Lynch v. Cabell
| Decision Date | 22 February 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1:21cv221 (AJT/IDD) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
| Parties | Lester B. Lynch, Petitioner, v. Beth Cabell, Respondent. |
Lester B. Lynch, Petitioner,
v.
Beth Cabell, Respondent.
No. 1:21cv221 (AJT/IDD)
United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Alexandria Division
February 22, 2022
MEMORANDUM OPINION
ANTHONY TRENGA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Lester B. Lynch (“Petitioner” or “Lynch”), a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the validity of his January 5, 2004 convictions in the Circuit Court for the City of Norfolk, Virginia for first-degree murder, robbery, burglary and three counts of use of a firearm in the commission of those felonies. The Respondent filed a Rule 5 Answer and a Motion to Dismiss, with supporting briefs and exhibits, and Lynch has exercised his right to file responsive materials pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975) and Local Rule 7(K) to the motion to dismiss. [Dkt. Nos. 18, 19, 21]. Lynch has also filed a motion to amend his petition and raise “a new claim” that he did not raise in state court and which he admits is “unexhausted” and “procedurally defaulted.” [Dkt. No. 22 at 1-2]. Accordingly, this matter is now ripe for disposition. For the reasons that follow, the respondent's Motion to Dismiss must be granted and the petition will be dismissed with prejudice.
I. Procedural History
A. Trial and Direct Appeal
On May 1, 2003, a jury in the Circuit Court for the City of Norfolk convicted Lynch of first-degree murder, robbery, burglary and three counts of the use of a firearm in the commission
of those felonies. By order dated January 4, 2004, the court sentenced Lynch to a total of 68 years in prison. Commonwealth v. Lynch, Case Nos. CR01-3449-12 through -17.[1]
The Court of Appeals of Virginia granted Lynch an appeal, and after briefing and argument affirmed his convictions. Lynch v. Commonwealth, 617 S.E.2d 399 (Va.App. 2005). Lynch had alleged that “the trial court erroneously admitted an out-of-court statement under the adoptive admission exception to the hearsay rule.” Id. at 400. The Court summarized the evidence at trial as follows:
On June 9, 2001, Belinda Scott was shot and killed inside her home by Lynch, “Tyreke” Williams, and a third unidentified man. After the shooting, Lynch and Tyreke “burst” into a bedroom occupied by Belinda's son, Ronald, and his friend, Tamika Reid. The third man remained outside the bedroom door. Tyreke told Ronald to “get on his knees, ” pointed a gun at him, and told Tamika “not to move.” Tyreke then repeatedly hit Ronald on the head with the gun and took some money out of Ronald's pockets, while Lynch removed heroin and money from a table in the room. The third man eventually told Tyreke and Lynch, “Let's get out of here.” The three men then “ran out of the house.”
Earlier that afternoon, Kenneth Parker was “hanging out” at Tyreke's house with Christopher Tyreke's brother. Kenneth saw Lynch drive up to the house in a black Acura. Tyreke was in the passenger seat. Lynch got out of the car to talk to Christopher, and Tyreke went across the street to get a gun. After he returned, Tyreke agreed to give Kenneth a ride home. Kenneth then got into the Acura with Lynch, Tyreke, and the unidentified third man. However when Kenneth said that he needed to cross the Campostella Bridge, Lynch told him that they were going on a “sting, ” and they needed to “take care of [that] first.” Thus, Kenneth got out of the car, and Lynch told him that they would return in about thirty minutes.
When the three men returned to Tyreke's house, Kenneth noticed that Tyreke was wearing a different shirt and had small bloodstains on his clothing. Tyreke carried something into his house wrapped up in the shirt he had been wearing before the murder. Kenneth followed. After entering the house, Tyreke went directly to an upstairs bathroom, and Kenneth sat in the upstairs den. Lynch did not enter the house immediately, but remained in the driveway speaking to the third man, who was “looking down at the ground like something was really bothering him.”
When Tyreke left the bathroom, he knocked on Christopher's door and told him that “they had just shot a woman.” Kenneth joined the conversation and asked
Tyreke, “man, what you done got yourself into? You-all done shot a woman?” Tyreke responded, “yeah.” Kenneth asked, “where was you-all at?” Tyreke responded, “we went to Little Ronald's house ... to go get him.” Kenneth then asked, “why would you-all go in and try to do something and rob him or whatever when he cool with everybody?” Tyreke then said that he “don't care who I get” because “my light's due, my rent due, my girl getting ready to leave, ” and he was “going to get put out.”
