Lyons v. Board of Directors of School Administrative Dist. No. 43

• Decision Date: 09 January 1986
• Parties: 29 Ed. Law Rep. 1074 Robert LYONS v. BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF SCHOOL ADMINISTRATIVE DISTRICT NO. 43.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 233

503 A.2d 233

29 Ed. Law Rep. 1074

Robert LYONS v. BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF SCHOOL ADMINISTRATIVE DISTRICT NO. 43.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued Sept. 13, 1985.

Decided Jan. 9, 1986.

Hanscom & Carey, P.A., Thomas S. Carey (orally), Rumford, for plaintiff.

David W. Austin (orally), Rumford, for defendant.

Before McKUSICK, C.J., and NICHOLS, VIOLETTE, WATHEN, GLASSMAN and SCOLNIK, JJ.

SCOLNIK, Justice.

The Board of Directors of School Administrative District No. 43 (Board) appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court, Oxford County, vacating the Board's decision that discharged Robert Lyons from his employment as a bus driver and custodian. On appeal, the Board contends that the court erred because the Board's decision to discharge the plaintiff was warranted by its findings of fact and supported by competent evidence. Because the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to decide this case on a complaint brought pursuant to Rule 80B of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure, we vacate the judgment and remand for dismissal of the complaint.

I.

The facts may be summarized as follows: On January 30, 1984, the plaintiff was doing volunteer work at the Mexico Recreation Center in Mexico, building a sauna in the boys' locker room. He had been working on the project during his off-hours from his employment by the district as a custodian and bus driver. At that time, the plaintiff, who was also Director of the Mexico Recreation Department, was found by two members of the Recreation Department in an unlit hallway outside a locked and unused door to the girls' locker room, located in the basement of the recreation center. Girls participating in a basketball program sponsored by the junior high school were using the locker room at that time. The unused door had a keyhole that could be employed by a person to look directly in the shower area of the locker room. No one actually saw the plaintiff looking through the keyhole. The plaintiff stated that he was merely listening to the activity in the locker room after having used the corridor to ensure that an outside door was secure.

On February 13, 1984, the Board conducted a hearing concerning the incident. The plaintiff was present as were the two members of the Recreation Department who discovered him. All three made statements and answered questions put to them by the Board. During the hearing, members of the Board went to the recreation center and viewed the girls' locker room and adjoining rooms and hallways. After the hearing and in public session, by a vote of six to four, the Board discharged the plaintiff for the stated reason that his employment "would no longer be profitable to the school district."

On March 15, 1984, pursuant to Rule 80B, the plaintiff filed in the Superior Court a complaint that contained two counts, one for "Review of Governmental Rule," the other for "Wrongful Discharge of Employment." ¹ In Count I, the plaintiff alleged that, in discharging him, the Board failed to follow the educational policy of the school district, including the "rules and discipline" procedures for nonteaching personnel, and thus, the Board's decision was arbitrary and capricious. On motion of the Board, the court dismissed Count II of the plaintiff's complaint on July 6, 1984, because a Rule 80B review offered a "complete remedy" to the plaintiff. The plaintiff's subsequent motion to reconsider the dismissal of the wrongful discharge claim was denied. ²

On September 10, 1984, after a review of the parties' stipulation of facts and briefs, the court remanded the matter to the Board to make additional findings to enable the court to conduct a review pursuant to Rule 80B. The Board made an additional finding of fact that the plaintiff had looked through the keyhole while the locker room was in use.

On March 11, 1985, after a second hearing, the court vacated the decision of the Board. It found the Board's factual finding that the plaintiff looked through the keyhole was not supported by the evidence. The court concluded there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that the plaintiff listened to the activity in the girls' locker room. However, since the Board did not decide that this conduct fell within a category of the district's "rules and discipline" guidelines that called for immediate dismissal, the court remanded the proceeding to the Board for the imposition of appropriate lesser sanctions. It is from that decision that the Board appeals. At oral argument, we raised the issue whether the decision of the Board is reviewable on a complaint brought pursuant to Rule 80B. At our request, both parties submitted supplemental briefs. Because we conclude that this matter is not reviewable under Rule 80B of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure, we vacate the judgment.

II.

Rule 80B does not create an independent right to appeal any governmental action to the Superior Court. It only provides a procedural avenue for those disputes in which the court has jurisdiction. See, e.g., Colby v. York County Comm'rs, 442 A.2d 544, 547 (Me.1982). In order for the Superior Court to review the Board's action on a complaint filed solely on the basis of Rule 80B(a), review must either be provided by statute or be otherwise available by law. Rule 80B(a) provides in part When review by the Superior Court, whether by appeal or otherwise, of any action or failure or refusal to act by a governmental agency, including any department, board, commission or officer, is provided by statute or is otherwise available by law, proceedings for such review shall ... be governed by these Rules of Civil Procedure as modified by this rule.

