Lynch v. Hudson
| Decision Date | 28 September 2011 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:07-cv-948 |
| Parties | RALPH LYNCH, Petitioner, v. STUART HUDSON, Warden, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
OPINION AND ORDER
Petitioner, a prisoner sentenced to death by the State of Ohio, has pending before this Court a habeas corpus action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This matter is before the Court for final judgment and disposition.
In a February 25, 2009 Opinion and Order, the Court dismissed as procedurally defaulted the following grounds for relief: four, nine (paragraph 89), eleven (paragraphs 110-111), fourteen (sub-part B), fifteen, and sixteen. (ECF No. 25.)
The Court permitted some factual development in this case. On October 29, 2009, the Court issued an Opinion and Order granting Petitioner's request for funds to employ a neuropsychologist and denying Petitioner's request for funds to employ a clinical psychologist. (ECF No. 31.) On May 24, 2010, the Court issued an Opinion and Order granting Petitioner's motion to expand the record with the affidavit, report, and curriculum vitae of Dr. Michael M. Gelbort, the doctor who conducted the neuropsychological evaluation of Petitioner as permitted by this Court's October 29, 2009 Opinion and Order. (ECF No. 49.) The matter of factual development remains open, however, because also before the Court are Petitioner's motion for an evidentiary hearing (ECF No. 59) and Respondent's motion for reconsideration of the Court's order granting Rule 7 expansion of the record (ECF No. 65). The Court addresses those motions in Section II below.
Pursuant to the Court's September 21, 2010 Scheduling Order, Petitioner filed his meritbrief on November 24, 2010 (ECF No. 56), Respondent filed his response in opposition on December 22, 2010 (ECF No. 57), and Petitioner filed his reply memorandum on January 13, 2011 (ECF No. 58). This case is now ripe for review.
Before addressing the merits of Petitioner's claims, the Court must resolve two matters concerning factual development in this case. The first concerns the Court's May 24, 2010 Opinion and Order granting Petitioner's Rule 7 motion to expand the record with Dr. Gelbort's materials. Respondent seeks reconsideration of that Opinion and Order, relying on the recent Supreme Court decision of Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388 (2011). (ECF No. 65.) Also before the Court are Petitioner's response in opposition (ECF No. 66) and Respondent's reply (ECF No. 67).
Respondent argues that Pinholster confirms his original argument opposing expansion of the record that new evidence developed during federal habeas corpus proceedings is not relevant to the federal court's determination of whether a state court's decision contravened or unreasonably applied clearly established federal law. (ECF No. 65, at 1.)1 According to Respondent, Pinholster recognized that 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) limits a federal court's review to the record as it existed when the state court reached its adjudication. "Therefore," Respondent reasons, "a habeas petitioner cannot support a claim under the applicable 28 U.S.C. §2254(d) standard of review with evidence that was not presented to the state court." (Id. at 2.) To that point, Respondent asserts that the Ohio courts rendered adjudications on the merits of the claims that Petitioner now seeks to bolster with the new evidence of Dr. Gelbort's report.
