Lyons v. Labor Relations Com'n

• Decision Date: 30 May 1985
• Parties: , 24 Ed. Law Rep. 450 Joseph K. LYONS v. LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION. Whittier Regional Teachers Association, Intervener.
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

Page 243

476 N.E.2d 243

19 Mass.App.Ct. 562, 24 Ed. Law Rep. 450

Joseph K. LYONS v. LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION.

Whittier Regional Teachers Association, Intervener.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts,

Suffolk.

Argued, Oct. 18, 1984.

Decided April 1, 1985.

Further Appellate Review Granted May 30, 1985.

Glenn M. Taubman, Roslyn, N.Y. (Frederick V. Casselman, Boston, with him) for plaintiff.

John B. Cochran, Boston, for defendant.

Brian A. Riley, Boston, for intervener, submitted a brief.

Before PERRETTA, ROSE and DREBEN, JJ.

DREBEN, Justice.

Following the option offered in School Committee of Greenfield v. Greenfield Educ. Assn., 385 Mass. 70, 85, 431 N.E.2d 180 (1982), Joseph K. Lyons, a public school teacher and non-union member, brought a prohibited practice complaint before the Labor Relations Commission (Commission). He claimed that the union's ¹ demand of an agency fee in an amount equal to full union membership dues was in excess of the fee allowed under the Commission's regulations. 402 Code Mass.Regs. 17.04 (1982). ²

The Commission dismissed the complaint without a hearing and, after reviewing its decision at the request of Lyons, reaffirmed its dismissal for the reason that Lyons had failed to file his complaint within the forty-five day period prescribed by the Commission's regulations, 402 Code Mass.Regs. 17.06(2) (1982), ³ or to show good cause warranting a waiver of the forty-five day filing requirement.

Lyons filed a notice of appeal with the Commission seeking review in this court pursuant to G.L. c. 150E, § 11, but the Commission refused to assemble the record. Its letter of refusal stated: "Please be advised that dismissals of charges after a probable cause investigation are not final orders under Section 11 of G.L. c. 150E and are therefore not subject to judicial review."

Unable to docket his appeal in this court, see Mass.R.A.P. 9(d) and 10(a), as amended, 378 Mass. 936, 937 (1979), Lyons filed a motion with the single justice to order assembly of the record and to permit the appeal to be heard by a panel of the court. The single justice denied Lyons' motion, and this appeal is taken from that denial.

Appended to Lyons' motion before the single justice were copies of the papers which he asserted constituted the record before the Commission. In its supplemental brief, see note 5 infra, the Commission appended a copy of an additional document and acknowledged that, subject to this inclusion, this court has the documents (and more) which constitute the record for purposes of appeal.

We hold that the Commission was required to assemble the record and that this court has jurisdiction to review the Commission's dismissal of Lyons' complaint, but we conclude that Lyons' constitutional challenges to the Commission's forty-five day filing requirement are without merit. ⁴ Accordingly, we reverse the denial of Lyons' motion by the single justice and affirm the dismissal of Lyons' complaint by the Commission.

1. Refusal of the Commission to assemble the record. The Commission has cited no authority ⁵ supporting its extraordinary claim that it may refuse to assemble the record because, in its view, the dismissal is not reviewable. Fundamental to our commitment to the rule of law is that a government agency may not preclude judicial access to the record of a challenged decision based on its own determination that the decision is not subject to judicial review. Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 692-693, 708-709, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 3099-3100, 3107-3108, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974). It is for the court, not the Commission, to determine whether an action is subject to judicial scrutiny.

Whether the agency is right or wrong on the issue of jurisdiction, it may not, by refusing to assemble the record, limit judicial inquiry into that question. Cf. Smith v. Federal Trade Comm., 403 F.Supp. 1000, 1008 (Del.1975). Even where an appeal is improper, the Commission, like a clerk of court, must perform the task of assembling the record once a notice of appeal has been filed. ⁶ See Mass.R.A.P. 9(d); Mancuso v. Mancuso, 10 Mass.App. 395, 402, 408 N.E.2d 652 (1980); Graves v. General Ins. Corp., 381 F.2d 517, 518 (10th Cir.1967). Cf. Westland Housing Corp. v. Commissioner of Ins., 346 Mass. 556, 557-558, 194 N.E.2d 714 (1963), where there was a remand to the Superior Court for evidence on the jurisdictional point, and cf. such cases as Costello v. Department of Pub. Utils., 391 Mass. 527, 535-538, 462 N.E.2d 301 (1984), and Foster from Gloucester, Inc. v. City Council of Gloucester, 10 Mass.App. 284, 295, 407 N.E.2d 363 (1980), where appellate courts ordered supplementation of the record for purposes of review.

