Lyons v. Appeal Bd. of Mich. Employment Sec. Commission, 36
| Decision Date | 26 April 1961 |
| Docket Number | No. 36,36 |
| Citation | 108 N.W.2d 849,363 Mich. 201 |
| Parties | Charies LYONS, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. APPEAL BOARD OF the MICHIGAN EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION, Defendant and Appellee, and The Michigan Employment Security Commission, Defendant and Appellant, and Chrysler Corporation, Defendant and Appellee. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Zwerding & Zwerding, Detroit, for plaintiff.
Paul L. Adams, Atty. Gen., for the State.
G. Lee Philip, Detroit, for defendant Chrysler Corp.
Before the Entire Bench.
This is a saga of modern American initiative--as to which we are asked to endorse a bitter penalty.
An auto-worker named Lyons had a wife, 7 children, a house and a job all located in a Detroit-area community. He was laid off from the job--but not from the other responsibilities.
While he was laid off and drawing unemployment compensation, Lyons heard about a chance for work at the Chrysler plant at Indianapolis--273 miles from his home in Trenton. Promptly he drove to Indianapolis, was offered a job, and took it.
What this record shows beyond all dispute is that Lyons was an optimist. Whatever his hopes may have been, 2 1/2 weeks later, the car he had depended on for transportation had broken down; the friend with whom he had planned to commute to Indianapolis nad gotten sick and quit; Lyons had received no overtime work or pay; and his 15-year-old son had left home. At this point, Lyons took stock and decided, in his own words, 'I just couldn't make it, that's all.'
It is suggested to us that this represents the sort of voluntary desertion of employment which the Employment Security Act forbids, and that Lyons, his wife and his 7 children must lose the benefit of all of the unemployment compensation as to which he had built up credits in his former job in Trenton.
No one argues that Lyons had any duty to take the Indianapolis job in the first place. Indeed, the inference is that he was stupid to do so. If he had spent most of his days in a rocking chair and never left the Detroit area to look for work, his unemployment compensation checks would have been safe enough.
Because our hardy optimist took a chance (along with a job) and soon found he 'couldn't make it,' he would be held to be a quitter of the 'voluntary' variety. As to him (and his wife and children), his decision in the Indianapolis employment office is to be made one of the sudden death variety.
We hold that this result is not in accord with the facts; is not in accord with the express language of the Employment Security Act; is not in accord with the basic purpose and spirit of the act. Further--although hardly controlling of decision--such a result would make a mockery of our claim that we prize the individual spirit of initiative.
This appeal requires interpretation of one of the disqualification provisions of the Employment Security Act. 1 Ultimately, it turns upon a single word. Yet that word expresses a concept which through the ages has provoked vast dispute amongst the world's greatest philosophers. It is the word 'voluntary.'
Except in one particular, the facts are not at issue.
The claimant, Charles Lyons, worked for Chrysler Corporation at its Trenton, Michigan, engine division plant. He lived with his wife and 7 children at Trenton, where he was buying his home. He was laid off July 15, 1957, because of lack of work. He applied for and began to receive unemployment compensation.
A month later, having heard of job possibilities there, claimant drove 273 miles to Indianapolis, Indiana, where on August 19 he hired in as a cutter grinder at the Chrysler Indianapolis plant. He claims that on being hired he was promised overtime which he said was important to him because of the distance of the job away from his home. A company witness admitted telling Lyons the cutter grinding department was working overtime, but denied any promise.
After working 2 1/2 weeks without overtime or any early prospect of it, claimant quit the job in Indianapolis. On his return to Trenton, he reapplied for unemployment compensation. At a hearing before a referee, he gave this testimony:
As frosting on the cake of his trouble, Lyons got word from home that his 15-year-old son had left home to look for work.
The referee who heard the case held that claimant 'left his work of his own volition, his own choice and election,' that there was no express agreement ont he part of the employer to give him overtime work, and that claimant was disqualified for benefits under Section 29(1)(a)(1) for the duration of his unemployment.
The appeal board affirmed the referee's decison in toto.
On appeal in the nature of certiorari, the circuit judge reversed the decision of the appeal board. The preliminary reasoning in his opinion was:
The logic of this reasoning would suggest that the circuit judge did not believe that claimant's leaving the job was 'voluntary.' The reversal, however, the circuit judge pinned squarely to a holding that the disqualification provision of Section 29(1)(a)- (1) did not apply to workmen outside of Michigan, or to plants outside of Michigan.
This led appellant, Michigan employment security commission, to suggest the following as the sole question to be decided:
'Is Section 29(1)(a)(1) of the employment security act, which disqualifies an individual if he leaves his work voluntarily without good cause attributable to his 'employer' or 'employing unit,' applicable to separations from work performed outside the State of Michigan?'
Whereupon, appellee-claimant added a second one:
'Where an individual accepts employment under circumstances where a refusal would not disqualify him for unemployment compensation benefits, does his leaving necessarily constitute a voluntary leaving without good cause attributable to his employer or employing unit?'
We believe appellant Michigan employment security commission's question must be answered affirmatively. The disqualification does apply to employment outside of Michigan.
Nothing in the language of the disqualification section itself supports a contrary view. It says:
'Sec. 29. (1) An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:
'(a) For the duration of his unemployment in all cases where the individual has: (1) left his work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the employer, or employing unit, * * *' C.L.S.1956, § 421.29 (Stat.Ann.1960 Rev. § 17.531).
Further, the contrary interpretation is in conflict with those provisions of the act which recognize the mobility of labor and provide for reciprocal agreements between States for one State to pay accrued benefits to an employee after he has moved to another State and become unemployed there.
Further, such an interpretation is in obvious conflict with the basic scheme of the act. See Section 42(2) (C.L.S.1956, § 421.42 [Stat.Ann.1960 Rev. § 17.545(2)]). Many employees of Michigan firms work temporarily outside of the State, or partly within and partly without the State. To hold that the disqualification section is not applicable to them when they are employed across State lines would result in imposition of far more stringent standards of conduct on employees working wholly in Michigan than those whose employment takes them outside of the State.
We recognize that the circuit judge relied upon the specific wording of the statutory difinition of 'employing unit' in Section 40. 2
A careful reading of this section does not result in the conclusion that it must be read as holding the disqualification clause inapplicable to out-of-State employment. It does say that for an employing unit to be covered by the Michigan act, it must have some employees who do work for it 'within the State.' This is customary and perhaps necessary language when the Michigan statute also levies a tax upon the employing unit as does this statute. But this definition does not by its language or necessary implication require us to adopt an interpretation of Section 29(1)(a)(1) which is so obviously out of accord with the balance of the act.
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