Lynch v. State

• Decision Date: 03 June 2016
• Docket Number: CR–14–1582.
• Parties: Marvin Dallas LYNCH v. STATE of Alabama
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

229 So.3d 260

Marvin Dallas LYNCH

v.STATE of Alabama

CR–14–1582.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

June 3, 2016.

Marvin Dallas Lynch, pro se.

Luther Strange, atty. gen., and Kristi O. Wilkerson, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.

KELLUM, Judge.

Marvin Dallas Lynch appeals the circuit court's summary dismissal of his petition for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Rule 32, Ala. R.Crim. P., in which he attacked his 2008 convictions for one count of first-degree robbery, one count of second-degree theft of property, and one count of reckless endangerment, and his resulting sentences, as a habitual offender, of 60 years' imprisonment for the robbery conviction, 10 years' imprisonment for the theft conviction, and 1 year's imprisonment for the reckless-endangerment conviction. This Court affirmed Lynch's convictions and sentences in an unpublished memorandum issued on July 24, 2009. Lynch v. State (No. CR–08–0375), 57 So.3d 205 (Ala.Crim.App.2009) (table). The Alabama Supreme Court denied certiorari review, and this Court issued a certificate of judgment on May 7, 2010.

On June 29, 2015, Lynch filed this, his second, Rule 32 petition.¹ Lynch alleged in his petition: (1) that the State suppressed exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) ; (2) that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to render the judgments and to impose the sentences for first-degree robbery and second-degree theft because, he said, those convictions violate double-jeopardy principles; and (3) that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to render the judgments or to impose the sentences for first-degree robbery, second-degree theft, and reckless endangerment because, he said, there was no probable cause to support the arrest warrant.

On or about July 16, 2015, the State filed a response to Lynch's petition, arguing that Lynch's claims were precluded by Rules 32.2(a)(3) and (a)(5), that they were insufficiently pleaded, and that they were meritless. On July 21, 2015, the circuit court issued an order summarily dismissing Lynch's petition. On July 29, 2015, Lynch filed a reply to the State's response. On or about August 5, 2015, the State filed an amended response, admitting to clerical mistakes in its initial response, mistakes Lynch had pointed out in his reply. On August 17, 2015, the circuit court issued an order setting aside its July 21, 2015, order on the ground that additional pleadings had been filed and, after considering the additional pleadings, the court again summarily dismissed Lynch's petition, finding "that the Petition is not sufficiently specific, fails to state a claim or that no material issue of fact or law exists which would entitle [Lynch] to relief under this Rule 32 and that no purpose would be served by any further proceeding." (C. 99.)

On appeal, Lynch reasserts the three claims he raised in his petition. The facts of the crimes are necessary for a better understanding of Lynch's claims.² In our unpublished memorandum affirming Lynch's convictions and sentences, this Court set out the following facts:

"On the morning of April 23, 2008, 72–year–old D.H. Edmondson drove his truck to his barn and noticed that a truck was parked partially in the driveway near the barn. Edmondson got out of his truck and saw Lynch, whom he had never seen before, and asked Lynch ‘[A]re you broke down, lost?’ One of Edmondson's new transmissions was in the back of Lynch's truck. Lynch grabbed Edmondson in a ‘bear hug’ and the two men ‘scuffled’ down the driveway. Lynch pushed Edmondson down and struck Edmondson on his back with an object. Lynch removed Edmondson's .22 rifle from the cab of Edmondson's truck and began shooting. Edmondson crawled around to the passenger side of his truck as gunshots striking the road caused gravel to strike him.

"Lynch got into his truck, and Edmondson got into his truck. Edmondson rammed his truck into Lynch's truck as Lynch drove down the driveway. After leaving Edmondson's property, but before being apprehended by police, Lynch engaged in a high speed automobile chase with police, followed by a chase on foot."