If an appeal is frivolous, this court has ample power to prevent abuse by imposing sanctions. We hold, therefore, that the Commission acted improperly in refusing to assemble the record, and that the single justice erred in not requiring it to perform this ministerial function.

2. Judicial reviewability of the Commission's dismissal of Lyons' complaint. Relying on an unpublished decision of this court, the Commission argues that its dismissal of a prohibited practice charge without a hearing is not reviewable because it is a discretionary administrative act under G.L. c. 150E, § 11. See note 11, infra. Before discussing the substance of the Commission's claim, we take this occasion to point out, for reasons set forth in the margin, that unpublished decisions of this court are not to be relied upon or cited as authority in unrelated cases. ⁷ Not only is the cited decision without precedential value because it is unpublished, but the matter before the Commission in that controversy did not, as here, involve an agency fee--a crucial distinction. ⁸ Any analysis of Lyons' right to judicial review must begin with two cases, Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 97 S.Ct. 1782, 52 L.Ed.2d 261 (1977), and School Committee of Greenfield v. Greenfield Education Assn., 385 Mass. 70, 431 N.E.2d 180 (1982). Abood makes clear that while an agency shop provision ⁹ in a collective bargaining agreement covering government employees is constitutionally valid, the employees may not be compelled to subsidize "ideological activities unrelated to collective bargaining," id. 431 U.S. at 236, 97 S.Ct. at 1800, nor may they be put to an unreasonable burden in exercising their rights to withhold support from such activities. See id. at 241, 97 S.Ct. at 1802. The burden to justify the fee must be placed on the union. Greenfield, 385 Mass. at 82, 431 N.E.2d 180, construed that burden as vesting the employee with certain procedural safeguards. The "onus of justification" is only "meaningful" if the legitimacy of the service fee "is proved before a neutral tribunal and subjected to judicial review " (emphasis supplied). Id.

Similar concerns influenced the court's interpretation of G.L. c. 150E, § 12. Although that section requires a union to establish a rebate procedure, the court was not satisfied that that remedy would prove constitutionally adequate. See Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline and S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 104 S.Ct. 1883, 1890, 80 L.Ed.2d 428 (1984), where, subsequent to the decision in Greenfield, the United States Supreme Court held invalid a rebate scheme on statutory grounds. Thus, in Greenfield, § 12 was read to make the union rebate route merely permissive and to afford a dissenting employee the option of challenging the amount of an agency fee by bringing a prohibited practice complaint before the Labor Relations Commission. Id. 385 Mass. at 81-85, 431 N.E.2d 180.

Greenfield also placed restrictions on the Commission. The Commission may not, prior to determining the permissible amount, order the fee paid to the union. ¹⁰ Id. at 85, 431 N.E.2d 180. Once the employee brings the complaint, "the burden of justifying the fee as permissible must rest on the organization." Id. As we have already indicated, this "burden is only meaningful if legitimacy is proved before a neutral tribunal and subjected to judicial review." Id. at 82, 431 N.E.2d 180. In addition, the Commission must give prompt attention to the employee's complaint. Id. at 85, 431 N.E.2d 180.

Federal courts, too, have imposed similar requirements. In Hudson v. Chicago Teachers Union Local No. 1, 743 F.2d 1187, 1192-1193, 1196 (7th Cir.1984), employees of a school board were held to have a viable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because the procedure afforded them to challenge an agency fee was inadequate. The court held that as a "constitutional minimum," an employee is entitled to "fair notice, a prompt administrative hearing before the Board of Education or some other state or local agency--the hearing to incorporate the usual safeguards for evidentiary hearings before administrative agencies--and a right of judicial review of the agency's decision." Id. at 1196 (emphasis supplied). Cf. Robinson v. New Jersey, 741 F.2d 598, 610-611, 615 (3d Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1228, 105 S.Ct. 1228, 84 L.Ed.2d 366 (1985).

These safeguards, imposed by constitutional considerations, procedural as well as substantive, effectively curb the discretion of the Commission to dismiss an employee's challenge to an agency fee. In such cases, the first two sentences of G.L. c. 150E, § 11, ¹¹ must bear this constitutional imprint. The constitutional constraints also require rejection of the Commission's contention that its discretion to dismiss Lyons' complaint is unreviewable. Just as the Supreme Judicial Court construed G.L. c. 150E, § 12, to avoid constitutional difficulty, we interpret the last two sentences of G.L. c. 150E, § 11, ¹² as permitting judicial review of any Commission action which decides the outcome of a dissenting employee's challenge to an agency fee. We also hold, for purposes of review, that such decisions are adjudicatory proceedings which commence on the filing by the employee of his or her prohibited practices...