Lynch v. Scheininger
| Citation | 714 A.2d 970,314 N.J.Super. 318 |
| Parties | Gale Ann LYNCH and Robert Louis Lynch, her husband, and Joseph Lynch, an infant, by his Guardians Ad Litem, Gale Lynch and Robert Louis Lynch, Individually and Per Quod, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Laurence M. SCHEININGER, M.D., Laurence A. Seitzman, M.D., Drs. Finkel, Drucker, Seitzman, P.A., and Drucker, Seitzman & Scheininger, P.A., Defendants-Respondents, and Jerrold S. Finkel, M.D., The Estate of Jerrold S. Finkel, M.D., Paul Drucker, M.D., John F. Kennedy Medical Center and Stephen A. Grochmal, M.D., Defendants. |
| Decision Date | 07 August 1998 |
| Court | New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division |
Richard C. Swarbrick, Piscataway, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Beth A. Hardy, Morristown, for defendant-respondent Laurence M. Scheininger, M.D. (Francis & Berry, attorneys; Hugh P. Francis, of counsel; Mr. Francis and Ms. Hardy, on the brief).
Richard J. Bolger, Toms River, for defendants-respondents Laurence A. Seitzman, M.D., Drs. Finkel, Drucker, Seitzman, P.A. and Drucker, Seitzman & Scheininger, P.A. (Orlovsky, Grasso & Bolger, attorneys; Mr. Bolger, of counsel and on the brief).
Before Judges PETRELLA, SKILLMAN and STEINBERG.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SKILLMAN, J.A.D.
The issue presented by this appeal is whether a child with birth defects caused by malpractice in connection with the mother's prior pregnancy is barred from maintaining a malpractice action against the doctor because his parents' voluntary decision to conceive another child despite their awareness of the increased risks of any future pregnancy constitutes a supervening cause of the birth defects. We conclude that a trier of fact could find that the conception of additional children by the infant plaintiff's parents was reasonably foreseeable and consequently this action is not barred.
Defendants Laurence M. Scheininger and Laurence A. Seitzman are obstetricians who treated plaintiff Gale Ann Lynch during a 1984 pregnancy which ended in a stillbirth. This stillbirth resulted from erythroblastosis fetalis, a condition caused by the incompatibility of maternal and fetal blood Rh factors. When the Rh negative blood of a mother is exposed to the Rh positive blood of her fetus, the mother's immune system recognizes the fetal blood as foreign material and produces antibodies to attack the fetal blood cells. This process is called Rh isoimmunization. Erythroblastosis fetalis occurs when the mother's blood mixes with the fetus' blood and the fetus attempts to compensate for the destruction of red blood cells caused by the mother's antibodies by overproducing blood cells. If the fetus is not delivered prematurely, this condition causes organ failure and may result in death.
In 1986, Mrs. Lynch and her husband, plaintiff Robert Lynch, brought a malpractice action against Dr. Scheininger and others seeking damages for the stillbirth and injury to Mrs. Lynch's childbearing capacity. That action was eventually settled. 1
During the pendency of the prior action, Mrs. Lynch gave birth to plaintiff Joseph Lynch on January 11, 1987. Joseph was born with extremely serious neurological impairments, which were caused by the same erythroblastosis condition which caused the 1984 stillbirth.
On January 3, 1990, plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint relating to the 1984 stillbirth to add claims arising out of Joseph's birth. The trial court denied this motion, and on January 23, 1990, plaintiffs filed the present action, naming as defendants Drs. Scheininger and Seitzman, their professional associations, their associates Drs. Jerrold S. Finkel and Paul Drucker, Dr. Finkel's estate, and the John F. Kennedy Medical Center. 2 Plaintiffs alleged that defendants did not diagnose and consequently did not treat Mrs. Lynch's Rh isoimmunization, which was a deviation from accepted standards of practice that not only caused the 1984 stillbirth but also contributed to Joseph's disabilities. Plaintiffs alleged that the failure to perform a fetal blood transfusion or to deliver the fetus at an earlier point in the course of Mrs. Lynch's 1984 pregnancy increased Mrs. Lynch's isoimmunization and consequently increased the risk of a bad outcome in future pregnancies. Mr. and Mrs. Lynch asserted a claim of "wrongful birth" on their own behalf and a claim of "wrongful life" on Joseph's behalf based on defendants' alleged failure to properly advise them of the risks of a future pregnancy. In addition, plaintiffs claimed that defendants' failure to properly manage Mrs. Lynch's 1984 pregnancy was a substantial contributing cause of Joseph's severe disability and the resultant medical and other expenses.
After Scheininger filed a third-party complaint against Dr. Stephen A. Grochmal, the treating doctor during the mother's pregnancy with Joseph, plaintiffs also joined Grochmal as a defendant. Prior to trial, plaintiffs settled their claim against Dr. Grochmal for $880,000.
