Lynch v. Belden and Co., Inc., 88-2171
| Decision Date | 16 August 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 88-2171,88-2171 |
| Citation | 882 F.2d 262 |
| Parties | 50 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1259, 51 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 39,248 George LYNCH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BELDEN AND COMPANY, INC., Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
John O. Moss, Moss & Walton, Indianapolis, Ind., for George Lynch.
Jay R. Larkin, Douglas J. Heckler, William E. Roberts, Barnes & Thornburg, Indianapolis, Ind., for Belden and Co., Inc.
Before FLAUM, RIPPLE and KANNE, Circuit Judges.
George Lynch brought this action against his employer, Belden and Company (Belden), under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981 1 alleging that Belden had discriminated against him because of his race by denying him promotions and transfers and by subjecting him to racial harassment. The case was tried before a jury, and, on May 16, 1988, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Belden. Mr. Lynch appeals, contending that the district court improperly instructed the jury. We now affirm.
Mr. Lynch, who is black, has been employed by Belden at its Richmond, Indiana plant since 1968. 2 Since 1976, Mr. Lynch has held the position of Electrician in Belden's machine shop. The job classification of Electrician is one of several "skilled trades" positions in the machine shop at Belden's plant. Other skilled trades positions include Electronic Technician, Millwright, Pipefitter, Lathe Operator, Machinist, and Tool and Die Maker.
Mr. Lynch contends that Belden discriminated against him in a number of ways. On December 7, 1981, Mr. Lynch applied for the position of Boiler Room Operator. He maintains that Belden refused to promote him to this position solely because of his race. Similarly, on several occasions between 1973 and 1986, Mr. Lynch sought promotion to the position of Electronic Technician. He maintains that white employees with less experience than he has were placed in the positions for which he applied. Mr. Lynch also alleges that, in 1982 and 1983, he requested transfers from one position with Belden to another. He maintains that, although he was qualified for each of the positions that he sought, his transfer requests were denied solely because of his race. See R.8 at 2 (Plaintiff's Statement of Contentions). Finally, Mr. Lynch contends that he was subjected to racial harassment. He presented testimony that he was given heavy work assignments in hot and dirty worksites more frequently than were white employees, that Evelyn Sellers, a black Electronic Technician apprentice, was instructed not to ask him for assistance when similar instructions were not given to white employees, and that his supervisor followed him closely around the plant. Mr. Lynch maintains that white employees were not treated in a similar fashion.
Belden introduced evidence to rebut each of Mr. Lynch's claims. James Bright, Belden's machine shop and maintenance manager, testified that the Boiler Room Operator position was first offered to a black employee, who declined the job because he had decided that it would interfere with his weekend recreational activities. The job was next offered to, and accepted by, a white employee. Mr. Lynch was ranked second from last on a list of applicants for the job prepared by Belden management. The list rankings were based on the applicants' mechanical or pipefitter knowledge and their absenteeism and tardiness records.
Mr. Bright also testified that Mr. Lynch was unqualified for the position of Electronic Technician. In order to qualify for the position, an applicant was required to have had, among other things, two years' experience as an electronic technician. Mr. Lynch claimed that he had satisfied this requirement since he had repaired radios and televisions in his basement. However, he did not have a license to operate a TV repair business, as required by state law, and he was unable to produce tax records indicating that he had derived any income from operating a repair business in his home. The company also presented testimony that, each time Mr. Lynch applied for an Electronic Technician position, white employees were also rejected as nonqualified and that the applicant selected in each instance met the qualifications listed in the position's job description.
With regard to Mr. Lynch's allegation of racial harassment, Belden presented testimony that every other electrician in Mr. Lynch's department had been assigned to the undesirable jobs complained of by Mr. Lynch. In addition, Mr. Lynch's supervisor denied that he had ever "followed" Mr. Lynch around the plant. Rather, supervisors routinely circulate in the plant and take appropriate disciplinary action when necessary. Finally, Mr. Lynch's supervisor testified that Evelyn Sellers was instructed not to ask Mr. Lynch for assistance because she was being "pushed out of the nest" as part of her apprenticeship program. See Tr. (Defendant's Case-In-Chief) at 155.
