Lynch v. Meridian Hill Studio Apts., Inc.

• Decision Date: 25 April 1985
• Docket Number: No. 84-277.,84-277.
• Citation: 491 A.2d 515
• Parties: Robin G. LYNCH, Appellant, v. MERIDIAN HILL STUDIO APTS., INC., Margaret K. Scott and Wilson L. Scott, Appellees.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

491 A.2d 515

Robin G. LYNCH, Appellant, v. MERIDIAN HILL STUDIO APTS., INC., Margaret K. Scott and Wilson L. Scott, Appellees.

No. 84-277.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued November 27, 1984.

Decided April 25, 1985.

Jeff A. Sacks, for appellant.

Donald J. Caulfield, Washington, D.C., for appellee Meridian Hill Studio Apts., Inc.

Morris R. Battino, Washington, D.C., with whom Christopher E. Hassell, Washington, D.C. was on brief, for appellees Margaret K. Scott and Wilson L. Scott.

Before FERREN, BELSON and ROGERS, Associate Judges.

FERREN, Associate Judge:

This is an appeal from the denial of plaintiff-appellant's motion to vacate summary judgments for defendant-appellees in an action to recover for property damage from a fire. The trial court had granted the summary judgments because of appellant's failure to file timely oppositions. The motions judge subsequently denied without a hearing the motion to vacate, ruling that counsel's proffered reason for the default—his own careless failure to observe the 10-day time requirement of Super.Ct.Civ.R. 12-I (e)—was not "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect" within the meaning of Super.Ct.Civ.R. 60(b)(1). We conclude that the judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion on the ground advanced by counsel. We also conclude, sua sponte, that although the trial court erred in granting the judgments simply because the motions were unopposed, a review of the pleadings, affidavits, and other papers (as required when no opposition has been filed) makes clear that appellees are entitled to summary judgment. Accordingly, we affirm.

I.

Appellant Robin Lynch filed a tort action alleging damage to personal property in her apartment caused by heat, smoke, and vapor from a fire in the neighboring apartment of appellees Margaret and Wilson Scott. Appellant claimed that the Scotts and appellee Meridian Hill Studio Apartments, Inc. (the cooperative association holding legal title to the Scotts' unit) were jointly and individually liable for negligence and fraud in maintaining a defective party wall that caused the damaging smoke to spread into her apartment.¹

The Scotts and Meridian Hill filed motions for summary judgment on October 25 and 26, 1983, respectively. Appellant did not file a timely opposition to either motion.² The trial court granted both motions, as unopposed, on December 9, 1983. On December 19, 1983, appellant filed a motion to vacate under Super.Ct.Civ.R. 60(b)(1) and appended belated oppositions to the motions for summary judgment. The motion was denied without a hearing. Appellant filed a timely appeal.

Appellant stated in the motion to vacate, and urges on appeal, that the failure to file timely oppositions was attributable to the mistake, inadvertence, and excusable neglect of youthful counsel, who was handling his first court case. Counsel mistakenly thought that, under Super.Ct.Civ.R. 56(c), a hearing would be scheduled on the summary judgment motions as a matter of course, and that he would receive at least 10 days notice of that hearing as the event triggering his responsibility to file oppositions. He failed to notice that, under Super.Ct.Civ.R. 12-I—which is cross-referenced in Rule 56—an opposition must be filed within 10 days of service of a summary judgment motion. See supra note 2.

II.

The grant or denial of a motion to vacate "is within the discretion of the trial court," and "its determination will be disturbed on appeal only upon a showing of abuse of discretion." Joseph v. Parekh, 351 A.2d 204, 205 (D.C. 1976) (citations omitted). We agree with the trial court's implicit finding that the extenuating circumstances claimed by appellant's counsel did not satisfy any requirement of Rule 60(b)(1).

That provision of Rule 60 is designed to provide relief for a mistake which could not have been avoided through due diligence of counsel. See Kasachkoff v. Ross H. Finn Co., 408 A.2d 993 (D.C. 1979) (relief granted for counsel's reasonable, mistaken belief that parties had reached a settlement). The courts accordingly will treat a mistake of fact with greater leniency than a mistake of law, see id. at 995, since knowledge of the law is ordinarily imputed to counsel.

