Lynch v. Hurley, WD 81790

CourtCourt of Appeal of Missouri (US)
Writing for the CourtCynthia L. Martin, Judge
Citation569 S.W.3d 33
Parties Russell Scott LYNCH, Appellant, v. James HURLEY, Respondent.
Docket NumberWD 81790
Decision Date13 February 2019

569 S.W.3d 33

Russell Scott LYNCH, Appellant,
v.
James HURLEY, Respondent.

WD 81790

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

OPINION FILED: February 13, 2019


Russell S. Lynch, Appellant Pro Se.

Caroline M. Coulter, Jefferson City, MO, for respondent.

Before Division One: Cynthia L. Martin, Presiding Judge, Victor C. Howard, Judge and Thomas H. Newton, Judge

Cynthia L. Martin, Judge

569 S.W.3d 35

Russell Scott Lynch ("Lynch") appeals from the trial court's judgment dismissing his petition for declaratory judgment. Lynch argues that he is entitled to receive credit against sentences imposed in St. Charles County for time spent in jail in connection with St. Louis County charges, and for time spent in a long-term treatment program. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.

Factual and Procedural Background

On October 22, 2010, Lynch pleaded guilty in St. Charles County in Case No. 0711-CR06162-01 to two charges, represented by Lynch to be burglary and stealing. On the same date, judgment was entered sentencing Lynch to seven years in the Department of Corrections for burglary and three years in the Department of Corrections for stealing, with these sentences to run consecutive to one another, but concurrent with sentences imposed in four cases from St. Louis County: 07SL-CR06306-01, 07SL-CR06299-01, 07SL-CR07249, and 07SL-CR05800-01. In addition, the St. Charles County judgment imposed long-term treatment pursuant to section 217.3621 for twenty-four months. Thereafter, by order dated November 18, 2010, Lynch was released on probation pursuant to section 217.362, with custodial release occurring on December 12, 2010.

On August 25, 2016, Lynch's probation in the St. Charles County case was revoked, and his previously suspended sentences were executed. As with the initial judgment, the order revoking probation provided that Lynch's sentences would be served consecutively with one another, and concurrently with sentences in the above referenced St. Louis County cases. According to Lynch, he was delivered to the Department of Corrections on September 6, 2016, and he is presently incarcerated at the Northeast Correctional Center in Bowling Green, Missouri.

In all four of the St. Louis County cases, Lynch pled guilty on October 2, 2008, and was placed on probation on December 28, 2009, for three years, with the obligation to remain in custody for two years, and an anticipated custodial release date of December 9, 2010. It appears from the record that long-term treatment pursuant to section 217.362 was also ordered in each of these cases. The record indicates that Lynch successfully completed a two-year treatment program on January 18, 2010, but that other cases required him to remain detained in the Department of Corrections until December 12, 2010, the date which corresponds with Lynch's release pursuant to the probation order entered in the St. Charles County case. Lynch requested early release from the custodial component of the probation orders in the St. Louis County cases (which required him to remain in custody until December 9, 2010), but that request was denied on October 22, 2010. The records support the conclusion that Lynch was either ultimately discharged from probation in the St. Louis County cases, that he is not presently incarcerated in connection with any

569 S.W.3d 36

claimed violation of the terms of probation in those St. Louis County cases, or both.

On November 1, 2017, Lynch filed a petition for declaratory judgment ("Lynch's petition") against the Missouri Department of Corrections ("Department of Corrections") in the Circuit Court of Cole County. Lynch's petition asserted that the Department of Corrections erroneously refused to give Lynch credit against the service of his sentences in the St. Charles County case for two time periods: (i) the time he spent in the St. Louis County jail until his delivery to the Department of Corrections for his sentences in the St. Charles County case, and (ii) for the time he spent in a long-term treatment program in connection with the St. Louis cases.

Lynch's petition claimed that he was entitled to 400 days of credit for the time he spent in custody in the St. Louis County jail from September 11, 2007, to October 15, 2008. Lynch attached exhibits to his petition to support this claim, including copies of his Department of Corrections face sheet, the Department of Corrections' decision following his complaint about credit for the time he spent in custody, and docket sheets from each of the cases for which he was held in custody in the St. Louis County jail.

