Lyons v. Illinois Greyhound Lines, 10452.

• Decision Date: 01 November 1951
• Docket Number: No. 10452.,10452.
• Citation: 192 F.2d 533
• Parties: LYONS v. ILLINOIS GREYHOUND LINES, Inc.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

192 F.2d 533 (1951)

LYONS v. ILLINOIS GREYHOUND LINES, Inc.

No. 10452.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

November 1, 1951.

Luis Kutner, Reginald E. Goodwin, Chicago, Ill., for appellant.

Earle C. Hurley, John J. Sharon, Chicago, Ill. (Ryan, Condon & Livingston, Chicago, Ill., of counsel), for appellee.

Before MAJOR, Chief Judge, KERNER and DUFFY, Circuit Judges.

KERNER, Circuit Judge.

This appeal is from the dismissal of an action to recover damages for injuries alleged to have been sustained by plaintiff, a Negro woman, as a result of unlawful discrimination against her while a passenger on a motor vehicle engaged in interstate commerce. Jurisdiction was based solely on the alleged violation of Art. 1, § 8, Cl. 3 of the Constitution of the United States, and § 216(a) and (d) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C.A. § 316(a) and (d). Defendant moved to dismiss for want of jurisdiction, relying on 49 U.S.C.A. § 304(c), providing for investigation of complaints of non-compliance with any provisions of the Act by the Interstate Commerce Commission. The court sustained defendant's motion.

The only question presented is whether a federal district court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of the suit.

The complaint sets up the following facts. On or about September 9, 1949, plaintiff purchased a round trip ticket for transportation on defendant's bus line from Chicago, Illinois, to Ruleville, Mississippi. At Paducah, Kentucky, the bus driver compelled plaintiff and other negro passengers to "shove" to the rear of the bus behind a curtain. At Memphis, Tennessee, a different driver required Negro passengers, including plaintiff, to give up their seats for white persons and to move closer to the rear of the bus where there were insufficient seats for the negro passengers, and forced plaintiff to stand in the aisle of the bus although at the time there were vacant seats in the section reserved for white passengers which was separated from the back section by a movable black curtain. Plaintiff complained to the driver and asked him either to let her sit in one of the empty seats or to move the curtain closer to the front of the bus. In response the driver said, "I'm driving this bus and stay behind that curtain, I don't care whether you are standing up." Plaintiff was thus compelled to stand the entire distance from Memphis to Ruleville, a distance of about 150 miles, and for a period of about five hours. As a result she suffered physical and mental pain and her health was impaired. She asks damages for her own pain and suffering and also asks punitive damages "for the wilful, wanton and malicious action of the defendant from further unreasonable and unequal treatment of herself and other members of the negro race," and such further relief as justice may require.

Section 216(d) of the Interstate Commerce Act makes it unlawful for any common carrier by motor vehicle engaged in interstate commerce "to subject any particular person * * * to any unjust discrimination or any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever." There can be no question but that the conduct described in the complaint violates this statute, Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816, 70 S.Ct. 843, 94 L.Ed. 1302, and defendant does not deny that it was the conduct of its duly authorized agent acting in its behalf. It contends, however, that the court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter for the reason that Congress, in enacting the Interstate Commerce Act, conferred exclusive primary jurisdiction upon the Commission "to determine whether the practices or acts of an interstate motor carrier in a particular instance constitute an unreasonable or unlawful discrimination, under the Interstate Commerce Act." It relies on General American Tank Car Corp. v. El Dorado Terminal Co., 308 U.S. 422, 60 S.Ct. 325, 331, 84 L.Ed. 361, in support of this theory. That case differs from ours, however, in that there a complex state of facts involving the relative rights of the lessor and the lessee of tank cars to the mileage allowances required to be made by a carrier under the provisions of its duly filed tariff...