For example, in Wallace v. Warehouse Employees Union No. 730, 482 A.2d 801 (D.C. 1984), which addressed a motion for relief from summary judgment brought under Super.Ct.Civ.R. 59(e), we recently wrote that "a mistake of law" will "rarely warrant relief." Id. at 804 & n. 10.³ Similarly, in In re Estate of Starr, 443 A.2d 533 (D.C. 1982), we said that if a practice governing the probate court's award of brokerage commissions was "well-known as a standard court practice" (we remanded for a determination on this point), then counsel's ignorance of that practice and consequent failure to protect his client's right to a commission was no basis for relief under Rule 60(b)(1). Id. at 537. Counsel's "failure to ascertain adequately the applicable court procedures and to so advise appellant is not excusable neglect and may not be the type of mistake warranting relief from the order." Id. (citations omitted).

A number of federal courts also have held that ignorance of court rules and procedures cannot be "excusable neglect" under the corresponding federal rule, Fed. R.Civ.P. 60(b).⁴ For example, in Quality Prefabrication v. Daniel J. Keating Co., 675 F.2d 77 (3d Cir. 1982), counsel's error was strikingly similar to the one in this case. Counsel failed to respond to a motion to compel production of documents in "the mistaken belief that the motion would be heard unopposed." Id. at 79 n. 3. Actually, a local court rule required counsel to file a brief in opposition within ten days after service of the motion. The court of appeals declined—as we do—to decide that failure to understand or observe court rules is per se inexcusable neglect; but it held that the district court had not abused its discretion in determining, on the facts presented, that the neglect was not excusable.⁵

We reach our decision mindful that a mistake of law, under some circumstances, has furnished the basis for post-judgment relief.⁶ We also are aware that when appellate courts have sustained the denial of Rule 60(b) relief, counsel's error has often been more prejudicial to the opposing party than in this case.⁷ Nonetheless, such exceptional situations do not derogate from the general principle, applicable here, that an attorney's mistake of law will not serve as basis for Rule 60(b)(1) relief. As a consequence, counsel's mistake must usually be imputed to, and thus bind, the client. See Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633-34, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 1390, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Hill, 250 A.2d 923, 926 (D.C. 1969).

There is, however, one exception. Counsel's conduct will not be imputed to the client, and thus relief will be available under Rule 60(b)(1), when that conduct "is outrageously in violation of either his express instructions or his implicit duty to devote reasonable efforts in representing his client," provided that the client himself is diligent in pursuing the claim. Railway Express Agency, 250 A.2d at 926 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).⁸ On the facts here, however, counsel's ignorance of a filing deadline was not the kind of outrageous attorney conduct that warrants relief for the client. Accordingly, the motions judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion to vacate.

III.

In view of the "outrageous" attorney conduct exception, we pause to discuss why it is appropriate to impute an attorney's mistake of law to the client under most circumstances. The "dominant purpose" of Rule 60(b), while permitting relief when warranted, is "to `buttress the finality of judgments.'" Railway Express Agency, 250 A.2d at 925 (citation omitted); see also Household Finance Corp. v. Frye, 445 A.2d 991, 992-93 (D.C. 1982); Manos v. Fickenscher, 62 A.2d 791, 792 (D.C. 1948); 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra, at § 2857. The rule achieves this purpose by providing for postjudgment relief only under exceptional circumstances. Clark v. Moler, 418 A.2d 1039, 1042 (D.C. 1980). However sympathetic we may be to the circumstances of this appeal, the imputation of acts and omissions of counsel to the client "is necessary for the orderly conduct of litigation." Railway Express Agency, 250 A.2d at 926. To give a party in appellant's position a second chance would increase the burden on other litigants in the system, as well as on our already overtaxed courts. As the court stated in Ohliger v. United States, 308 F.2d 667, 667-68 (2d Cir. 1962): "Counsel's carelessness cannot be excused by this Court if it is to perform its obligation to other litigants whose cases are necessarily delayed by such conduct." In short, as a general proposition, the client, not the adversary or the court, must bear responsibility for retaining counsel who failed to understand the rules of court. The client's relief, if any is due, must come from the attorney.

We should add that denial of a plaintiff's motion for Rule 60(b)(1) relief from summary judgment in favor of a defendant is typically less prejudicial than a refusal to grant a defendant's motion to vacate a default judgment. A default judgment typically gives a plaintiff the benefit of an altogether unlitigated claim, see Manos, 62 A.2d at 793; Super.Ct.Civ.R. 55, whereas an unopposed summary judgment for a defendant at least presupposes that the trial court has "review[ed] the pleadings and other papers to determine whether the moving party is legally entitled to judgment." Milton Properties, Inc. v. Newby, 456 A.2d 349, 354 (D.C. 1983); see Super.Ct. Civ.R. 56(e).

IV.

This would end the matter but for an issue which, in the interest of fairness, we address sua sponte. Recently this court, following Milton Properties, Inc., stated that because the motions judge had "granted the renewed motion for summary...