During the trial, the court conducted a Lopez hearing, 3 as a result of which it dismissed Mr. and Mrs. Lynch's claims on the ground that they were barred by the statute of limitations. The court found that the Lynches knew or should have known that they may have had a basis for a claim against defendants at the time of Joseph's birth and consequently there was no basis for invocation of the discovery rule.
At the close of plaintiffs' case, the court also dismissed Joseph's claim for wrongful life on the ground that the evidence could not support a finding that Mr. and Mrs. Lynch relied upon defendants' advice in deciding to conceive another child. 4
At the conclusion of a twenty-three day trial, the court reserved decision on defendants' motion to dismiss Joseph's remaining claims and submitted the case to the jury. The jury subsequently indicated that it was unable to reach a verdict, whereupon the court declared a mistrial and indicated that it would decide defendants' reserved motions to dismiss Joseph's remaining claims within a few days.
In a written opinion on the reserved motions, the court concluded that the recognition in the field of medical malpractice of "a preconception tort," which it characterized as a claim that a defendant's malpractice "cause[d] some injury to the mother's reproductive ability before the child [was] conceived and, as a result, a child in a subsequent pregnancy [was] harmed," would be consistent with New Jersey law and consequently it would "presume such a cause of action exists." 5 However, the court concluded that Mr. and Mrs. Lynch's intentional conception of a child when they were aware Mrs. Lynch's Rh negative sensitization presented a serious risk to any future baby she might deliver constituted a supervening cause of Joseph's disabilities which precluded the imposition of liability upon defendants. The court stated that "[t]o hold the defendants liable ..., where the parents intentionally assumed the risk, would be ... contrary to [the] principle ... that in the face of a defendant's negligence a person should not be able to increase the consequences of that negligence by an intentional act." In addition, the court concluded that Joseph's claim against Dr. Seitzman should be dismissed because the record did not contain any evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find that he had committed malpractice.
Plaintiffs appeal from the dismissal of their claims. We reverse the part of the judgment dismissing Joseph's claims for his disabilities and consequent medical and other expenses against Dr. Scheininger. We affirm the judgment in all other respects.
Before discussing the only substantial issue raised in this appeal, we briefly address plaintiffs' other arguments.
Although none of plaintiffs' point headings relate to the dismissal of Mr. and Mrs. Lynch's claims on the ground that they were not filed within the two year limitation period, some of the discussion under Point III of their brief appears to be directed at this ruling. Consequently, we assume the appeal challenges the dismissal of Mr. and Mrs. Lynch's claims. We affirm this ruling substantially for the reasons expressed in the trial court's oral opinion of July 5, 1995.
Plaintiffs argue that after granting a mistrial the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider defendants' reserved motion to dismiss. However, Rule 4:40-2(a) provides in pertinent part:
Reservation of Decision. The court may reserve decision on a motion for judgment made at the close of all the evidence, submit the case to the jury and then decide the motion either before or within 10 days after the verdict, or if no verdict is returned, within 10 days after the jury's discharge. (Emphasis added).
Thus, the applicable court rule expressly permits the trial court to reserve on a motion for judgment and decide the motion later even if no verdict is returned.
Plaintiffs also argue that the motion for judgment was improperly granted because it was not renewed by defendants after the trial. However, a party is required to renew a motion for judgment only if it has been denied at trial. R. 4:40-2(b). If the court has reserved decision, the moving party is entitled to a ruling without renewing the motion. R. 4:40-2(a); see Wenner v. McEldowney & Co. 102 N.J.Super. 13, 18-19, 245 A.2d 208 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 52 N.J. 493, 246 A.2d 452 (1968).
Plaintiffs' brief does not contain any point heading which challenges the trial court's conclusion that the record does not contain any evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find that Dr. Seitzman committed malpractice. However, plaintiffs make several cryptic references to this conclusion under Points III and VI of their brief. Consequently, in the interests of completeness, we have reviewed the record relating to this point and agree substantially for the reasons set forth in the trial court's written decision that the record does not support a finding of malpractice on the part of Dr....
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Provenzano v. Integrated Genetics
...Court would most likely adopt the reasoning expressed in a recent New Jersey Appellate Division case. See Lynch v. Scheininger, 314 N.J.Super. 318, 714 A.2d 970 (App.Div.1998). Mrs. Lynch was treated by several physicians during a 1984 pregnancy that resulted in a stillbirth. Lynch, 314 N.J......
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Provenzano v. Integrated Genetics
...which would not break the chain of proximate cause "so long as the intervening cause was foreseeable". Lynch v. Scheininger, 314 N.J.Super. 318, 327-328, 714 A.2d 970 (App.Div.1998). Defendants respond by pointing out that, in Lynch, it was the conception of the child that was foreseeable, ......