Lynch v. Reed
| Decision Date | 02 October 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-343,96-343 |
| Citation | 944 P.2d 218,284 Mont. 321 |
| Parties | Neil J. LYNCH and Charlotte F. Lynch, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Dean REED and Barbara Reed, Defendants and Respondents. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
David R. Paoli, Missoula, R. Lewis Brown, Butte, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Gary L. Walton; Poore Roth & Robinson, Butte, Scott W. Reed, Salt Lake City, for Defendants and Respondents.
Neil J. and Charlotte F. Lynch (the Lynches) appeal from the judgment and underlying jury verdict of the Second Judicial District Court, Silver Bow County, in favor of respondents Dean and Barbara Reed (the Reeds). The Lynches also appeal rulings of the District Court denying them the opportunity to present certain evidence to the jury regarding construction safety standards. We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand to the District Court for further proceedings.
We address the following issues on appeal:
1. Does this Court have jurisdiction to hear the appeal?
2. Did the District Court commit reversible error by excluding employment safety regulations including OSHA and ANSI from the trial of the case?
3. Did the District Court err in denying the Lynches' motion for a new trial on the basis that they were denied an opportunity to fully cross-examine the Reeds' expert witness?
4. Did the District Court err in denying the Lynches' motion for a new trial on the basis that their expert witness was not permitted to testify as to the basis of his expert opinions?
5. Are the Lynches entitled to a new trial because of defense counsel's remarks regarding Neil Lynch's prior motorcycle accident?
In 1991 the Reeds began construction of a retirement cabin on property they had purchased at Georgetown Lake. The Reeds contracted with Dale Fredlund, a Butte log home builder to excavate the foundation and install the log home package. Dean Reed (Reed) had been working part time for Fredlund erecting log home packages at Fredlund's property. In exchange for Reed's help in erecting the Reed log home package, Fredlund reduced the overall price of the package.
After the excavation was completed, Reed contracted with two masonry companies for the construction of the foundation. Once the foundation was completed, Reed contracted with two carpenters for the installation of the floor joists and floor decking. When the floor decking was completed, two openings were left in the decking. One was for the installation of the stairway from the basement and the other was for the installation of a fireplace. After the carpenters had completed their work, Fredlund returned to the site to begin the installation of the log home package in accordance with his contract with the Reeds.
Reed and Neil Lynch (Lynch) were acquaintances and would periodically discuss the progress of the cabin. Lynch agreed to come to the construction site and help with the erection of the log home package. At this point in the construction, the log walls were approximately eleven courses high. When this type of log home is erected, the doorways and windows are cut into the walls after the walls have been erected. Consequently, a person must go through the basement to access the interior of the cabin.
On September 25, 1991, Lynch arrived at the Reeds' property and gained access to the main floor of the cabin by entering the basement and climbing up an extension ladder. The extension ladder passed through the opening in the floor which had been left for the future installation of the stairs. The stairway opening in the floor decking was approximately four feet wide by eight feet in length. Two sheets of plywood covered approximately one-half of the stairway opening. The fireplace floor hole opening was covered with plywood, logs and saw horses.
After Lynch was on the main floor of the cabin, Reed instructed him to wait while Reed and Fredlund retrieved another log from outside the cabin. While Lynch was waiting, he decided to move the plywood that was next to him on the floor and set it up against the wall, out of the way. Lynch approached the piece of plywood, picked it up with both hands, raised it to his chest and stepped forward in an effort to push it toward the wall he was facing. Once he stepped forward, he fell into the hole that the loose piece of plywood had covered. Lynch fell approximately eight feet to the basement's dirt floor; he was paralyzed as a result of the accident.
The Lynches filed suit to recover damages for the personal injuries suffered by them as a result of Neil Lynch's accident. Before trial, the District Court granted the Reeds' motion in limine restricting the Lynches from presenting evidence on construction site safety standards. The court further denied the Lynches' attempts to introduce the standards during trial and limited Lynches' cross-examination of Reeds' expert. Following a three-day trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Reeds.
