Lynch v. State, No. 473S69

Docket NºNo. 473S69
Citation262 Ind. 360, 316 N.E.2d 372
Case DateSeptember 11, 1974
CourtSupreme Court of Indiana

Page 372

316 N.E.2d 372
262 Ind. 360
Perry Lee LYNCH, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
No. 473S69.
Supreme Court of Indiana.
Sept. 11, 1974.

[262 Ind. 361]

Page 373

Arnold Paul Baratz, Indianapolis, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., John Meyers, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

De BRULER, Justice.

The Marion County Grand Jury indicted appellant, Perry Lee Lynch, for the crimes of Rape (I.C.1971, 35--13--4--3, being Burns' § 10--4201), and Kidnapping (I.C.1971, 35--1--55--1, being Burns' § 10--2901), perpetrated upon one Holly. Lynch was convicted on both charges after a trial by jury in the Marion Criminal Court, Special Judge David McNamar presiding, and sentened to concurrent terms of two to twenty-one years and life imprisonment respectively. He has now perfected an appeal to this Court in which he alleges two grounds for the reversal of this judgment: (1) That the conviction on the charge of rape is not supported by sufficient evidence; (2) that the trial court erred in not declaring a mistrial because of two instances of alleged prosecutorial misconduct during the trial.

The evidence elicited at the trial below shows that on the evening of August 20, 1971, Holly, and two friends, Donna and Vicky, visited the Indiana State Fair in Indianapolis. Sometime after 10:00 p.m., they left the fair and returned [262 Ind. 362] to Holly's car in order to return home. As they approached the car Holly noticed that one door was partially open and the convertible roof had been slit. The three women decided to leave the area as rapidly as possible, but before they were able to do so two men appeared with guns. One of the men, identified at trial by both Holly and Donna as the appellant Lynch, pointed a pistol at Donna and ordered all three women into the back seat of the car. The appellant then got in the front passenger seat while his companion occupied the driver's seat. They drove for about ten minutes to the Washington Park Zoo in Indianapolis. During the drive the appellant faced the three women in the back seat and held a gun pointed at them. He spoke several times telling them not to try to escape or attract the attention of other motorists.

Upon arriving at Washington Park Zoo the appellant forced Donna to disrobe, threatened to kill her if she resisted and had intercourse with her in the back seat of the car. The other two girls were kept under surveillance outside the car by appellant's companion. After several minutes the appellant came over to where his companion and the girls were and told the other man that they would have to leave the area because he could see car lights across the park. The men then forced the two girls to get back in the car. They drove for another three or four blocks and parked in an alley behind some buildings. Holly and Vicky were again ordered out and this

Page 374

time the appellant stood guard over them while his companion raped Donna.

Appellant next told Holly to get in the back seat. He threatened to shoot her if she did not cooperate and he forced her to take her clothes off. Holly testified at the trial that the appellant then raped her while holding a gun in his right hand pointed at her head. The appellant then traded places with his companion who also raped Holly.

All the women were then ordered back in the car and the appellant and his companion drove around some more. After a while they stopped the car, got out and told the women to [262 Ind. 363] drive away without looking back. Holly drove a short distance and then flagged down an Indianapolis City Police car. The officer placed a brief description of the assailants on the radio and escorted the women to the Marion County General Hospital where they were examined, treated and released the following day.

Before specifically addressing appellant's claim of insufficiency of the evidence we feel constrained to again reiterate that when called upon to decide this issue it is not our proper function as an appellate court to weigh the evidence at the trial below nor to decide questions concerning the credibility of witnesses. Priola v. State (1973), Ind., 292 N.E.2d 604. Rather we look to that evidence most supportive of the verdict and determine whether that evidence, along with the reasonable inferences which a jury might draw from it, is sufficient in probative value to establish all the necessary elements of the offense charged. Turner v. State (1972), Ind., 287 N.E.2d 339.

In this case the appellant asserts that the evidence outlined above is not sufficient to establish that he committed the crime of rape upon Holly. The statute with which we are concerned here provides in part:

'Whoever has...

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22 practice notes
  • Stacks v. State, No. 3-1175A263
    • United States
    • Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • February 22, 1978
    ...court to accurately gauge the surrounding circumstances of the testimony and its probable impact on the jury. Lynch v. State (1974), 262 Ind. 360, 316 N.E.2d 372. Under ordinary circumstances, a jury admonition to disregard the Page 1210 statement is deemed sufficient to overcome any prejud......
  • Sizemore v. State, No. 1079S295
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court of Indiana
    • October 25, 1979
    ...Page 785 alone. Harris v. State, (1978) Ind., 373 N.E.2d 149; Beard v. State, (1975) 262 Ind. 643, 323 N.E.2d 216; Lynch v. State, (1974) 262 Ind. 360, 316 N.E.2d The Court of Appeals quotes extensively from Vuncannon v. State, (1970) 254 Ind. 206, 258 N.E.2d 639 for the requirement of more......
  • Lottie v. State, No. 779S200
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court of Indiana
    • June 23, 1980
    ...trial court to add the last line to this instruction; but neither was it improper or erroneous for it to do so. In Lynch v. State, (1974) 262 Ind. 360 at 364, 316 N.E.2d 372 at 375, we emphasized that "penetration, not ejaculation, is the essential element of the crime of rape. The presence......
  • Skaggs v. State, No. 4-781A45
    • United States
    • Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • July 26, 1982
    ...(1978) Ind., 382 N.E.2d 170; Harris v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 12, 373 N.E.2d 149. Furthermore, we emphasized in Lynch v. State, (1974) 262 Ind. 360, 316 N.E.2d 372, that penetration, not ejaculation, is the essential element of the crime of rape. Here, the victim testified that the defendan......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
22 cases
  • Stacks v. State, No. 3-1175A263
    • United States
    • Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • February 22, 1978
    ...court to accurately gauge the surrounding circumstances of the testimony and its probable impact on the jury. Lynch v. State (1974), 262 Ind. 360, 316 N.E.2d 372. Under ordinary circumstances, a jury admonition to disregard the Page 1210 statement is deemed sufficient to overcome any prejud......
  • Sizemore v. State, No. 1079S295
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court of Indiana
    • October 25, 1979
    ...Page 785 alone. Harris v. State, (1978) Ind., 373 N.E.2d 149; Beard v. State, (1975) 262 Ind. 643, 323 N.E.2d 216; Lynch v. State, (1974) 262 Ind. 360, 316 N.E.2d The Court of Appeals quotes extensively from Vuncannon v. State, (1970) 254 Ind. 206, 258 N.E.2d 639 for the requirement of more......
  • Lottie v. State, No. 779S200
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court of Indiana
    • June 23, 1980
    ...trial court to add the last line to this instruction; but neither was it improper or erroneous for it to do so. In Lynch v. State, (1974) 262 Ind. 360 at 364, 316 N.E.2d 372 at 375, we emphasized that "penetration, not ejaculation, is the essential element of the crime of rape. The presence......
  • Skaggs v. State, No. 4-781A45
    • United States
    • Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • July 26, 1982
    ...(1978) Ind., 382 N.E.2d 170; Harris v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 12, 373 N.E.2d 149. Furthermore, we emphasized in Lynch v. State, (1974) 262 Ind. 360, 316 N.E.2d 372, that penetration, not ejaculation, is the essential element of the crime of rape. Here, the victim testified that the defendan......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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