Lynch v. Kleindolph

• Decision Date: 15 November 1927
• Docket Number: No. 38317.,38317.
• Citation: 204 Iowa 762,216 N.W. 2
• Parties: LYNCH v. KLEINDOLPH.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

204 Iowa 762

216 N.W. 2

LYNCH

v.KLEINDOLPH.

No. 38317.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Nov. 15, 1927.

Appeal from District Court, Muscatine County; D. V. Jackson, Judge.

An action for damages resulting from an automobile collision. The jury returned a verdict for defendant. From an adverse ruling on a motion for a new trial, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.Nichols, Tipton & Tipton, of Muscatine, for appellant.

H. M. Bartlett, of Muscatine, for appellee.

ALBERT, J.

But one question is involved in this appeal, to wit, the ruling of the court on a motion for a new trial and to arrest judgment. The only question raised is the alleged misconduct of one of the jurors, growing out of the following facts:

While the case was in the process of trial and at the noon adjournment on October 2, 1925, before the case had gone to the jury, the events occurred on which this motion was made. Charles Kleindolph, defendant, had charge of the county home in Muscatine county, which was located some miles from the county seat where the case was being tried. On the day in question, defendant was going home at the noon hour in his automobile. A juror by the name of Banks approached, remarking that he had never been out to the poor farm and that he should like to ride out and look the place over. Kleindolph replied, “All right,” they got into the automobile and rode to the poor farm. Banks looked the farm over and, as dinner was already prepared, Kleindolph invited Banks to have dinner with the family. After dinner they rode back in the automobile to the courthouse. They were gone not exceeding an hour and a half. Kleindolph testified by way of affidavit that the case on trial was never mentioned at any time. It is upon these circumstances that appellant bottoms her claim for a new trial. The record shows that this matter did not come to the attention of the plaintiff or her attorney until after the verdict of the jury.

[1] The question involved herein is of a more serious character than would appear at first blush. There is probably no more interesting or fascinating question involved in the history of courts than the origin and development of the jury system. It is one of the most vital elements of our system of government. So far as the average citizen is concerned, he is less in touch with the executive and legislative department. When he is confronted with private or public differences, he naturally turns to the court for relief. His faith in the courts must be encouraged. When the time comes that our people lose faith in the courts, our form of government is fast nearing its end. It is meet and proper, therefore, that on questions of this kind the ruling should be such as to support the faith of litigants in our judicial system. That faith can only be sustained by keeping our judicial proceedings not only free from wrong, but free from all suspicion of wrong. In other words, all our court proceedings should be like Cæsar's wife, “above suspicion.”

[2][3][4] The question before us is not a question of whether any actual wrong resulted from the association of this defendant with the juror under the circumstances related, but whether it created a condition from which the opposing litigants and the general public might suspect that wrong resulted from this association. It is not a question of whether both the defendant and the juror were high class citizens and would not be guilty of discussing this lawsuit on this trip, but rather a question of whether or not this conduct should be countenanced by the court. The struggle courts have ever made from the early history of the jury system has been to attain such a perfection as that the matter in dispute between the parties should be submitted to a jury of unbiased and unprejudiced minds, and that the jury should determine the matter wholly upon the evidence submitted to them in court, unbiased and uninfluenced by anything they might have heard or seen outside of the actual trial of the case. Many rules and limitations have been put upon jurors to attain this end, and we are of the opinion, under the circumstances related in this case, that the district court should have granted a new trial. It is true that in the granting of a new trial the discretion of the district court is large. He is familiar with the case, the parties connected therewith, and the circumstances surrounding it, yet we feel that this question is so vital and so far reaching in its effect that we ought to place our stamp of disapproval thereon to the end that, for the benefits of litigants at least, a jury's verdict should be above suspicion. As illustrative of this thought of the struggle of courts to keep the jury system free from suspicion, we cite, among many, the following cases:

In Cottle v. Cottle, 6 Greenl. (6 Me.) 117, 19 Am. Dec. 200, where it is said:

“The party obtaining a verdict in this case did, during the session of the court at which his action was tried, carry one of the jury to whom his cause was submitted, knowing him to be a juror, several miles in a sleigh to the house of a friend of the party, where the juror was gratuitously provided with refreshment and lodging. Whether furnished at the party's own house, or at the house of another by his procurement, either as an act of hospitality, or for a pecuniary compensation to be paid by the party, it is equally exceptionable. This is by statute [Stat. 1821 Me. c. 84, § 15] made a sufficient reason, at the discretion of the court, to set aside the verdict. * * * There is no doubt also, that at common law, independent of the statute, it would afford just ground for the interposition of the court. There is too much reason to believe that the party intended to practice with the juror. He sought his society, and attempted to impress his mind with the justice of his claim. It is insisted that the juror was not in fact influenced, and that justice has been done between the parties. It may be so; but it may be useful to the party to learn that a good cause may be injured, but cannot be promoted, by conduct of this sort, and to the public generally to know that it will be tolerated in no case whatever.”

In Knight v. Inhabitants of Freeport, 13 Mass. 218, that court said:

“Too much care and precaution cannot be used to preserve the purity of jury trials. The attempt to influence the juror in this case was grossly improper, and ought to be discountenanced. It is not necessary to show, that the mind of the juror, thus tampered with, was influenced by this attempt. Perhaps it is not in his power to say whether he was influenced or not. If he was, there is sufficient cause to set aside the verdict; and, if he was not, and the party who has gained the verdict has a good cause, he will still be entitled to a verdict upon another trial. We cannot be too strict in guarding trials by jury from improper influence. This strictness is necessary to give due confidence to parties in the results of their causes; and every one ought to know, that for any, even the least, intermeddling with jurors, a verdict will always be set aside.”

In the case of Mobile & O. R. Co. v. Davis, 130 Ill. 146, 22 N. E. 850, the court in discussing a similar question said:

“The jury box must be free from improper influences. Any association of any kind by either party, or the counsel of either party, to a cause on trial, with any one of the jurymen, is calculated to give rise to suspicion and uncertainty as to the fairness of the verdict. If the administration of justice is to be kept pure and above reproach, every appearance of a want of impartiality on the part of juries must be discountenanced. In the present case, Davis and the railroad company were each entitled to a fair, and impartial trial of the controversy between them. The settlement of a long pending lawsuit may have inspired Allen with such a feeling of gratitude as to bias his judgment as a juror. The sense of obligation for a favor received is a subtle emotion and often unconsciously dominates the faculties. It is better that a juryman rest under no obligation, nor under any apparent obligation, to either of the parties, upon whose rights he is called upon to adjudicate.”

In Harrington v. Hamm, 153 Mich. 660, 117 N. W. 62, the jury was to determine the necessity of a drainage district and also to assess the damage. They accepted entertainment of, and were repeatedly treated to cigars by, certain of the petitioners for the drain and who were interested in its construction. The lower court there said:

“It does not seem to me that the court can say that the mere exchange of such courtesies as are indicated in this record unduly influenced the judgment of 12 men whose integrity and standing as citizens was passed upon by the relators' counsel at the time of their selection as jurors.”

The Supreme Court said:

“We cannot approve of this reasoning. While a judge or juror is...