Petitioner argues that Respondent is urging this Court to adopt an overly broadinterpretation of Pinholster. Observing that "Pinholster did not overrule, amend, remove or delete Rule 7," Petitioner asserts that Rule 7's "continued existence means that the district court is still permitted to grant such expansions." (ECF No. 66, at 1.) Thus, Petitioner's first argument is that Respondent misconstrues Pinholster's reach. Petitioner asserts that Pinholster is consistent with previous Supreme Court decisions forbidding petitioners who failed to exhibit diligent factual development in the state courts to engage in and benefit from factual development in federal habeas corpus proceedings. Petitioner emphasizes that Pinholster expressly "rejected the notion that its holding would forever bar habeas petitioners from presenting new evidence in the federal habeas proceedings." (Id. at 2 (citing Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1401).) Petitioner next argues that Pinholster is distinguishable from the instant case because Pinholster, unlike Petitioner, never claimed an inability to discover, develop, or present evidence to the state courts. Insisting that "Pinholster does not preclude fact development for a section (d) analysis, when the state court's fact-finding process is shown to be unfair or inadequate," Petitioner argues that he could not have offered the evidence that he now asks this Court to consider-Dr. Gelbort's materials-due to the state trial court's denial of Petitioner's request for funds to employ Dr. Gelbort. (Id. at 4.) Petitioner explains that unlike Pinholster, he does not seek to introduce new witnesses. Rather, Petitioner seeks only to present the witness that the state court thwarted him from presenting. Petitioner also argues that Respondent's "reading of Pinholster would render 28 U.S.C. §2254(e) moot." (Id. at 5.) Specifically, according to Petitioner, "a petitioner cannot rebut the presumption [of correctness] in (e)(1) by clear and convincing evidence without discovery and Rule 7 record expansion, especially when the factual predicate could not previously be discovered due to the denial of testing by the state court, after specifically requested by the defense." (Id.) Petitioner's final argument is that the state courts did not adjudicate the claims at issue on the merits, either because they addressed only part of certain claims or because they did not have all necessary facts. (Id. at 6-7.) In his reply, Respondent reiterates his position as follows:
Pursuant to Pinholster, a federal court adjudicating a habeas claim, which was adjudicated on the merits in state court, is barred from considering evidence that was not presented to the state court. Before the Court are claims adjudicated on the merits in state court. Lynch has developed new materials that were not presented in state court, i.e., the Gelbort materials. Therefore, the Court is barred from considering these materials. Under the Pinholster rationale, the Gelbort materials are "irrelevant."
(ECF No. 67, at 1.) Respondent also takes Petitioner to task for advancing a position now that is inconsistent with the position he previously had taken concerning the applicability of § 2254(d). Although "Lynch had maintained throughout these proceedings that he is entitled to relief under §2254(d)," Respondent asserts, Petitioner now takes the position that the state courts did not adjudicate on the merits his first, sixth, seventh, or eleventh grounds for relief. (Id. at 2.) Respondent proceeds to explain that whereas this Court originally granted Petitioner's motion to expand the record on the basis that the materials that Petitioner sought to add were relevant, Pinholster now makes clear that the materials are not relevant to the threshold determination the Court must make in reviewing the merits of every claim, the § 2254(d) inquiry. Respondent also argues that, under Pinholster, whether or to what extent a petitioner exercises due diligence is not relevant to the question of whether a federal court, while considering a claim on the merits, may consider new evidence that the state courts did not consider when addressing that claim on the merits.
In Pinholster, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve two questions, the first of which was: "whether review under § 2254(d)(1) permits consideration of evidence introduced in an evidentiary hearing before the federal habeas court." 131 S.Ct. at 1398. The Supreme Court had before it a case in which first the district court and then the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, had held on the basis of evidence developed during a federal evidentiary hearing that the California state courts' decision rejecting Pinholster's ineffective assistance claim was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law and warranted habeas corpus relief. The Supreme Court reversed, holding "that review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state courtthat adjudicated the claim on the merits." Id. Noting that "[o]ur cases emphasize that review under § 2254(d)(1) focuses on what a state court knew and did," the Supreme Court remarked that "[i]t would be strange to ask federal courts to analyze whether a state court's adjudication resulted in a decision that unreasonably applied federal law to facts not before the state court." Id. at 1399. "[H]old[ing] that evidence introduced in federal court has no bearing on § 2254(d)(1) review," the Supreme Court made clear that, "[i]f a claim has been adjudicated on the merits by a state court, a federal habeas petitioner must overcome the limitation of § 2254(d)(1) on the record that was before that state court." Id. at 1400.
The Sixth Circuit has yet to address Pinholster in detail. In Bray v. Andrews, however, the Sixth Circuit stated without further elaboration that, "[o]ur review is, as the Supreme Court recently made clear, 'limited to the record that was before the state court.' " Bray, No. 09-4151, 2011 WL 1544740, at *4 (6th Cir. Apr. 26, 2011) (quoting Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1398). The Sixth Circuit went on to note that, "[i]f Bray is to 'overcome the limitation of § 2254(d)(1),' she must do so 'on the record that was before the state court.' " Id. (quoting Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 400). Recently, in Trimble v. Bobby, a sister court within the Sixth Circuit addressed the reach of Pinholster in the...
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