Lynch ex rel. Lynch v. Alabama

Decision Date24 July 2008
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 08-S-450-NE.
PartiesIndia LYNCH, by her parent, Shawn King LYNCH, et al., individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. The State of ALABAMA; Bob Riley, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Alabama; and Tim Russell, in his official capacity as Commissioner of Revenue for the State of Alabama; Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama

Edward Still, James U. Blacksher, Birmingham, AL, Robert D. Segall, Shannon L. Holliday, Copeland Franco Screws & Gill PA, Montgomery, AL, for Plaintiffs.

David A. Perry, Drayton Nabers, Jr., James L. Mitchell, John D. Bethay, III, Maynard Cooper & Gale PC, John B. Tally, Jr., Rumberger Kirk & Caldwell PA, Birmingham, AL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

C. LYNWOOD SMITH, JR., District Judge.

This case is a sequel to the long-running, higher-education desegregation action filed in this District in 1981.1 See Knight v. Alabama, 628 F.Supp. 1137 (N.D.Ala.1985) ("Knight I"), rev'd 828 F.2d 1532 (11th Cir.1987) ("Knight II"), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210, 108 S.Ct. 2857, 101 L.Ed.2d 894 (1988), on remand, 787 F.Supp. 1030 (N.D.Ala.1991) ("Knight III"), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, vacated in part, 14 F.3d 1534 (11th Cir.1994) ("Knight IV"), on remand, Knight v. Alabama, 900 F.Supp. 272 (N.D.Ala.1995)("Knight V"). See also Knight v. Alabama, 458 F.Supp.2d 1273, 1277 (N.D.Ala.2004) ("Knight VI"), aff'd, 476 F.3d 1219 (11th Cir.) ("Knight VII"), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 3014, 168 L.Ed.2d 728 (2007).

The plaintiffs in the original action claimed that the State of Alabama had failed to complete the desegregation of its colleges and universities, and that "many of the State's policies governing higher education tended to perpetuate its formerly de jure segregated university system." Knight VII, 476 F.3d at 1220. After ten years of litigation, including two bench trials, the district court issued a lengthy and complex opinion finding liability. See Knight II, 787 F.Supp. at 1030. In 1995, following the Eleventh Circuit's review of that opinion, the district court entered a remedial decree ordering numerous changes in Alabama's higher education policies, and retained jurisdiction to monitor the State's progress. See Knight V, 900 F.Supp. at 272. The parties were informed that the district court expected to return control of the college and university systems to the State in 2005. See id. at 374.

Before that date was reached, however, the plaintiffs filed a motion requesting additional relief in the form of "an injunction ordering Alabama to adequately fund its system of lower [i.e., K-12] education." Knight VI, 476 F.3d at 1223 (emphasis in original). The following six provisions embedded in Alabama's 1901 Constitution were the focus of those plaintiffs' claims for additional relief:2

(1) Article XI, section 214, as amended, which limits the rate of ad valorem taxation3 the Alabama legislature may place on taxable property;4

(2) Article XI, section 215, as amended, which limits the rate of ad valorem taxation counties may place on taxable property;5

(2) Article XI, section 216, as amended, which limits the rate of ad valorem taxation municipalities may place on taxable property;6

(4) Article XIV, section 269, as amended, which limits the rate of ad valorem taxation counties may place on taxable property for the benefit of public education, and which further requires approval of those property taxes by the voters in a referendum election;7

(5) Amendment 325, which changed the language of Article XI, § 217 of Alabama's 1901 Constitution in order to establish three classes of property for purposes of ad valorem taxation lower assessment ratios, require voter approval of all property tax increases, and establish a cap (or "lid") on total ad valorem taxes;8 and

(6) Amendment 373, which further changed the language of Article XI, § 217, as previously revised by Amendment 325, in order to establish four classifications of property subject to taxation, further lower assessment ratios, establish the socalled "current use" method of property assessment, and establish lower caps (or "lids") on total ad valorem taxes.9

After a thorough review of the factual and legal history of the foregoing provisions, the district court held that "the current ad valorem tax structure is a vestige of discrimination inasmuch as the constitutional provisions governing the taxation of property are traceable to, rooted in, and have their antecedents in an original segregative, discriminatory policy." Knight VI, 458 F.Supp.2d at 1311. Even so—and despite finding that "the current tax structure in Alabama cripples the effectiveness of state and local governments in Alabama to raise funds adequate to support higher education," id. (emphasis supplied)—the district court concluded that

the relationship between the funding of higher education and f[u]nding of K-12 is marginal insofar as ad valorem property tax is concerned. Put differently the effect of the state's inability to raise revenue due to the challenged constitutional provisions is simply too attenuated to form a causal connection between the tax policy, and any segregative effect on school [i.e., college] choice.