As Kenneth, Christopher, and Tyreke were discussing whether the “skinny lady” who had been shot was Ronald's mother or sister, Kenneth heard someone climbing the stairs. As Lynch reached the top of the stairs, he asked Tyreke “why he was telling [Kenneth and Christopher] what they had just done.” Although Tyreke told Lynch that Kenneth was “cool” and would not tell anyone, Kenneth said he would have “nothing to do with it, ” and left the house. Kenneth called Ronald's cellular phone and spoke with Tamika, who was still hysterical over the events she had just witnessed.
Id. at 400-01. The Court of Appeals found that the Commonwealth had
presented sufficient evidence from which it could be inferred that Lynch overheard at least a portion of the conversation … the trial court could reasonably have inferred that Lynch understood not only the nature of the conversation, but also the fact that he had been implicated in the shooting. Specifically, Lynch entered the conversation and immediately asked, “Why you telling them what we just did?”...[and that] the trial court could reasonably have inferred that Lynch's statement, “Why you tell[] them what we just did?, ” was sufficient to indicate his agreement that he had been involved in the murder. Again, Lynch's use of the word “we” is telling. Rather than stating, “Why you tell[] them what you just did, ” Lynch asked, “Why you tell[] them what we just did?” Ordinarily, an individual accused of murder would take reasonable steps to deny his participation in that murder. Here, however, Lynch did not merely fail to deny his participation in the shooting ― he, by his own words, affirmatively implicated himself. Thus, the trial court could reasonably have concluded that Lynch's statement was sufficient to indicate his agreement that he had been involved in the murder.
Id. at 404-05. The Supreme Court of Virginia granted Lynch an appeal on the same evidentiary issue, but affirmed his convictions. Lynch v. Commonwealth, 630 S.E.2d 482 (Va. 2006).
B. First Habeas Petition
On June 2, 2007, Lynch filed a habeas petition in the Circuit Court for the City of Norfolk, and raised the following claims:
A. The court erred in admitting into evidence the out of court statements of Kenneth Parker as adoptive admissions against the petitioner at trial.
B. The witnesses Tameka Reid and Ronald Scott were not credible as evidenced by their inconsistent testimony at trial.
D. Ineffective assistance of counsel.[2]
1. Counsel was ineffective because he did not introduce the petitioner's testimony at a previous hearing or otherwise inform the jury that the petitioner had previously testified that he did not go into the house, or go up the stairs, and never made the statement that he was accused of making.
2. Counsel's two-week delay in obtaining a videotape from a convenience store amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel because the tape would have established the petitioner's alibi.
E. The police conducted an inadequate investigation.
The circuit court dismissed the habeas petition on September 10, 2007. Lynch v. Watson, Case No. CL07-3485. Lynch did not appeal the dismissal to the Supreme Court of Virginia.
On January 18, 2017, Lynch filed a second habeas petition, by counsel, alleging violations of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), specifically, that the Commonwealth had failed to provide his defense the taped interviews of three witnesses. Lynch v. Ray, Case No. CL17-583 (hereinafter “CL17 at ”). Lynch nonsuited his petition on June 6, 2017. (CL17 at 1982-83). On November 13, 2017, Lynch, by counsel, refiled a third petition for a writ of habeas corpus raising the following claim: “The Commonwealth violated petitioner's rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and Article 1, Section II of the Constitution of Virginia in failing to provide Brady evidence.” (CL17 at 1974). Respondent moved to dismiss the habeas petition as time barred and without merit. The circuit court ordered an evidentiary hearing, which was held on August 2, 2018. On that date, the circuit court allowed petitioner to amend his pleadings to explain the specific allegations with respect to the allegedly non-disclosed taped statements made by the Commonwealth's witnesses Ronald Scott, Tamika Reid, and Kenneth Parker to the police.
On October 18, 2018, after considering the parties briefs, the circuit court found that
Lynch had failed to demonstrate the Commonwealth had suppressed exculpatory evidence and dismissed the petition. (CL17 at 887-88). Lynch, by counsel, appealed, and the Supreme Court of Virginia granted him an appeal. After briefing and argument, the Supreme Court of Virginia held, in an unpublished order dated February 13, 2020, that Lynch had failed to prove that the Commonwealth had suppressed exculpatory evidence. No. petition for rehearing was filed. Lynch, by counsel, filed a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court arguing that (1) the Norfolk Circuit Court in state habeas erred in finding that he had failed to prove that the Commonwealth did not disclose...
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