After entry of judgment for the Reeds, the Lynches moved for a new trial. The motion was received by the court but, due to a clerical error, was not filed with the clerk of court. Thereafter, the Lynches filed a brief in support of their motion for new trial. Two days later the Lynches filed a notice of appeal. In an order dated July 31, 1996, the District Court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to rule on the Lynches' motion for new trial by virtue of the notice of appeal. The Lynches appeal from the judgment entered on the jury verdict and other orders of the District Court.
The Reeds contend that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal because the Lynches filed their notice of appeal while their motion for new trial was still pending in the District Court. According to Rule 5(a)(4), M.R.App.P., a notice of appeal filed before disposition of a Rule 59 motion for new trial has no effect. On July 31, 1996, the District Court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the Lynches' "motion" because of the subsequent filing of the notice of appeal. The Reeds argue that because the District Court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to rule on the motion, the Lynches' motion for a new trial was deemed denied on August 11, 1996, and, pursuant to Rule 5(a)(4), M.R.App.P., the Lynches were required to re-file a notice of appeal no later than thirty days after their motion for a new trial was deemed denied. The Reeds contend that because the Lynches did not re-file a notice of appeal, this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear their appeal.
In its order ruling that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the "motion" for new trial, the District Court stated: "Plaintiffs filed a Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for a New Trial; however, Plaintiffs never filed a Motion for a New Trial." The Lynches argue that this order led them to believe that the clerical error in failing to file the motion for a new trial with the District Court was fatal to that motion and that, therefore, their notice of appeal was timely filed. We agree. Because the motion for new trial was never filed it was a nullity and the Lynches' subsequent notice of appeal was timely filed. This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
The standard of review of a district court's discretionary ruling is whether the district court abused its discretion. Durbin v. Ross (1996), 276 Mont. 463, 477, 916 P.2d 758, 767; State v. Santos (1995), 273 Mont. 125, 137, 902 P.2d 510, 517. The abuse of discretion standard applies to trial administration issues, post-trial motions and similar rulings. Montana Rail Link v. Byard (1993), 260 Mont. 331, 337, 860 P.2d 121, 125.
The Reeds submitted a motion in limine requesting that the Lynches be restricted from mentioning any construction site safety standards. The District Court granted the Reeds' motion in limine in several respects. The District Court ruled that Occupational Safety and Health Administration Regulations (OSHA), American National Standard Safety Requirements (ANSI), and Montana's Construction Site Health and Safety Act were inadmissible on the issue of the Reeds' negligence because the "safety standards in question do not have the force of law...." The District Court had the opportunity to analyze this issue at various junctures since the Lynches persistently raised the issue throughout the trial.
The Lynches' argument on appeal focuses on the District Court's exclusion of OSHA and ANSI regulations, and we will therefore discuss only those regulations. The Lynches argued to the District Court, and argue here, that the Reeds' failure to comply with OSHA regulations and ANSI standards is evidence of their negligence and, thus, admissible. The Reeds, on the other hand, contend that OSHA and ANSI are not applicable to an individual who is constructing his own private residence.
The Lynches argue that in granting the Reeds' motion in limine regarding safety standards, the court incorrectly relied on Hackley v. Waldorf-Hoerner Paper Products Co. (1967), 149 Mont. 286, 294-95, 425 P.2d 712, 716, for the proposition that "evidence of safety standards that do not have the force of law are inadmissible on the issue of negligence." In Hackley, this Court considered two rulings by the district court in which the district court had refused the use of evidence on safety standards for any purpose. The first issue considered by this Court was whether the district court had erred in refusing to permit any testimony on the "minimum Safety Standards for the Construction Industry, section 41-1702, R.C.M.1947...." Hackley, 425 P.2d at 716. The Court began its analysis by examining the language of the statute at issue....
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