Lyons v. Andersen

Decision Date01 December 2000
Docket NumberNo. C99-3093-PAZ.,C99-3093-PAZ.
Citation123 F.Supp.2d 485
PartiesHolly LYONS; Glenn Lyons; Chad Lyons, Chelsie Lyons and Jordon Lyons, Minors, by their Parents and Next Friends, Holly Lyons and Glenn Lyons, Plaintiffs, v. Arlan Lee ANDERSEN and Franklin Dale Bode dba Bode Trucking, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

Guy R. Cook of Grefe & Sidney, Des Moines, IA, Paul R. Doster of Fenchel & Doster, Algona, IA, for Plaintiffs.

R. Jeffrey Lewis, Kimberly Knoshaug of Lewis, Webster, Johnson, VanWinkle & Devolder, Des Moines, IA, for Defendants.

ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ZOSS, United States Magistrate Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

On a snowy night in November 1997, two vehicles traveling in opposite directions collided on a slippery road in rural Humboldt County, Iowa. At the time of the collision, one of the vehicles, an ambulance, was being driven by the plaintiff Holly Lyons ("Lyons"). The other vehicle, a semi tractor-trailer, was being driven by the defendant Arlan Lee Andersen ("Andersen"). Lyons alleges the collision resulted from Andersen's negligence, and claims she was seriously injured in the collision.

The plaintiffs commenced this action on November 10, 1999, by filing a petition in Humboldt County, Iowa, district court. The defendants removed the case to this court on December 6, 1999, based on diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (See Doc. No. 1) On April 4, 2000, the parties consented to jurisdiction over this case by a United States Magistrate Judge (Doc. No. 9), and on April 5, 2000, the Honorable Mark W. Bennett signed an order transferring the case to Magistrate Judge Paul A. Zoss (Doc. No. 10).

The case is now before the court on the defendants' combined motion for summary judgment and to exclude evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a), filed on October 27, 2000 (Doc. No. 27). The combined motion was resisted by the plaintiffs on November 9, 2000 (Doc. No. 34). The defendants filed a reply on November 16, 2000 (Doc. No. 58). The parties have filed the appropriate briefs and other papers supporting their respective positions on the motion (Doc. Nos. 28, 29, and 35), and on November 27, 2000, the court heard oral arguments on the motion. The court now deems the motion to be fully submitted.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

Just after midnight on November 14, 1997, Lyons was driving a 1991 Ford Life Ambulance southbound on Highway 169 in Humboldt County, Iowa. At the same time, Andersen was driving a 1985 Freightliner semi tractor-trailer northbound on Highway 169. The road was covered with snow and ice.

At about 12:03 a.m., the ambulance and Andersen's trailer collided near the center of the highway. The left front of the ambulance collided with the left rear of the trailer. The plaintiffs allege the trailer veered into Lyons's lane of travel, resulting in the collision. The defendants allege Andersen's tractor and trailer remained in his lane of travel, and therefore they claim Lyons must have crossed the center of the highway and into Andersen's lane of travel, resulting in the collision.

At the time of the collision, Shelly Ann Watnem ("Watnem") was a passenger in the ambulance being driven by Lyons. Lyons and Watnem were traveling to the scene of a bus accident in the course of their employment as emergency medical technicians. Andersen was operating his semi tractor under a continuous lease to the defendant Franklin Dale Bode ("Bode"). The trailer attached to Andersen's semi tractor was owned by Bode and was being hauled by Andersen under the lease. Displayed on Andersen's semi tractor was a placard with the words "Bode Trucking, Courtland, Mn," along with Bode's ICC and DOT numbers.

On May 10, 1999, Watnem filed an action against Andersen in this court alleging she was injured in the collision as a result of Andersen's negligence. See Watnem v. Andersen,1 No. C99-3038-PAZ (N.D.Iowa), Doc. No. 6. On March 20, 1999, Andersen moved to consolidate the present case with the Watnem case. The motion was not resisted by the Lyons plaintiffs, but was resisted by Watnem. See Watnem, Doc. Nos. 21 and 22. The court denied the motion, ruling as follows:

The court has broad discretion under Rule 42(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to consolidate cases pending in the same district. Powell v. Nat'l Football League, 764 F.Supp. 1351, 1359 (D.Minn. 1991); A/S Ludwig Mowinckles Rederi v. Tidewater Constr. Co., 559 F.2d 928 (4th Cir.1977); N.A.A.C.P. of Louisiana v. Michot, 480 F.2d 547 (5th Cir.1973).

