Lynch v. State
| Decision Date | 14 June 1991 |
| Citation | 587 So.2d 306 |
| Parties | Ex parte State of Alabama. (Re Robert LYNCH v. STATE). 1900551. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Don Siegelman, Atty. Gen., and Yvonne A. Henderson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
John Bertolotti, Jr., Mobile, for Robert Lynch.
The issue in this case is whether the Court of Criminal Appeals, on remand, was required to follow the mandate of this Court. We hold that it was.
The facts are as follows: The defendant, Robert Lynch, grabbed the victim's purse. He then fled on foot, jumped over a fence, and got into an automobile driven by Arthur James Fantroy. Lynch and Fantroy were tried as codefendants, and both were found guilty of second degree robbery. § 13A-8-42, Ala.Code 1975. Lynch was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment on the second degree robbery conviction. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction, without an opinion, and subsequently denied rehearing.
This Court granted the petition for certiorari review. On August 17, 1990, we issued an opinion (Ex parte Lynch, 587 So.2d 303 (Ala.1990)) remanding this case to the Court of Criminal Appeals in order for that court to comply with its decision in Fantroy v. State, 560 So.2d 1143 (Ala.Cr.App.1989). In Fantroy, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that Fantroy, Lynch's codefendant, could not be guilty of second degree robbery, as a matter of law, because he was not "actually present" within the meaning of § 13A-8-42. Under the facts, Fantroy could be guilty only of robbery in the third degree. That court ordered that Fantroy's conviction for second degree robbery be set aside and that he be adjudged guilty of third degree robbery and be sentenced accordingly.
This Court ordered the Court of Criminal Appeals to comply with Fantroy, because Lynch also could not be convicted of second degree robbery, because § 13A-8-42 requires, for that crime, that at least two robbers be "actually present." Ex parte Lynch, supra. Instead, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed Lynch's conviction and remanded the case for a new trial based on a different issue. (Lynch v. State, 587 So.2d 305 (Ala.Crim.App.1990)). We find that the Court of Criminal Appeals' reversal goes beyond the mandate of this Court's order of remand. "On remand, the issues decided by the appellate court become law of the case and the trial court's duty is to comply with the appellate mandate 'according to its true intent and meaning, as determined by the directions given by the reviewing court.' " Walker v. Carolina Mills Lumber Co., 441 So.2d 980 (Ala.Civ.App.1983), citing Ex parte Alabama Power Co., 431 So.2d 151 (Ala.1983). This principle also applies when a mandate from a reviewing court is issued to a lower appellate court.
In the instant case, the directions given by this Court were clear. The Court of Criminal Appeals, after it affirmed this petitioner's conviction, considered the conviction of his codefendant, Arthur James Fantroy; it reversed Fantroy's conviction, discussing the identical issue presented in Ex parte Lynch, supra, of whether a defendant could be convicted of second degree robbery if his codefendant was not "actually present" for purposes of § 13A-8-42. Specifically, the Court stated:
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Simmons v. State
... ... "On remand, the issues decided by an appellate court become the law of the case, and the trial court's duty is to comply with the directions given by the reviewing court. Lynch v. State, 587 So.2d 306 (Ala.1991) ; McGee v. State, 620 So.2d 145 (Ala.Cr.App.1993) ." ... Ellis v. State, 705 So.2d 843, 847 (Ala.Cr. App.1996) ... Thus, because the trial court was without jurisdiction to impose sentence for the conviction in Count II, we remand this cause ... ...
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Nichols v. Encompass Health Corp. (Ex parte Encompass Health Corp.)
... ... See Dickerson v. Alabama State Univ. , 852 So. 2d 704, 705 (Ala. 2002) ("The general rule is that a trial court's order is not final unless it disposes of all claims as to all ... 1998). Generally, a lower court exceeds its authority by addressing issues already decided by an appellate court's decision in that case. Lynch v. State , 587 So. 2d 306, 308 (Ala. 1991). In Anderson v. State , 796 So. 2d 1151, 1156 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000) (opinion on return to remand), the ... ...
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Dubose Constr. Co. v. Dubose Constr. Co.
... ... See Ex parte Alabama Power Co., 431 So.2d 151, 155 (Ala.1983) (quoting 5 Am.Jur.2d Appeal and Error 991 (1962)). In Lynch v. State, 587 So.2d 306, 307 (Ala.1991), the Supreme Court of Alabama held that a lower court acts beyond its authority if it takes any action on ... ...
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Anderson v. State
... ... However, by vacating Anderson's conviction and sentence for first-degree kidnapping and reinstating his guilty plea to second-degree kidnapping, the trial court exceeded the scope of our remand order, and thus exceeded its jurisdiction. Pursuant to the Alabama Supreme Court's holding in Lynch v. State, 587 So.2d 306 (Ala.1991), any act by a trial court beyond the scope of an appellate court's remand order is void for lack of jurisdiction. See also Ellis v. State, 705 So.2d 843, 847 (Ala.Crim.App.1996) (stating that on remand, "the trial court had no jurisdiction to modify the original ... ...