(emphasis added).

There is no statutory right of appeal from a ruling of the Board. Cf. Mutton Hill Estates v. Town of Oakland, 468 A.2d 989, 991 (Me.1983) ( 30 M.R.S.A. § 2411(3)(F) (1978)). Thus, we must determine whether judicial review here is "otherwise available by law."

Review is deemed "otherwise available by law" if it is in the nature of that formerly available under the common law extraordinary writs, such as certiorari, mandamus or prohibition, adapted to current conditions. See, e.g., Bolduc v. Androscoggin County Comm'rs, 485 A.2d 655, 657 (Me.1984); M.R.Civ.P. 80B advisory committee's note to 1983 amend., Me.Rptr., 459-466 A.2d XLII, XLIII. Until 1967, the writ of certiorari was the appropriate procedure to invoke judicial review of actions taken by a governmental agency performing a judicial or a quasi-judicial function. Cunningham v. Kittery Planning Bd., 400 A.2d 1070, 1077 (Me.1979); see generally 2 R. Field, V. McKusick & L. Wroth, Maine Civil Practice §§ 80B.I, 81.9-.13 (2d ed.1970 and Supp.1981); Comment, Rule 80B and Nonstatutory Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Maine, 23 Maine L.Rev. 419 (1971). ³ While we recognize that judicial review pursuant to the rule is not limited to those previous situations where certiorari was exercised, see M.R.Civ.P. 80B advisory committee's note to 1983 amend., supra, at XLIII-XLIV, the principle governing the right to review is nevertheless still based on whether the governmental agency acted in a quasi-judicial manner.

An agency's actions are quasi-judicial in nature when it adjudicates the rights of a party before it. Carter v. Wilkins, 160 Me. 290, 294-95, 203 A.2d 682, 683-84 (1964); see also Inhabitants of North Berwick v. State Bd. of Educ., 227 A.2d 462, 467 (Me.1967). In Carter v. Wilkins, we noted that:

Whether an act is judicial or quasi-judicial so as to be reviewable by certiorari depends on the nature of the act performed, rather than on the character of the officer or body performing it. Judicial action is an adjudication on the rights of the parties who, in general, appear or are brought before the tribunal by notice or process, and on whose claims some decision or judgment is rendered.

160 Me. at 294, 203 A.2d at 684 (quoting 14 Am.Jur.2d Certiorari § 17, at 794 (1964)). Thus, if the record before us fails to demonstrate that the Board did adjudicate a right of the plaintiff, then the Board did not act in a quasi-judicial manner, and therefore, review is not "otherwise available by law."

Neither the record of the Board's proceedings being reviewed, as stipulated pursuant to Rule 80B(e), nor the parties' briefs provide any detail concerning the conditions, duration or other terms of the plaintiff's employment. There is no indication that the plaintiff had any right that restricted the Board's discretion to terminate his employment. The plaintiff has not claimed that a statute existed that conferred rights upon him, thus, restricting the Board's action. See, e.g., Bolduc v. Androscoggin County Comm'rs, 485 A.2d 655 (Me.1984) (statutory right that county employee be dismissed "only for cause"); Winship v. Brewer School Comm., 390 A.2d 1089 (Me.1978) (statutory right that teacher be dismissed if either unfit to teach or would be unprofitable to the school district); see also Frye v. Inhabitants of Cumberland, 464 A.2d 195 (Me.1983); Colby v. York County Comm'rs, 442 A.2d 544 (Me.1982); McLaughlin v. Machias School Comm., 385 A.2d 53 (Me.1978); Wright v. Superintending School Comm., City of Portland, 331 A.2d 640 (Me.1975); Hopkins v. Inhabitants of Bucksport, 119 Me. 437, 111 A. 734 (1920); Andrews v. King, 77 Me. 224 (1885). Nor has the plaintiff claimed that a constitutional right restricted the Board's action. See, e.g., Solmitz v. Maine School Admin. Dist. No. 59, 495 A.2d 812 (Me.1985) (teacher, scheduled speaker and student sought review of a school board's decision to cancel a speaking program at a school-wide assembly pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1983) and Rule 80B based on the allegation that the Board's action violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights).

The plaintiff suggests that he had such a right because the school district's educational policy statements restricted the Board's discretion in the discharge of its employees. The parties...