Lynch's petition further claimed that he was entitled to credit for the entire time he spent in a section 217.362 long-term treatment program, and that the Department of Corrections only gave credit for fifty-seven days, calculated from the time he was sentenced on October 22, 2010, in the St. Charles County case, until December 12, 2010, the day he was released on probation in the St. Charles County case. Lynch's petition did not identify the number of additional days credit to which he believed he is entitled, or the time frame for the additional credit to which he believed he is entitled. Lynch attached exhibits to his petition to support this claim, including copies of his Department of Corrections face sheet, the Department of Corrections' decision following his complaint about credit for the time he spent in custody, documentation from the classification hearing following his successful completion of the long-term treatment program, and docket sheets from his St. Charles County case.

The Department of Corrections filed a motion to dismiss Lynch's petition on January 2, 2018 ("Motion to Dismiss").2 The Motion to Dismiss argued that Lynch had previously litigated his request for credit for the time he spent in the St. Louis County jail, and that he was collaterally estopped from litigating the same issue in his petition for declaratory judgment. To support this argument, the Department of Corrections attached a copy of a judgment ("Habeas Judgment") entered by the Circuit Court of Pike County ("habeas court") wherein the court entered judgment on Lynch's request for habeas release on the same grounds alleged in the declaratory judgment petition. The Habeas Judgment

569 S.W.3d 37

found that a habeas petition was not the proper method to compel jail-time credit because the one-year credit sought by Lynch would not entitle him to immediate release. Thus, the Habeas Judgment concluded that Lynch's habeas claim was not cognizable. Nonetheless, the Habeas Judgment addressed the merits of Lynch's claim and concluded that Lynch failed to prove that his time in custody in St. Louis County jail was related to the St. Charles County case for which he was currently serving.

The Motion to Dismiss also argued that Lynch's petition failed to allege facts entitling him to relief in connection with the claim for credit for time spent in a long-term treatment program. In particular, the Motion to Dismiss argued that the allegations in Lynch's petition addressed only the time frame for which the Department of Corrections had already awarded Lynch fifty-seven days credit. The Motion to Dismiss asserted that "Lynch does not contend that he should receive credit for time spent in custody before sentencing, and he does not contend that he should receive credit for time spent on probation after probation release."

Lynch filed a response to the Motion to Dismiss which reiterated the arguments in his petition for declaratory judgment and which attached additional exhibits. Thereafter, the trial court issued its memorandum, order, and judgment ("Judgment") granting the Motion to Dismiss and entering judgment in favor of the Department of Corrections.

The Judgment concluded that Lynch's claim for 400 days of credit for the time he spent in the St. Louis County jail until his delivery to the Department of Corrections in connection with the St. Charles County case had already been determined in the Habeas Judgment. The Judgment noted that "[t]he Pike County Circuit Court determined that state habeas was not the proper vehicle by which to litigate jail time credit issues, but it also concluded the claim was meritless." (Citations omitted.) As such, the Judgment concluded that "[p]rinciples of res judicata and collateral estoppel prevent Lynch['s] repetition of the first claim." The Judgment further concluded that Lynch had already received credit for fifty-seven days in connection with the long-term treatment program, and that his petition did not state any facts identifying or requesting "credit for time spent in custody before sentencing ... and ... credit...

To continue reading

Request your trial
2 practice notes
  • Courtright v. O'Reilly Auto., WD 82684
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)
    • March 17, 2020
    ...into a motion for summary judgment, and they likewise waive compliance with Rule 74.04's procedural requirements." Lynch v. Hurley , 569 S.W.3d 33, 39 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019) (citations omitted). Here, the parties both submitted matters outside the pleadings for the court's consideration and, ......
  • Jeschke AG Serv. v. Bell, WD84474
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)
    • June 28, 2022
    ...parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 74.04. In Lynch v. Hurley, 569 S.W.3d 33, 38-39 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019), our court examined Missouri Supreme Court precedent with respect to the conversion of motions to dismiss for fa......
2 cases
  • Courtright v. O'Reilly Auto., WD 82684
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)
    • March 17, 2020
    ...into a motion for summary judgment, and they likewise waive compliance with Rule 74.04's procedural requirements." Lynch v. Hurley , 569 S.W.3d 33, 39 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019) (citations omitted). Here, the parties both submitted matters outside the pleadings for the court's consideration and, ......
  • Jeschke AG Serv. v. Bell, WD84474
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)
    • June 28, 2022
    ...parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 74.04. In Lynch v. Hurley, 569 S.W.3d 33, 38-39 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019), our court examined Missouri Supreme Court precedent with respect to the conversion of motions to dismiss for fa......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT