Lynch v. Baxley

• Decision Date: 14 December 1974
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 74-89-N.
• Citation: Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F.Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974)
• Parties: Jean P. LYNCH, Individually and on behalf of all persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs, Jesse M. Hughes, Intervening Plaintiff, v. William J. BAXLEY, Individually and as Attorney General of the State of Alabama, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

386 F. Supp. 378

Jean P. LYNCH, Individually and on behalf of all persons similarly situated, PlaintiffsJesse M. Hughes, Intervening Plaintiff, v.William J. BAXLEY, Individually and as Attorney General of the State of Alabama, et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 74-89-N.

United States District Court, M. D. Alabama, N. D.

December 14, 1974.

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Edward Still, Birmingham, Jack Drake, Drake, Knowles & Still, Tuscaloosa, Ala., for plaintiff.

Robert D. Segall, Hobbs, Copeland, Franco & Screws, Montgomery, Ala., for intervening plaintiff.

William J. Baxley, Atty. Gen., and Frank P. Ralph, Asst. Atty. Gen. of Ala., Montgomery, Ala., for defendantWilliam J. Baxley.

George B. Azar, Azar Campbell & Azar, Montgomery, Ala., for defendantPerry Hooper.

William J. Baxley, Atty. Gen., of Ala., and Robert L. Humphries, Asst. Atty. Gen., of Ala., Dept. of Mental Health, for defendantsTaylor Hardin and Fred L. Huggins.

Before RIVES, Circuit Judge, and JOHNSON and VARNER, District Judges.

JOHNSON, District Judge:

The named plaintiff and intervening plaintiff,¹ suing on their own behalf and as representatives of a class composed of persons who are now, or who may be, involuntarily civilly committed in Alabama, seek to have three statutes² authorizing involuntary commitment declared unconstitutional on their face and as applied and to have their enforcement enjoined.

This action arises under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.Plaintiffs invoke the jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983and28 U.S.C. § 1343(3).

The defendants are the Attorney General of the State of Alabama; the Commissioner of the Department of Mental Health of the State of Alabama; and the Probate Judges of Montgomery County, Alabama, and Clarke County, Alabama, individually and as representatives of all other judges of probate in the State of Alabama.

Because an injunction was sought against statutes of statewide application whose constitutionality was at issue, plaintiffs requested that a three-judge court be convened.A survey of the pertinent case law indicated that the complaint raised a substantial constitutional question, Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30, 54 S.Ct. 3, 78 L.Ed. 152, (1933), but that the defense of the constitutionality of the statutes was neither frivolous nor foreclosed by prior decisions of the United States Supreme Court, Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 82 S.Ct. 549, 7 L. Ed.2d 512(1962).Consequently, a three-judge court was constituted pursuant to the requirements of 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281and2284.

The case is submitted upon the pleadings, briefs, stipulations, and documentary evidence.All parties are in agreement that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to involuntary commitment proceedings, Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 608, 87 S.Ct. 1209, 18 L.Ed.2d 326(1967);Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 520(5th Cir.1974), and that certain minimal constitutional standards and safeguards must be observed throughout the commitment process.Whereas plaintiffs argue that the statutes in question are unconstitutional both on their face and as applied, defendants maintain that they are constitutional on their face but concede that they may have been applied unconstitutionally in some cases.There being substantial controversy concerning the specific minimal standards and safeguards mandated by the Due Process Clause, the parties in this case join in requesting this Court to determine those constitutionally required standards and safeguards.

I.

From the pleadings and stipulations in this case, it appears that plaintiffJean P. Lynch, a resident of Montgomery County, was arrested by the Montgomery County Sheriff's Department on November 2, 1973, pursuant to a warrant issued that date by the defendant Probate Judge of Montgomery County under the authority of Ala.Code, tit. 15, § 432(1958).Said warrant was sworn out by one Theresa Lynch, daughter of the named plaintiff, who averred that plaintiff"is at large and not under the control, restraint or management of any person, and that she is not able to restrain or manage said person, and that it is necessary for his sic own and the public good that she be restrained and an inquisition proceedings had to determine whether or not she should be committed to an insane hospital."