Rule 42 requires the presence of common questions of law and fact as a prerequisite for any consolidation. Magnavox Co. v. APF Electronics, Inc., 496 F.Supp. 29 (N.D.Ill.1980). The fact that a common question of law exists does not, however, justify consolidation in the absence of other factors which would promote trial convenience and economy in administration. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Marine Nat'l Exchange Bank, 55 F.R.D. 436 (E.D.Wis.1972). Moreover, consolidation is not justified when the cases are in different phases of pretrial procedures. Schacht v. Javits, 53 F.R.D. 321 (S.D.N.Y.1971).

Thus, in determining whether consolidation is appropriate, "the court must balance the savings of time and effort resulting from consolidation against any inconvenience, delay or expense that it would cause. See, e.g., Rohm & Haas Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 525 F.Supp. 1298 1309 (D.Del.1981) (citations omitted)." Powell, 764 F.Supp. at 1359.

Finally, the party seeking consolidation bears the burden of establishing that it would promote judicial convenience and economy. Powell, 764 F.Supp. at 1359. Fleishman v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., 103 F.R.D. 623 (E.D.Wis.1984).

The court finds the plaintiff in the [Watnem] case would be prejudiced by consolidation at this late date, which would delay the trial of [the Watnem case]. In addition, the two cases the defendant seeks to consolidate are at widely differing stages; the [Lyons] case is just beginning, in terms of discovery and pretrial preparation, while the [Watnem] case is almost ready for trial. Accordingly, the motion to consolidate (Doc. No. 6) is denied.

(Doc. No. 12)

In June 2000, the Watnem case was tried to verdict before a jury. At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury was instructed on Watnem's theory that Andersen was negligent because of his failure to have his vehicle under control and his failure to operate his vehicle in a careful and prudent manner. On June 26, 2000, the jury returned a verdict finding no negligence on Andersen's part. Judgment was entered in favor of Andersen on June 26, 2000. See Watnem, Doc. No. 62. Thereafter, Watnem filed a motion for new trial, which was denied by the court2 and not appealed.

Throughout the Watnem trial, the Lyons's attorney, Paul Doster, sat at Watnem's counsel table, but the Lyons plaintiffs "deny any suggestion by the defendants that Lyons or Doster had any influence or control over the strategies implemented by Watnem in the Watnem trial such that Lyons had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the negligence of Andersen." (Doc. No. 35, ¶ 13) Lyons was not a party to the Watnem action, although Lyons did testify as a witness for Watnem at trial. Doster did not openly participate in the proceedings.

The defendants in the present case are seeking summary judgment under the doctrine of issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel.3 Advocating a defensive use of the doctrine, the defendants argue the Watnem jury's finding that Andersen was not negligent precludes relitigation of the same issue in this case. In addition, the defendant Bode argues that under applicable law, he cannot be held vicariously liable for any negligence Andersen may have committed. Each of these issues is addressed below.

Preliminarily, the court notes the defendants' motion also seeks to exclude evidence pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a).4 Rule 104(a) permits the court to decide evidentiary questions in advance of trial. See, e.g., Sorensen v. Shaklee Corp., 31 F.3d 638, 648 (8th Cir. 1994) (deciding prior to trial whether to admit expert scientific testimony); United States v. Hoelscher, 914 F.2d 1527, 1539-40 (8th Cir.1990) (deciding prior to trial whether to admit statements of co-conspirators); see also Newton v. Ryder Transp. Services, Inc., 206 F.3d 772, 775 (8th Cir. 2000).

To the extent the issues raised in the defendants' motion are case-dispositive, the court will address them in the context of summary judgment. To the extent the issues are not case-dispositive, the court will address them in the context of a motion under Rule 104(a) for a ruling on an evidentiary question in advance of trial.

III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Standards for Summary Judgment

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions for summary judgment and provides that either party to a lawsuit may move for summary judgment without the need for supporting affidavits. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a) & (b). Rule 56 further states that summary judgment

shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "A court considering a motion for summary judgment must view all the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, ... and give [the nonmoving party] the benefit of all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the facts." Lockhart v. Cedar Rapids Comm. Sch. Dist., 963 F.Supp. 805, 814 (N.D.Iowa 1997) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)).

The party seeking summary judgment must "`inform[ ] the district court of the basis for [the] motion and identify[] those portions of the record which show lack of a...

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