Lynn v. Deaconess Medical Center-West Campus

• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
• Writing for the Court: Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, BEAM, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD; BEAM
• Citation: Lynn v. Deaconess Medical Center-West Campus, 160 F.3d 484 (8th Cir. 1998)
• Decision Date: 17 November 1998
• Docket Number: CENTER-WEST,No. 98-1110,98-1110
• Parties: 78 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 595, 74 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 45,588 Michael LYNN, Appellant, v. DEACONESS MEDICALCAMPUS, also known as Deaconess West Hospital, Appellee.

Page 484

160 F.3d 484

78 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 595,

74 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 45,588

Michael LYNN, Appellant, v. DEACONESS MEDICAL CENTER-WEST CAMPUS, also known as Deaconess West Hospital, Appellee.

No. 98-1110.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Sept. 21, 1998.

Decided Nov. 17, 1998.

Jonathan Berns, St. Louis, MO, argued (Jerome J. Dobson, St. Louis, MO, on the brief), for Appellant.

Paula Luepke, St. Louis, MO, argued (Kelly Field Farrell, St. Louis, MO, on the brief), for Appellee.

Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, BEAM, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

BEAM, Circuit Judge.

Michael Lynn appeals from the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of his former employer, Deaconess Medical Center-West Campus (Deaconess). Lynn alleges that Deaconess terminated him on the basis of his gender in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 and the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA), Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 213.010-213.137. For the reasons discussed below, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

Viewed in the light most favorable to Lynn, the record reveals the following facts. Lynn began working for Deaconess as a registered nurse in the Acute Rehabilitation Unit (Rehab Unit) on March 19, 1992. He initially held the position of charge nurse, and performed supervisory duties such as quality assurance, patient care, evaluation, and scheduling staff nurses and patient care technicians. His supervisor at this time was Cyndi Murphy. In March 1993, Jackie McClanahan replaced Murphy as director of the Rehab Unit. During this time period, no performance deficiencies were noted nor were any disciplinary actions taken against Lynn.

In April 1994, Patricia Shanks replaced McClanahan as director of the Rehab Unit. The hospital was also interviewing applicants for the position of Assistant Patient Care Manager in that unit. Lynn interviewed with Shanks for the position but he was rejected. Lynn had both a bachelor's and a master's degree in nursing and had been working for over two years as a charge nurse in the Rehab Unit. Instead, Shanks hired Janene Ford. Ford had only an associate nursing degree, no postgraduate nursing education, and had only been employed with Deaconess for four months as a staff nurse. After Ford assumed her position, Lynn reported directly to Ford instead of to Shanks. Shortly thereafter, Shanks decided that because the Rehab Unit was so small there was no need to employ both an Assistant Patient Care Manager and a charge nurse. She then demoted Lynn from charge nurse to staff nurse on July 17, 1994.

According to the record, complaints regarding Lynn's work performance began while he was still reporting to Shanks. On June 3, 1994, Shanks received a report that Lynn had lain on a couch and watched television during his shift. After confirming the report with another worker, Shanks verbally counseled Lynn. Lynn explained to Shanks that he was resting because he had not been feeling well. Shortly before Ford assumed her new position, Shanks told her about a family member's complaint that Lynn had not taken care of a patient after the patient had urinated in bed. Ford investigated the incident and concluded that there had been no wrongdoing by Lynn.

The record shows that in November and December of 1994, Lynn received verbal counseling from Ford on various issues such as allegedly arriving late to work, failing to comply with time-clocking policies, exhibiting a lack of productivity, and complaints about his lack of compassion towards staff and patients. Finding that Lynn's performance was not improving, Ford and Shanks issued two Letters of Understanding to Lynn on January 13, 1995. ¹ The first Letter of Understanding (Letter) stated that Lynn had been late for work by about five minutes on different occasions and that he failed to have his timecard signed when he clocked in late. The second Letter addressed three areas of concern: (1) incomplete documentation; (2) an attitude of disrespect and lack of compassion towards others; and (3) an ongoing failure to meet productivity standards. Lynn responded to these Letters with a written statement which explained that his time clocking and documentation procedures had been the result of confusion with earlier policies and not the result of willful neglect. Lynn denied the other charges.

