Lynch v. Com. Transp. Com'r

• Decision Date: 09 January 1998
• Docket Number: No. 970278,970278
• Citation: Lynch v. Com. Transp. Com'r, 495 S.E.2d 247, 255 Va. 227 (1998)
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: Edwin W. LYNCH, Jr., v. COMMONWEALTH TRANSPORTATION COMMISSIONER, et al. Record

Page 247

495 S.E.2d 247

255 Va. 227

Edwin W. LYNCH, Jr., v. COMMONWEALTH TRANSPORTATION COMMISSIONER, et al.

Record No. 970278.

Supreme Court of Virginia.

Jan. 9, 1998.

Robert J. Zelnick (Szabo, Zelnick & Erickson, on briefs), Woodbridge, for appellant.

James F. Hayes, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Richard Cullen, Attorney General; John Paul Woodley, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, on brief), for appellee Commonwealth Transportation Commissioner.

Grady C. Frank, Jr., Alexandria (Steven T. Webster; Hazel & Thomas, Falls Church, on brief), for appellee First Union National Bank of Virginia.

Present: CARRICO, C.J., COMPTON, HASSELL, KEENAN, KOONTZ and KINSER, JJ., and WHITING, Senior Justice.

WHITING, Senior Justice:

The issue in this sequel to a condemnation proceeding involves a landowner's liability for refund of that amount of the sum previously deposited with the court by the condemning authority and withdrawn by the landowner that exceeded the amount of the subsequent award.

The Commonwealth Transportation Commissioner (the Commissioner) planned to take 9.270 acres of a larger tract of approximately 75 acres owned by Edwin W. Lynch, Jr., in Fairfax County for the improvement of Interstate Route 95. The 75 acres was subject to a deed of trust then held by Dominion National Bank of Virginia, later by First Union Bank of Virginia, Dominion Bank's successor in title. Both banks are referred to herein as the lienholder. The deed of trust secured the payment of Lynch's $3,500,000 obligation to the bank and in pertinent part provided that:

Borrower or Grantor shall appear in and prosecute any such [condemnation] action or proceeding unless otherwise directed by Lender in writing.... The proceeds of any award, payment or claim for damages ... in connection with any condemnation or other taking, whether direct or indirect ... are hereby assigned to and shall be paid to Lender[.]

... Unless Borrower and Lender otherwise agree in writing, any application of proceeds to principal shall not extend or postpone the due date of the [monthly installment payments of principal and interest] or change the amount of such installments.

Because the Commissioner desired immediate possession of the 9.270 acres and his evaluation of the land taken was $1,016,755, he deposited that sum with the clerk of the circuit court under the provisions of Code § 33.1-120. ¹ The Commissioner also executed and recorded a certificate of take naming Lynch as the owner of the property.

Lynch then took advantage of Code § 33.1-124, which authorized him to petition the court to order the withdrawal of these funds. His petition alleged that he and Dominion Bank were the only parties entitled to receive the funds and that the bank had agreed to release its lien on the property taken "through a Deed of Partial Release." In a withdrawal order requested by Lynch, the court ordered the deposited funds to be paid to Lynch in care of his attorney, who was directed to "use such funds as are necessary ... to satisfy the Deeds of Trust ... currently owing on the property." The order also provided that if the award was less than the deposited funds, judgment for the excess amount of the deposit shall be entered for the Commissioner against "any person [who] has been paid any greater sum than that to which he is entitled as determined by the award."

Upon demand by the lienholder, Lynch endorsed the clerk's November 26, 1990, check of $1,016,755, "[p]ay to order of Dominion Bank for credit to account of Edwin W. Lynch, Jr." The proceeds of the check were applied by the lienholder in partial discharge of the obligation secured by its deed of trust.

In December 1991, the Commissioner filed a condemnation petition naming Lynch as the only defendant. Lynch filed an answer and grounds of defense in which he asserted that the offer to purchase "was grossly inadequate."

Following a trial before a condemnation commission, the commission fixed the value of the land taken at $740,000 with no damages to the residue. Over Lynch's objection, the court confirmed the commission's report and entered judgment against Lynch for $276,755, the difference between the amount of the deposit and the amount of the award. We awarded Lynch an appeal, reversed the judgment, and remanded the case for a new trial because of errors in the exclusion of certain evidence. Lynch v. Commonwealth Transp. Comm'r, 247 Va. 388, 394, 442 S.E.2d 388, 391 (1994).

At the new trial, a different condemnation commission fixed the value of the land taken at $451,000 with no damages to the residue. The court confirmed the commissioners' report but retained jurisdiction to resolve a dispute concerning the identity of the "person, firm or corporation (if any) which must refund the excess [of $565,755 representing the amount by which the deposit exceeded the commissioners' award] and against which judgment should be entered pursuant to [Code] § 33.1-128."

At the same time, the court ordered the lienholder to be joined as a party to the action "for the purpose of determining [the lienholder's] liability to return excess condemnation proceeds pursuant to [Code] § 33.1-128." Following argument and submission of memoranda, in a written opinion, Judge Richard J. Jamborsky ruled that since Lynch had withdrawn the amount of the deposit, he, not the lienholder, became liable to the Commissioner for the repayment of the excess under the provisions of Code § 33.1-128. Later, Judge F. Bruce Bach entered an order in conformity with Judge Jamborsky's opinion. Lynch appeals.

Code § 33.1-128 provides in pertinent part:

In the event of an award in a condemnation proceeding being of a lesser amount than that deposited with the court, the Commissioner shall recover the amount of such excess and, if any person has been paid a greater sum than that to which he is entitled as determined by the award, judgment shall be entered for the Commissioner against such person for the amount of such excess.

(emphasis added).

Well-settled rules of statutory interpretation guide us in determining whether Lynch is liable for payment of the excess deposit.

If language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for construction by the court; the plain meaning and intent of the enactment will be given it. School Board of Chesterfield County v. School Board of the City of Richmond, 219 Va. 244, 250, 247 S.E.2d 380, 384 (1978). When an enactment is clear and unequivocal, general rules of construction of statutes of doubtful meaning do not apply. Id. at 250-51, 247 S.E.2d at 384. Therefore, when the language of an enactment is free from ambiguity, resort to legislative history and extrinsic facts is not permitted because we take the words as written to determine their meaning.

Brown v. Lukhard, 229 Va. 316, 321, 330 S.E.2d 84, 87 (1985).

Lynch contends that there is no ambiguity in the language of the quoted portion of Code § 33.1-128 and that the withdrawal order "tracks" this language. We agree. Therefore, under the principles articulated in Brown, we do not consider Lynch's extended discussion of (1) whether he "received" the proceeds of the check, or (2) the differing statutory language governing eminent domain proceedings which expressly refers to an "owner" and the statute under consideration which refers to "any person [who] has been paid." We simply apply the statute and order as written and...