Lynch v. Murphy

• Decision Date: 23 December 1893
• Citation: 24 S.W. 774,119 Mo. 163
• Parties: LYNCH et al. v. MURPHY et al.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

24 S.W. 774

119 Mo. 163

LYNCH et al. v. MURPHY et al.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

December 23, 1893.

STATUTES — TITLES — CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — LOCAL AND SPECIAL LAWS — STATUTORY AMENDMENTS.

1. Act April 20, 1891, is entitled "An act to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors in original packages or otherwise." Held, that the words "original packages" do not limit the scope of the act, and that the words "or otherwise" show that the object of the act was to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors in any manner, whether in original packages or not.

2. Act March 8, 1893, entitled "An act to increase the state dramshop license and to change the distribution of the county dramshop license by amending section 7 of `An act to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors in original packages or otherwise,' approved April 20, 1891," is not invalidated by the fact that it requires the county court of each county to cause two-thirds of all the revenue for county purposes derived from the dramshop licenses to be set apart as a special road fund for such county, and to cause the same to be divided among the various road districts in proportion to the number of miles of public road in each district, since this provision is germane to the title of the act.

3. Such act does not contain "more than one subject," in violation of Const. art. 4, § 28, since its several provisions relate to matters which are germane to the general subject.

4. Act March 8, 1893, providing that two-thirds of the revenue for county purposes derived from dramshop licenses shall be set apart as a special road fund of the county, except that, in counties of 50,000 inhabitants or less, two-thirds of such revenue derived from licenses in a town which has compromised, or may compromise, its indebtedness, shall be applied on the interest and principal thereof, is neither local nor special in its application.

5. Where only one section of an act, or a part of a section, is void, such section may be amended in part, or by the substitution of a new section, provided the act, as amended, does not embrace a purpose outside of its title, and inconsistent with the provisions remaining unrepealed.

In banc. Appeal from circuit court, Jackson county; J. W. Henry, Judge.

Petition for injunction by Hugh Lynch, J. F. Richards, George Gaston, B. F. Jones, William E. Ridge, and Thomas H. Mastin, against Daniel Murphy, P. J. Henn, James Lattimer, and John Cappelle. Defendants demurred. Demurrer sustained. Plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.

A. M. Allen, for appellants. Wash. Adams, (John N. Southern, of counsel,) for respondents.

BURGESS, J.

This is a petition for injunction by plaintiffs, who are resident taxpayers of Jackson county, Mo., against the defendants, Murphy, Henn, Cappelle, and Lattimer, who compose the county court of that county, to enjoin and restrain them from appropriating or expending, and from causing to be expended, two-thirds of all revenue for county purposes derived from the tax on dramshop licenses as a special road fund, in compliance with section 7 of an act of the general assembly of the state of Missouri entitled "An act to increase the state dramshop license and to change the distribution of the county dramshop license by amending section 7 of an act entitled `An act to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors in original packages or otherwise,' approved April 20, 1891," approved March 8, 1893. A demurrer to the petition was sustained by the court below, and judgment rendered for defendants thereon, from which judgment plaintiffs appealed to this court.

Plaintiffs' first contention is that both of said acts are void because in conflict with section 28, art. 4, of the constitution of the state, which provides that "no bill * * * shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title." It is contended by counsel for plaintiffs that the words "or otherwise," as used in the title of the act of 1891, are of no significance, neither adding anything to, nor taking anything from, the scope and meaning of the title; that such words can be of no avail; and that they express nothing, and have no force or effect, as a compliance with the constitutional requirement. The word "otherwise," as defined by Mr. Webster, means "in a different manner; in any other way, or in any other ways; differently; contrarily." It would have been difficult to have made the title to the act more comprehensive in its scope and meaning by the use of any other words or title. The words "or otherwise," as used in the title of the act, have a more definite, and a very different, meaning from the words "or other purposes," as those words are generally used in the titles to legislative enactments. The latter words, when thus used, are laid out of consideration, and are not regarded as amounting to anything, but it is not so with the words "or otherwise." Section 7, as it originally stood, reads as follows: "Upon every such license there shall be levied a tax not less than twenty-five nor more than two hundred dollars for state purposes, not less than two hundred and fifty nor more than four hundred dollars for county purposes, for every period of six months, the amount of tax in every instance to be determined by the court granting the license. It shall be the duty of the county courts of the several counties of this state to cause one-half of all the revenue for county purposes, derived from the tax or dramshop license, to be set apart as a special road fund of such county, and cause the same to be divided among the various road districts in the county in proportion to the number of miles of public road in each district. Said fund shall be expended on the main lines of road in each district, which lead to the most important towns in the county, in proportion to the public utility of such roads, and shall be expended under the supervision of the road overseer of each district, or some one appointed by the county court for that purpose, who shall be a resident tax-payer of the district, and shall give a like bond and shall receive the same per diem for his services as the road overseer of the district: Provided, that in counties having fifty thousand inhabitants or less, where such license tax is derived from saloons situated in any township that is indebted, and that have compromised or that may hereafter compromise their indebtedness, then two-thirds of the county tax so derived from said saloons shall be applied by the county court to the payment of the interest and principal of such township indebtedness until such debt is fully paid." The only change made by the act of 1893 was in changing the amount of the minimum tax to be levied from twenty-five to fifty dollars, in providing that two-thirds, instead of one-half, of all the revenue for county purposes derived from the tax on dramshop licenses, be set apart as a special road fund, and in providing "that the courts shall, in their discretion, have the power to use all or any part of said fund in one or more districts." It will thus be observed that there was no material change in the provision of the section now under consideration, by the amendment, which would in any manner affect its validity. The title of the act is very general, and is broad and comprehensive enough to embrace within its meaning the sale of intoxicating liquors in any manner, and to provide for the appropriation of the revenue arising therefrom in any way, unless manifestly not within the meaning of the title to the act. The generality of title is no objection, so long as it was not made to cover up legislation incongruous in itself, and which by no fair construction could be considered as having a necessary or proper connection with the title. It has accordingly been held that the title of "An act to establish a police government for the city of Detroit" was not objectionable for its generality, and that all matters properly connected with the establishment and efficiency of such a government, including taxation for its support, and courts for examination and trial of offenders, might constitutionally be included in the bill under this general title. Under any different ruling, it was said, "the police government of a city could not be organized without a distinct act for each specific duty to be devolved upon it, and these could not be passed until a multitude of other statutes had taken the same duties from other officers before performing them; and the several statutes, fragmentary as they must necessarily be, would often...