According to his supervisors, Lynn showed improvement after he received these Letters, but after January 30, 1995, he again began to exhibit performance problems. On February 20, 1995, Lynn was issued a third Letter for allegedly diagnosing a patient. ² However, Ford's annual evaluation of Lynn's work performance in April 1995, described Lynn as "frequently exceed[ing] standards" in four of the twenty-four categories and as "meeting standards" in the other twenty categories.

Finally, two incidents occurred which resulted in Lynn's eventual discharge. On August 1, 1995, Lynn reportedly failed to assist a family member in attaching certain therapeutic equipment to her mother. On August 2, he allegedly failed to correctly prepare essential documents for a Patient Conference Team Meeting. On August 7, 1995, Ford and Shanks issued Lynn a Recommendation for Discharge on the ground that Lynn's work performance thus far reflected "a serious lack of appropriate nursing judgment" and they gave him the option of resigning. Lynn chose to resign on August 7, 1995.

Lynn then initiated the present action, alleging that Deaconess had discriminated against him on the basis of his gender in violation of Title VII and the MHRA. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Deaconess, and Lynn now appeals.

II. DISCUSSION

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, using the same standards as applied by the district court. See Hill v. St. Louis Univ., 123 F.3d 1114, 1118 (8th Cir.1997). Summary judgment is proper if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See id.; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party bears the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Webb v. Lawrence County, 144 F.3d 1131, 1134 (8th Cir.1998). In reviewing employment discrimination claims, we keep in mind the caution that summary judgment should seldom be used in discrimination cases. See Crawford v. Runyon, 37 F.3d 1338, 1341 (8th Cir.1994). Because such cases often depend on inferences rather than on direct evidence, summary judgment should not be granted unless the evidence could not support any reasonable inference for the nonmovant. See id.

Title VII and the MHRA declare it unlawful for an employer to discharge "or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's ... sex." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); see also Mo. Ann. Stat. § 213.055(1)(1)(a). Because Lynn has not put forth direct evidence of discrimination, his Title VII and MHRA claims are analyzed under the three-stage burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), and applied in countless other cases. ³ See, e.g., St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-08, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993); Rothmeier v. Inv. Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d 1328, 1332 (8th Cir.1996).

Under this framework, Lynn bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. See Rothmeier, 85 F.3d at 1332. Once a prima facie case is established, a rebuttable presumption of discrimination arises and the burden of production shifts to Deaconess to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for discharging him. See id. If Deaconess produces such a reason, the presumption disappears and Lynn bears the burden of proving that the proffered reason is merely a pretext for discrimination. See id. Lynn retains at all times the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the adverse employment action was motivated by intentional discrimination. See id.

Deaconess concedes that the first two stages of the McDonnell-Douglas framework have been met, i.e., that Lynn has established a prima facie case of discrimination and that Deaconess has sufficiently articulated a nondiscriminatory reason for discharging him. It argues, however, that Lynn has not produced sufficient evidence to meet his burden of establishing pretext.

We disagree. As proof of pretext, Lynn presented evidence that Deaconess disciplined female nurses in the Rehab Unit less severely than he was disciplined for conduct that was more egregious than his. Primarily, Lynn points to his supervisors' favorable treatment of another registered nurse in the Rehab Unit, Karen Mohr. ⁴ Instances of disparate treatment can support a claim of pretext, but Lynn has the burden of proving that he and the disparately treated female nurses were "similarly situated in all relevant respects." Harvey v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 38 F.3d 968, 972 (8th Cir.1994) (quotations omitted).

The record shows that beginning on February 3, 1995, Ford started receiving reports that Karen Mohr slept while on duty. Gail Washington, a patient care technician, reported to Ford that on one shift she had seen Mohr go into an empty patient's room, and take three 45-minute naps with the television on. Another patient care technician, Angie Washington, reported to Ford that during these naps Mohr would be sound asleep and difficult to arouse. It was only after Ford had received four reports of Mohr's sleeping that Ford finally talked to Mohr on May 24, 1995. For a few months following that counseling, Mohr performed adequately, but reports of her sleeping on the job began to surface again in November of that same year. It was...