to permit him to buy it. Young Griffin was met at the lot by one R. C. Croft, an employee of Lynch-Davidson. Mr. Croft was interested in selling an automobile and helped the boy find one that he particularly liked. A demonstration drive was suggested and so young Griffin drove the car out of the lot with Mr. Croft sitting beside him. A few blocks from the used car lot young Griffin collided with another automobile, injuring its driver.
Following the accident, suit was filed against Lynch-Davidson and young Griffin alleging that the accident was caused by the negligence of young Griffin in driving the automobile owned by Lynch-Davidson. At the trial of this cause plaintiff took a nonsuit as to young Griffin and received a verdict against Lynch-Davidson.
Prior to the accident mentioned above, Universal Underwriters had issued a policy of liability insurance to Lynch-Davidson insuring that company against liability for bodily injury and property damage . The insurance company was promptly notified of the accident and undertook an investigation. In connection with the investigation the company filed the appropriate SR-21 form with the Financial Responsibility Division of the office of the State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner in which form Universal Underwriters stated: 'Our policy applies to the owner of the vehicle, but does not apply to the operator of the vehicle involved in the accident.'
Universal Underwriters was also promptly notified of the filing of the suit against Lynch-Davidson and young Griffin and retained attorneys to provide a defense for Lynch-Davidson. Universal Underwriters did not provide any defense for young Griffin. The judgment recovered against Lynch-Davidson was paid by Universal Underwriters which company also paid the cost of defense and certain other claims which were asserted growing out of the accident. Lynch-Davidson paid no part of any of the claims or of the judgment or of the cost of defense.
This cause was instituted by Universal Underwriters in the name of its insured, Lynch-Davidson, against young Griffin and his parents, seeking to recover indemnity for the payments which it had made allegedly resulting from the negligence of young Griffin in driving the automobile. Any recovery made by the plaintiff will inure wholly to the benefit of Universal Underwriters.
One of the defenses asserted by young Griffin is that he was within the coverage of the insurance policy, entitled to its protection, and that since the insurance company is the real party in interest, it may not recover from him the very sum which it was obligated to pay on his behalf. The insurance company, of course, contends that young Griffin was not covered by the insurance policy and that he is therefore liable by way of indemnity to the insurance company for the sums which it paid resulting from his primary fault.
The policy of automobile liability insurance issued to appellant by the use plaintiff, Universal Underwriters, purported to extend insurance coverage only to appellant who was named as the insured therein, and to other specified classes of persons particularly described in the definitions provision of the policy. There is no controversy that the minor appellee, Norman Delano Griffin, does not fall within the various classifications of persons defined by the insurance policy as insureds thereunder. The primary question presented for adjudication is whether the minor appellee was, by operation of law, within the coverage of the liability insurance policy issued appellant by Universal Underwriters. The parties agree that if minor appellee was within the coverage of that policy of insurance, then appellees were entitled to judgment as a matter of law and, in that event, all other issues in the cause would be rendered moot and the decision of the trial court should be affirmed. The answer to the primary question hereinabove stated turns on a determination as to whether the terms and provisions of the financial responsibility law of 1955 1 shall be read into and adjudged to be part of the terms and provisions of the insurance policy under consideration.
The automobile liability insurance policy issued appellant by Universal Underwriters contains the following provision, to wit:
Appellant contends that the insurance coverage afforded by the policy extends only to those named as insureds therein, and does not extend to the minor appellee who was a permissive user of the vehicle at the time of the collision which resulted in the judgment for which indemnity is sought. Appellant further contends that the provisions of the financial responsibility law of Florida are not applicable to the insurance policy involved herein for the reason that the requirements of that law become applicable only after the insured has once been involved in an automobile collision and the insured's policy is thereafter certified by the insurer as proof of the insured's financial responsibility for the future. Appellant cites respectable authority from other jurisdictions to support this position, although some of the decisions cited are from jurisdictions where the statutes differ in material respects from the one in effect in this state. 2
Appellant urges the proposition that under the law of Florida an owner of a motor vehicle and a liability insurance company are free to contract with respect to insurance coverage, and to limit or restrict the coverage afforded by the policy in any manner they see fit. It argues that it is not until after the owner of such motor vehicle has his first accident that the financial responsibility law comes into effect and thereafter requires liability insurance policies issued to the insured to meet the minimum requirements of the law. In support of the first proposition so urged by appellant it cites as authority this Court's decision in the case of Carter v. National Automobile Ins. Co., 3 and the Supreme Court's decision in Jefferson Insurance Company v. Fischer. 4 It must be observed, however, that in neither the Carter case nor the Fischer case was the point now presented for our decision either raised or passed upon. In reaching our decision in the case sub judice we do not intend to recede from or disagree with anything said either in Carter or Fischer.
Appellant recognizes that the decision rendered by the Third District Court of Appeal in the case of Howard v. American Service Mutual Insurance Co. 5 appears to support the summary final judgment from which this appeal is taken, but...
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