Additionally, we point out that after being apprehended, Lynch gave police a statement denying any involvement in the crimes. However, a few days later, Lynch gave the following statement to police:

"On the day this happened, I went riding around looking for scrap metal. I had left Roanoke and had driven to Lafayette. The fence posts [found in Lynch's truck] I got in Roanoke, and the 5th wheel and rims [found in Lynch's truck] I got across the street from the fire department in Lafayette. I then went back to the car wash to close my tailgate and check my tire. I then drove to the Big Cat and got 15 dollars worth of gas. I was driving towards Wadley on H[ighway] 77 when I saw a barn up a dirt drive. I turned around and pulled up into the drive, got out and rolled up [to] a couple of blue pumps. A man in a red truck pulled up behind my truck. The man was sitting in his truck and I asked him who owned this property and he said, ‘I do.’ Then I asked the man if he wanted to get rid of some of the scrap he had up there and he said ‘Hell no’ and ‘that looks like my transmission on the back of your truck.’ I had gotten the transmission loaded before the man got there. I told the man that he was crazy as hell, and I'm getting outta [sic] here. I got into my truck, and I saw the man standing at the back of my truck holding a rifle. He fired one shot over my truck. I got out of my truck and told the old man I didn't have his stuff. I had my hands up and he turned away from me and said come with me. I then saw he wasn't looking, and I grabbed the gun and pushed it into the ground. I had my finger on the trigger and 5 rounds got fired into the ground while [I tried] to get the gun away from the old man. When I finally got the gun away, I put it in the cab of my truck and the man was laying on the ground. I then motioned for the man to get in his truck and back up and get out of the way. The man got in his truck, and he rammed my truck, causing my door to slam. I open[ed] the door and got in my truck, as I was trying to leave, the man sideswiped me with his truck. I spun out, and I think his truck went on down into the field. I then got on H[ighway] 77 and head[ed] back towards Lafayette, and I turned off on the first road to the right. I then traveled on that road which was the first dirt road to the left. I went a little ways and then threw the transmission off my truck into the woods. I drove a little further, then threw the gun into a creek. I then went to some guy named ‘Dawg’ and got him to fix my flat tire. After that I left from there and ended back up on H[ighway] 77 headed towards Wadley. I then got saw [sic] by one of the deputies and I got scared and ran. I eventually pulled over, got out of the truck and ran into the woods where I was later caught by Deputies. When I was in the back of the police car, when they opened the door for him to identify me, he, the old man, tried to pull a gun on me. This was nothing more than a simple case of theft and trespass that went bad when this guy tried to take the law into his own hands."

(Record on Direct Appeal, C. 48–50.)

Edmondson's rifle was later recovered from a creek; the transmission was not recovered.

I.

Lynch first reasserts on appeal the claim from his petition that the State suppressed exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).

Lynch alleged in his petition that the State had suppressed statements the victim, D.H. Edmondson, had made to police the day of the crimes. Lynch asserted that Edmondson's statements to police conflicted with his testimony at trial and established that Edmondson had perjured himself at trial. Specifically, Lynch asserted that Edmondson had testified at trial that after he and Lynch had struggled, Lynch had reached into Edmondson's truck, taken Edmondson's rifle, and fired the rifle in Edmondson's direction.

Edmondson denied at trial that he had gotten out of his truck holding his rifle, that he had pointed the rifle at Lynch, or that he had fired the rifle in Lynch's direction—as Lynch asserted in his second statement to police. Lynch also stated that Edmondson had testified at trial that he had suffered injuries from his encounter with Lynch, including a swollen hand and a bruised back

. Lynch alleged, however, that Edmondson had given statements to police in which he stated that he "did not sustain any injuries, and that he did got out [sic] the truck with his .22 caliber rifle, and a struggle over the gun did happen." (C. 42.) In other words, Lynch alleged that Edmondson's statements to police mirrored his own statement to police placing the blame for the incident on Edmondson.

"To [establish] a Brady violation, a defendant must show that ‘ "(1) the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) the evidence was favorable to the defendant; and (3) the evidence was material to the issues at trial." ’ Johnson v. State, 612 So.2d 1288, 1293 (Ala.Cr.App.1992), quoting Stano v. Dugger, 901 F.2d 898, 899 (11th Cir.1990), cert. denied, Stano v. Singletary, 516 U.S. 1122, 116 S.Ct. 932, 133 L.Ed.2d 859 (1996). See Smith v. State, 675 So.2d 100 (Ala.Cr.App.1995). ‘ "The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." ' Johnson, 612 So.2d at 1293, quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3383, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985)."

Freeman v. State, 722 So.2d 806, 810 (Ala.Crim.App.1998). "The term suppression ‘means non-disclosure of evidence that the prosecutor, and not the defense attorney, knew to be in existence." Donahoo v. State, 552 So.2d 887, 895 (Ala.Crim.App.1989) (quoting Ogden v. Wolff, 522...