Lynch v. Brown

Decision Date09 April 1986
Docket NumberNo. BE-338,BE-338
Citation11 Fla. L. Weekly 823,489 So.2d 65
Parties11 Fla. L. Weekly 823 Martin Jeffrey LYNCH, Appellant, v. Alice Clapp BROWN, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Patrick H. Perry, of Avera, Berstein & Perry, Gainesville, for appellant.

Marilyn R. McLean, of Jones & Carter, P.A., Gainesville, for appellee.

ZEHMER, Judge.

Martin Jeffrey Lynch, plaintiff below, appeals from a final summary judgment in favor of Alice Clapp Brown, defendant below. Lynch sought recovery for injuries sustained when he allegedly fell from an outside staircase landing while visiting a friend's apartment in a building owned by Brown. We reverse and remand for trial.

Brown argues that, as a matter of law, Lynch was a licensee and, therefore, Brown's duty was limited to not intentionally exposing him to harm and to warning him of known dangers not open to ordinary observation, citing Wood v. Camp, 284 So.2d 691 (Fla.1973). Since Lynch admitted in his affidavit that he had been told the stairs were dangerous, Brown argues she did not breach any duty to appellant.

We cannot accept Brown's argument that Wood v. Camp, 284 So.2d 691, inflexibly fixes the status of a tenant's guest as a mere licensee as to owner of the premises. Wood stated, in dictum, only that a social guest in an area in which the guest was not invited, nor where one would customarily go, is a licensee. In the instant case, it was not established as a matter of law that Lynch was a licensee. The record contains evidence that Lynch was invited by the tenant to come on the premises, and invited social guests of tenants are generally classified as invitees of the owner of the premises. See, e.g., Berlin v. Southgate Corp., 142 So.2d 362, (Fla. 3d DCA 1962); 41 Fla.Jur.2d, Premises Liability, § 8 (1983). Under the circumstances, Lynch's status was that of an invitee unless competent evidence is presented to dispute that Lynch was invited by the tenant, in which case his status would be a disputed question of fact. Wood v. Camp, 284 So.2d 695, 696.

There is also a factual question, which precludes summary judgment, as to the extent of Lynch's knowledge and appreciation of the dangerous condition. Brown contends that, even if Lynch was an invitee, her only duty was to warn of the dangerous condition; and since Lynch knew of the condition, that duty was satisfied. But this argument does not recognize that a landowner owes an invitee alternative duties: one, the duty to use ordinary care in keeping the premises in a reasonably safe condition, and, two, the duty to give notice or warning of any latent perils known or which should be known to the owner, but which are not known to the invitee. See, e.g., Hylazewski v. Wet 'N Wild, Inc., 432 So.2d 1371 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). We agree with Heath v. First Baptist Church, 341 So.2d 265 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967) that in some circumstances the landowner's duty extends beyond mere warning or, as in this case, knowledge by the plaintiff of a dangerous condition. The rule concerning liability for condition and use of land provides:

Known or obvious dangers,

(1) A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused to them by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness. [Emphasis added.]

Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 343A.

Brown's duty to warn under the circumstances was not negated as a matter of law by imputing knowledge to Lynch or implying that Lynch had to know of the dangerous conditions alleged in the complaint. The record contains evidence that the lighting at the stairway and balcony was deficient and did not meet building code requirements; hence, it cannot be inferred as a matter of law that Lynch visually perceived the alleged dangerous conditions of the stairway or of the balcony. Whether Lynch perceived the dangerous conditions complained of, even though he might well have seen them had he looked, has traditionally been a question of fact for the jury, rather than a question of law for the court. See, e.g., Berlin v. Southgate Corp, 142 So.2d 362. Even though Lynch stated in his deposition that someone had told him on a prior occasion that the stairway was unsafe because it tended to sway and that the landlord had been told of this problem, such testimony is not sufficient to establish, as a matter of law, plaintiff's knowledge of all alleged defective conditions. Given the evidence in the record that not only the staircase, but also the landing, did not meet applicable building code requirements relating to the railing height and other design criteria for safety, and that the lighting was deficient and did not meet the building code, the circumstances surrounding plaintiff's fall from the landing on this rainy night leave open genuine issues of fact as to whether Brown breached the duty of care to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition and negligently Since the extent of Lynch's knowledge of the condition and appreciation of the danger is unclear, in these circumstances the trial court could only have characterized his knowledge as comparative negligence in the nature of assumption of risk. Whether Lynch in fact had superior knowledge is a question for the jury, Bennett v. Mattison, 382 So.2d 873 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), and a plaintiff's knowledge of a dangerous condition does not negate a defendant's potential liability for negligently permitting the dangerous condition to exist; it simply raises the issue of comparative negligence and precludes summary judgment. Taylor v. Tolbert Enterprises, Inc., 439 So.2d 991 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).

failed to give adequate warning of a dangerous condition. 1

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

NIMMONS, J., concurs in result with written opinion.

BOOTH, C.J., dissents with written opinion.

NIMMONS, J., concurring in result.

I concur in the result only. I agree with the court's opinion that a jury question was presented on Lynch's status as an invitee versus licensee. See Medina v. 187th Street Apartment, Ltd., 405 So.2d 485 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Manassa v. New Hampshire Insurance Company, 332 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976).

I disagree, however, with the court's opinion that a genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to the question of Brown's liability under that...

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