Id. at 1312 (emphasis supplied).10

The plaintiffs appealed that decision, but were rebuffed by the Eleventh Circuit, which "agree[d] with the district court that plaintiffs' present claim is fundamentally about reforming Alabama's K-12 school funding system, and not about [the focus of the case during the preceding fifteen years of litigation: i.e.,] desegregating its colleges and universities." Knight VI, 476 F.3d at 1223 (emphasis supplied). Nevertheless, and importantly, the Eleventh Circuit's opinion did not foreclose the possibility of a separate action, specifically aimed at those constitutional provisions constraining the extent to which the State of Alabama, its counties, municipalities, and school districts fund public education from pre-school and kindergarten programs through high school. Thus came the present suit, which now is before this court on defendants' multifaceted motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.11 Before reaching the issues raised in those motions, the court pauses to set the scene.

The plaintiffs in the present action are a group of African American ("black") and Caucasian ("white") public school students who bring this putative, state-wide class action by and through their parents, all of whom reside in either Lawrence County or Sumter County, Alabama.12 Plaintiffs allege that they "are injured by the racially discriminatory property tax restrictions in the Alabama Constitution, which impede their ability and the ability of their elected representatives to raise state and local revenues adequately to fund the public services they need, including public education."13 As redress for those grievances, plaintiffs ask this court to enter a judgment declaring that the property tax restrictions embedded in Alabama's 1901 Constitution violate Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq., and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, "and to [fashion] a prohibitory injunction against their future enforcement."14

Plaintiffs fully recognize that, if such an injunction should be entered, the immediate effect would be a tremendous increase in property taxes in the State of Alabama.15 Plaintiffs are not deterred by that possibility. Indeed, they make quite plain that they seek the invalidation of the state constitutional provisions described above, no matter the cost, but suggest that the court could stay enforcement of the prohibitory injunction for a period of one year, to permit state lawmakers "an opportunity" to adopt an appropriate, and constitutionally sound, alternative property tax scheme.16 Defendants construe this invitation for legislative involvement as a concession that full relief cannot be obtained from this court; and—citing other factors that allegedly diminish plaintiffs' interest in having the subject state constitutional provisions stricken—argue that plaintiffs lack standing to bring this suit. Defendants also argue that the remedies plaintiffs request are prohibited by the Tax Injunction Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1341. Finally, defendants suggest that the judicial principle of "comity" divests this court of subject matter jurisdiction. Each of these arguments will be addressed in the following sections.

I. STANDING

"Standing frequently has been identified by both justices and commentators as one of the most confused areas of the law." Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 2:3, at 57 (5th ed.2007). "Many exasperated courts and commentators have ... [complained] that [the] standing doctrine is no more than a convenient tool to avoid uncomfortable issues or to disguise a surreptitious ruling on the merits." Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, 13 Federal Practice & Procedure: Jurisdiction § 3531 (2d ed.2006) (footnote omitted).

In light of this persistent confusion and consternation, it is helpful to "begin with the most basic doctrinal principles: Article III, § 2, of the Constitution restricts the federal `judicial Power' to the resolution of `Cases' and `Controversies.'" Sprint Communications Co., L.P. v. APCC Services, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 2531, 2535, 171 L.Ed.2d 424 (2008) (citing Daimler-Chrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 126 S.Ct. 1854, 164 L.Ed.2d 589 (2006)).17 "One element of that `bedrock' case-or-controversy requirement is that plaintiffs must establish that they have standing to sue." McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93, 225, 124 S.Ct. 619, 157 L.Ed.2d 491 (2003) (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818, 117 S.Ct. 2312, 138 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997)).

Standing is essential because "[t...

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