On the same day the warrant was issued, inquiry was made by the probate court³ as to the availability of facilities at Bryce Hospital for the accommodation of plaintiff, who was at that time confined in the Montgomery County Jail.Also on the same day an order was issued by the probate judge directing the Sheriff to summon six (6) jurors at 2:00 p. m. that day to determine whether "the said Jean P. Lynch is so deficient mentally that she should be committed to an insane hospital."At the appointed time, a hearing was held, and the jury returned a verdict that plaintiff was "sufficiently defective mentally to be sent as a patient to a hospital for insane persons."It is undisputed that plaintiff was not present at the hearing, that she was not represented by counsel, and that she was not advised of any right to the presence of counsel and the appointment of counsel if indigent.On November 6, 1973, plaintiff was ordered committed to Bryce Hospital by the defendant Probate Judge of Montgomery County under the authority of Ala.Code, tit. 45, §§ 208and211.Plaintiff remains at this date an involuntary patient in Bryce Hospital.

The parties have entered into the following stipulations regarding the procedures ordinarily followed in the course of involuntary civil commitments in Alabama:

1.The individual who is the subject of the commitment proceeding is given no notice of hearing, is not present during the hearing, is not informed of his/her right to counsel, and is not appointed counsel if indigent.

2.The defendant Probate Judge of Montgomery County, as well as certain other judges of probate, empanels a jury composed of six (6) persons to determine if the subject of an involuntary commitment proceeding should be committed to a state mental hospital.

3.The defendant Probate Judge of Clarke County, as well as certain other judges of probate, does not empanel a jury in civil commitment proceedings.

4.The only standard which is charged to the jury (if there is a jury) and which is applied by the trier of fact (judge or jury) is that contained in Ala.Code, tit. 45, § 205:

A person shall be adjudged insane who has been found by a proper court sufficiently deficient or defective mentally to require that, for his own or others' welfare, he be moved to the insane hospital for restraint, care and treatment.

II.

This action is properly maintainable as a Rule 23(b)(2) class action because defendants are alleged to have taken action or refused to take action with respect to the plaintiff class as a whole, and final relief of an injunctive and a declaratory nature, settling the legality of the behavior with respect to the class as a whole, is appropriate.SeeAdvisory Committee Note toRule 23(b)(2).As a practical matter, it is immaterial that certain potential class members may be satisfied with their present status and indifferent as to the constitutionality of the statutes herein attacked.If the statutes are declared unconstitutional, all those similarly situated will be equally affected.The fact that each member of the class is subject to the same deprivation of constitutional rights as the representative parties is sufficient to fulfill the representation requirements of Rule 23(a)(3) and (4).Sullivan v. Houston Independent School District, 307 F.Supp. 1328, 1338(S.D. Tex.1969).Thus, assuming, as the dissent does, that there may be members of the class who would not benefit by the effect of a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Alabama's civil commitment statutes, this is not determinative of plaintiffs' representative status.Davy v. Sullivan, 354 F.Supp. 1320, 1326(M. D.Ala.1973).

III.

This Court concludes from the evidence presented that the named plaintiff and members of the class she represents have been involuntarily civilly committed to Bryce and Searcy Hospitals as a result of proceedings and procedures which do not comport with the minimum requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.Specht v. Patterson, supra.

We further conclude and declare that Ala.Code, tit. 15, § 432(1958), which provides for emergency detention in the county jail or state mental hospitals, and Ala.Code, tit. 45 § 210(1958), which outlines certain procedures for involuntary commitment to such hospitals, are unconstitutional on their face because they purport to authorize ex parte and summary deprivation of liberty without any of the rudimentary protections long recognized as required by the due process of law.Unlike our dissenting brother, we find it unnecessary to reach the question of whether these particular statutes might be saved by excising from them certain constitutionally offensive words and phrases.On the contrary, we are compelled to hold each violative of the Fourteenth Amendment on account of the absence of the substantial procedural protections constitutionally required, as well as because of the offending provisions present in the statutes.

While recognizing that Ala. Code, tit. 45, § 208(1958), like the other statutes herein attacked, may have been applied unconstitutionally on occasion, we perceive no facial infirmity with respect to Title 45, Section 208, nor anything constitutionally offensive with respect to the authority therein conferred upon the probate judges of Alabama.

IV.

This Court shall now proceed to set forth those standards and safeguards which, at a minimum, the Due Process Clause requires for the protection of persons whose liberty is placed in...