Lynfatt v. Escobar

• Decision Date: 09 March 2010
• Citation: Lynfatt v. Escobar, 71 A.D.3d 743, 896 N.Y.S.2d 450, 2010 N.Y. Slip Op. 1935 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010)
• Parties: Nakia LYNFATT, appellant,v.Jorge Lasluisa ESCOBAR, et al., respondents, et al., defendants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

71 A.D.3d 743

896 N.Y.S.2d 450

2010 N.Y. Slip Op. 01935

Nakia LYNFATT, appellant,

v.Jorge Lasluisa ESCOBAR, et al., respondents, et al., defendants.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

March 9, 2010.

Jonah Grossman, Jamaica, N.Y. (Lawrence B. Lame of counsel), for appellant.Condon & Forsyth LLP, New York, N.Y. (John Maggio of counsel), for respondents.A. GAIL PRUDENTI, P.J., MARK C. DILLON, RANDALL T. ENG, and SHERI S. ROMAN, JJ.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Nelson, J.), dated July 21, 2009, which granted the motion of the defendants Jorge Lasluisa Escobar and LAN Airlines S.A. for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them and denied her cross motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability against those defendants.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

On May 21, 2007, the plaintiff was employed at JFK International Airport by Swissport North America, Inc. (hereinafter Swissport), as a customer service representative and was assigned to Terminal 4. At approximately 11:15 P.M., the defendant Jorge Lasluisa Escobar was operating a van owned by his employer, the defendant, LAN Airlines S.A. (hereinafter together the defendants), in a designated lane outside of Terminal 4. Another vehicle, apparently owned by Swissport, approached Escobar's vehicle from an unauthorized area and crashed into the passenger side of Escobar's vehicle. In an attempt to avoid the collision, Escobar steered the vehicle to the left, causing it to crash into the ground floor window of Terminal 4. Escobar admitted that he was operating the vehicle at approximately 25 miles per hour, which exceeded the speed limit for that area of the airport. At the time of the occurrence, the plaintiff, who had been sitting with a co-worker in the Customs area of Terminal 4 waiting for an incoming flight, was startled by the loud noise caused by the crash, and allegedly sustained, inter alia, back and neck injuries upon jumping up from her seat. The plaintiff was not injured by the defendants' vehicle or any flying debris, as she was situated approximately 40 feet away from the accident scene.

The Supreme Court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them and denied the plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability against those defendants. We affirm.

To hold a defendant liable in common-law negligence, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, (2) a breach of that duty, and (3) that the breach constituted a proximate cause of the injury ( see Ingrassia v. Lividikos, 54 A.D.3d 721, 724, 864 N.Y.S.2d 449). “Without a duty running directly to the injured person there can be no liability in damages, however careless the conduct or foreseeable the harm” ( Lauer v. City of New York, 95 N.Y.2d 95, 100, 711 N.Y.S.2d 112, 733 N.E.2d 184). The existence and scope of an alleged tortfeasor's duty is a legal question to be...