Lynch v. Grundy
| Decision Date | 01 July 1953 |
| Citation | 98 N.H. 282,98 A.2d 160 |
| Parties | LYNCH v. GRUNDY et al. |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
Johnson & Keller, Robert V. Johnson, Laconia, for plaintiff.
Bernard I. Snierson, Laconia, Walter G. Cogan, Brockton, Mass. for defendants.
The defendants' first exception is to the ruling of the court that there was a breach of covenant concerning the representation that no conditions existed to prevent the use of the property as a coeducational camp. They argue that this warranty meant only that the camp could be used for both sexes and that the evidence does not sustain the findings and rulings on this issue. The trial court, however, refused, and we believe rightly, to adopt the narrow construction urged by the defendants and ruled that as they knew when they signed the lease the camp could not be licensed for use by either sex they had breached the covenant in this respect. We held upon the first transfer of this case, Lynch v. Grundy, 97 N.H. 286, 86 A.2d 114, that in the absence of proven contrary doctrines in Massachusetts where the contract was signed, the plaintiff's rights are governed by our law, Garapedian v. Anderson, 92 N.H. 390, 31 A.2d 371, and that the defendants had committed a breach of their covenants. As it is not claimed that the evidence before us now varies significantly from that of the first trial, the defendants' exceptions on this issue are overruled. Bean v. Mercantile Insurance Co., 94 N.H. 342, 54 A.2d 149.
Their next exception relates to the issue of fraud and they contend that under Massachusetts law, which concededly governs and upon which they furnished authority, the record fails to sustain the findings and rulings. However, the cases which they cite concern merely matters of opinion or lack some other essential element, and are all distinguishable on their facts from the present situation. We believe the evidence here fully warrants the court's finding that the defendants knowingly concealed from the plaintiff material facts and misrepresented others intending the plaintiff to act thereon which he did to his damage. This satisfies all the requirements of the Massachusetts law and the defendants take nothing by this exception. Kilroy v. Barron, 326 Mass. 464, 95 N.E.2d 190, and cases cited. In view of this it appears unnecessary to pass upon the question of whether, due to proceedings in the Massachusetts courts, the issue of fraud is res adjudicata.
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Taylor v. Nutting
...of the case doctrine does not apply, however, where different evidence is presented on the subsequent appeal, see Lynch v. Grundy, 98 N.H. 282, 284, 98 A.2d 160, 161 (1953); see also Barney v. Winona, & c., Railroad Co., 117 U.S. 228, 231, 6 S.Ct. 654, 655, 29 L.Ed. 858 (1886); Perron v. Ro......
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...findings and rulings. Eastman v. Waisman, 94 N.H. 253, 51 A.2d 151, Racine v. Armstrong, 100 N.H. 96, 120 A.2d 137. See Lynch v. Grundy, 98 N.H. 282, 284, 98 A.2d 160. The plaintiff's argument for the most part comes within that The findings and rulings of the Trial Court, apart from those ......
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Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Burrows Motor Co.
...this court has decried the practice of stating that requests not consistent with findings and rulings made are denied (Lynch v. Grundy, 98 N.H. 282, 98 A.2d 160), the failure of the master to follow the preferred practice in this case does not require that it be remanded for that reason alo......
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