Mr. Lynch contends that the district court erred in instructing the jury in this case. His arguments are based on two instructions, Instructions No. 11 and No. 12. Instruction No. 11 reads as follows:
For the purposes of this case, 42 U.S.C., Section 1981 entitles a black person to equal opportunity and treatment in employment. Thus, when an employer fails to promote a black person because of that person's race, the law has been violated and the black person may file suit and recover damages.
In order for a plaintiff to establish his claim, plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant had a racially discriminatory purpose or motive in employment decisions with regard to the plaintiff.
The mere fact that the plaintiff is black and was also not promoted in his employment is not sufficient in and of itself to establish plaintiff's claim. To prove that defendant acted unlawfully, plaintiff must prove that it is more likely than not that his race was a reason the defendant failed to promote him. It need not have been the only reason.
In order for the plaintiff to recover on his claim against the defendant, the plaintiff must prove the following essential elements by a preponderance of the evidence:
First: that defendant intentionally discriminated against plaintiff; that is, plaintiff's race was a motivating factor in defendant's decision not to promote the plaintiff; and
Second: as a direct result of such discrimination, plaintiff sustained damages.
Tr. (Court's Instructions and Objections Thereto) at 10-11. Mr. Lynch objected to this instruction on the ground that it did not refer to his transfer claim or his harassment claim and thus left the impression that Mr. Lynch could only recover if he proved that he was not promoted as a result of discrimination. See id. at 28-29.
Instruction No. 12 reads as follows:
To prove intentional discrimination, plaintiff need not prove that his race was the sole motivation or the primary motivation for defendant's employment decision. Also, plaintiff is not required to produce direct evidence of unlawful intent. It is not easy to prove motive directly because there sometimes is no way to fathom or scrutinize the operations of the human mind. Intentional discrimination, however, if it exists, is a fact which you may infer from the existence of other facts.
With respect to each of plaintiff's claims, in deciding whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff because of his race, you should first consider whether plaintiff has established the following elements:
First that George Lynch is black;
Second, that George Lynch was satisfactorily performing his job;
Third, that he was denied certain job assignments and promotional opportunities;
Fourth, the employer, Belden, chose white persons with similar qualifications or qualifications not equal to plaintiff's to perform the jobs; and
Fifth, that George Lynch was damaged as alleged in his complaint.
If you find that plaintiff has proved each of these elements, then plaintiff has proved a prima facie case. A prima facie case means that the plaintiff has sufficiently established his cause of action by a preponderance of the evidence and is entitled to a verdict in his favor unless defendant rebuts such evidence.
Thus, it then becomes your duty to determine the second issue, namely, did the defendant introduce evidence showing that there was a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason why it did not promote or transfer plaintiff. If your answer on this second issue is yes, that defendant has articulated or stated his legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its failure to promote or transfer the plaintiff, then you should decide in favor of the defendant, unless the plaintiff has also proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's articulated legitimate nondiscriminatory reason is a pretext, disguising an underlying intent to discriminate on the basis of race.
Id. at 11-13. Mr. Lynch objected to this instruction on the ground that it erroneously instructed the jury that Belden could overcome Mr. Lynch's prima facie case, which he argues was established by direct evidence of discriminatory disparate treatment, merely by articulating a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Id. at 26.
Both Instruction No. 11 and Instruction No. 12 are based on instructions tendered by Mr. Lynch himself. See R.43 (Plaintiff's Jury Instructions No. 1 & No. 3). In addition, Mr. Lynch tendered, and then withdrew, two instructions informing the jury that it could conclude that Belden discriminated against him if it found that Belden failed to promote or transfer him because of his race or subjected him to racial harassment. See R.50 (Plaintiff's Supplemental Jury Instructions No. 14 & No. 17). At oral argument, Mr. Lynch's counsel informed us that these instructions were withdrawn because he had reached an "understanding" with the district judge that each of the claims ...
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