Lynch v. Astrue
Decision Date | 13 January 2010 |
Docket Number | No. C08-4090-MWB.,C08-4090-MWB. |
Citation | 687 F. Supp.2d 841 |
Parties | Christine A. LYNCH, Plaintiff, v. Michael J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of West Virginia |
David A. Scott, Cornwall Avery Bjornstad Scott, Spencer, IA, for Plaintiff.
Martha A. Fagg, U.S. Attorney's Office, Sioux City, IA, for Defendant.
TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION 844 A. Procedural Background 844 B. Factual Background 845 1. Introductory Facts and Lynch's Hearing Testimony 845 2. Lynch's Medical History 847 3. Vocational Expert's testimony 856 4. The ALJ's decision 857 II. LEGAL STANDARDS 859 III. PRELIMINARY MATTER: ADEQUACY OF LYNCH'S OBJECTION 862 IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS 863 A. Lynch's Subjective Complaints 864 B. Limitations From the Functional Capacity Evaluation 865 V. CONCLUSION 866
On May 10, 2005, plaintiff Christine Lynch filed applications for Title II disability insurance1 and Title XVI supplemental security income benefits2, alleging a disability onset date of September 1, 2004. In her application, Lynch claimed that she was disabled due to hepatitis C, peripheral edema, and chronic pain. According to Lynch, she suffers from swelling in her feet after standing for any length of time, back pain, and abdominal pain. Lynch's applications were denied initially and on reconsideration. An Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") held a hearing, as requested, on Lynch's claims on May 4, 2007. The ALJ issued a decision on August 28, 2007, which found that Lynch cannot return to any of her past relevant work but retains the functional capacity to perform other work—the ALJ found that Lynch was not disabled. On August 22, 2008, the Appeals Council denied Lynch's request to review the ALJ's decision, and this denial constituted a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner").
On October 20, 2008, Lynch filed a complaint in this court seeking review of the Commissioner's decision (docket no. 2)— the case was referred to Chief United States Magistrate Judge Paul A. Zoss for a report and recommendation, in accordance with Administrative Order # 1447.
On March 6, 2009, Lynch filed her Brief and Argument of Plaintiff (docket no. 10). In her brief, Lynch argued that the ALJ should have believed her testimony that she could only work part-time and could only stand for ten minutes at a time. Based on those limitations, the vocational expert ("VE") found that Lynch would be unable to perform any past or other fulltime work. Lynch also claimed that the ALJ improperly failed to consider her splints, carpal tunnel symptoms, and diminished sensation in finding that she was not disabled. Lynch argues that a Functional Capacity Evaluation ("FCE"), which recognized the alleged diminished sensation in her hands, determined that she could perform less than Sedentary Physical Demand Level for work above the waist, and determined that she had No Ability Demand Level for work below the waist.
On May 21, 2009, the Commissioner filed Defendant's Brief (docket no. 13). The Commissioner claimed that the ALJ's decision to deny benefits should be affirmed because there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the following findings: (1) that Lynch did not have medically determinable impairments that could reasonably be expected to produce all of her alleged limitations— the Commissioner specifically claims that there is no objective evidence of carpal tunnel syndrome; (2) that Lynch's description of her limitations was not credible and not supported by (and was inconsistent with) the record as a whole, and (3) that Lynch retained the functional capacity to perform activities consistent with competitive work—the Commissioner claims that the ALJ was not required to rely entirely on the FCE's finding that Lynch was unable to perform some sedentary work.
On December 4, 2009, Judge Zoss issued a report and recommendation (docket no. 15), which noted the ALJ's exhaustive review of Lynch's medical records in supporting his assessment of Lynch's credibility and found that the ALJ's decision to deny Lynch benefits was supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.
On December 18, 2009, Lynch filed her Objections to Report and Recommendation (docket no. 16), which contains one objection to Judge Zoss's Report and Recommendation. Lynch objects to Judge Zoss's finding that the ALJ's decision to deny benefits is supported by substantial evidence and identifies several pages that allegedly form the basis for her objection.
On December 22, 2009, the Commissioner filed Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Objections to the United States Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation (docket no. 17). According to the Commissioner, Lynch's Objections to Report and Recommendation fails to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, because the one and only objection Lynch asserts fails to make reference to any specific portion of the Report and Recommendation nor specify the basis for the objection. Instead, the Commissioner claims that Lynch only generally objects to Judge Zoss's ultimate recommendation.
In Judge Zoss's Report and Recommendation, he made the following findings of fact:
1. Introductory Facts and Lynch's Hearing Testimony
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