Lyons v. Legal Aid Soc.

• Decision Date: 30 October 1995
• Docket Number: No. 1802,D,1802
• Citation: 68 F.3d 1512
• Parties: , 4 A.D. Cases 1694, 12 A.D.D. 599, 7 NDLR P 208 Beth LYONS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The LEGAL AID SOCIETY, Defendant-Appellee. ocket 95-7030.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Page 1512

68 F.3d 1512

64 USLW 2293, 4 A.D. Cases 1694, 12

A.D.D. 599, 7 NDLR P 208

Beth LYONS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The LEGAL AID SOCIETY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 1802, Docket 95-7030.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Argued June 19, 1995.

Decided Oct. 30, 1995.

Debra L. Raskin, New York City (Anne L. Clark, Vladeck, Waldman, Elias & Engelhard, New York City, on the brief), for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Fredric C. Leffler, New York City (Stephanie L. Oratz, Proskauer Rose Goetz & Mendelsohn, New York City, on the brief), for Defendant-Appellee.

Before: KEARSE, ALTIMARI, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

KEARSE, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff Beth Lyons, a staff attorney employed by defendant Legal Aid Society ("Legal Aid"), appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Kevin Thomas Duffy, Judge, dismissing her complaint alleging that Legal Aid violated her rights under, inter alia, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. Secs. 12101-12213 (Supp. V 1993) ("ADA"), and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. Secs. 701-797b (1988 & Supp. V 1993) ("Rehabilitation Act") (collectively the "federal disability statutes"), principally by failing to provide her with a parking space near work. The district court, holding that the federal disability statutes imposed no such duty, dismissed Lyons's federal claims pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. On appeal, Lyons contends that the complaint sufficiently stated claims on which relief can be granted under the federal statutes and that the reasonableness of the requested accommodation was a fact question that could not be decided without development of the record and pretrial discovery. For the reasons that follow, we agree, and we therefore vacate the judgment of the district court and remand for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

Since September 1987, Lyons has been employed as an attorney in the Criminal Defense Division of Legal Aid in its office in lower Manhattan. Taking all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true, the pertinent events were as follows.

A. The History of Lyons's Disability

In January 1989, an automobile struck Lyons as she was leaving her parked car and dragged her some twenty feet, inflicting near-fatal injuries that included torn muscles, other hard- and soft-tissue wounds, and a dislocated left knee. From the date of the accident until June 1993, Lyons was on disability leave from Legal Aid; she underwent multiple reconstructive surgeries and received "constant" physical therapy. (Complaint p 11.) Since the accident, Lyons has been able to walk only by "us[ing] walking devices, including walkers, canes and crutches." (Id.) Her physician has prescribed several exercise sessions each week in order for Lyons to maintain her ability to walk.

Lyons was able to return to work at Legal Aid in June 1993 and has since then performed her job duties successfully. She has continued, however, to suffer from various physical impairments. She wears a brace on her left knee; she cannot stand for extended periods, and she cannot climb or descend stairs without difficulty. Her condition "severely limits her ability to walk long distances either at one time or during the course of a day" (id. p 14), and her general physical stamina is "significantly less than normal" (id. p 15).

Before returning to work, Lyons asked Legal Aid to accommodate her disability by "pay[ing] for a parking space near her office and the courts in which she would practice." (Id. p 17.) She stated that she would be unable to take public transportation from her home in New Jersey to the Legal Aid office in Manhattan because such "commuting would require her to walk distances, climb stairs, and on occasion to remain standing for Legal Aid informed Lyons that it would not pay for a parking space for her. Accordingly, since returning to work, Lyons has spent $300-$520 a month, representing 15-26 percent of her monthly net salary, for a parking space adjacent to her office building.

                extended periods of time," thereby "overtax[ing] her limited physical capabilities."  (Id. p 16.)   Lyons's physician, an orthopedic and reconstructive plastic surgeon, advised Legal Aid by letter that such a parking space was "necessary to enable [Lyons] to return to work."  (Id. p 17.)
                

Prior to returning to work, Lyons had also requested that Legal Aid accord her seniority increases for the entire 4 1/2-year period of her disability leave. Under Legal Aid's internal policies, management had "discretion to adjust the seniority of employees who have not been actively employed for an extended period." (Id. p 18.) Legal Aid agreed to increase Lyons's seniority level, but only by one year rather than by 4 1/2. Accordingly, Lyons has received lower compensation than she would have received had she been accorded full seniority increases for the entire period of her disability leave.

B. The Proceedings in the District Court

Lyons commenced the present action in April 1994. Citing an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") guideline which stated that "reasonable accommodation of a disability 'could include ... providing reserved parking spaces' " (Complaint p 24 (quoting EEOC Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the ADA)), the complaint alleged that Legal Aid had refused to provide reasonable accommodations for Lyons's disability, thereby violating her rights under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, state law, and municipal law.

Legal Aid moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), contending that the accommodations requested by Lyons were unreasonable as a matter of law. The district court granted the motion in a handwritten endorsement that stated as follows:

Whatever claims the plaintiff may have to an employer paid parking space are not cognizable under Federal law and those claims are dismissed. Lacking pendant [sic ] jurisdiction mandates dismissal of the State law claims.

Accordingly this motion is granted.

Judgment was entered dismissing the complaint in its entirety. This appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Lyons contends principally that the complaint alleged facts sufficient to state claims on which relief can be granted under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. Given the principle that the court should not grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim unless it appears "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief," Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957), we agree.

A. The Contours of the Federal Disability Statutes

The ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee "because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. Sec. 12112(a). As defined by the ADA, "discrimination" includes, inter alia,

not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless ... [the employer] can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the ... [employer's] business.

Id. Sec. 12112(b)(5)(A) (emphasis added). "[O]therwise qualified" means that the individual, "with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires." Id. Sec. 12111(8) (emphasis added).

The Rehabilitation Act, which prohibits disability-based discrimination by government agencies and other recipients of federal No otherwise qualified individual with a disability ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance....

funds, is similar. Section 504(a) of the Rehabilitation Act provides:

29 U.S.C. Sec. 794(a) (Supp. V 1993). Regulations promulgated under this statute by the Department of Health and Human Services define a "qualified" person with a disability as one "who, with reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential function of the job in question," 45 C.F.R. Sec. 84.3(k)(1) (1994) (emphasis added), and require recipients of federal funds to "make reasonable accommodation to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified handicapped ... employee unless the recipient can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of its program," id. Sec. 84.12(a) (emphasis added).

Thus, under either the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff can state a claim for discrimination based upon her employer's failure to accommodate her handicap by alleging facts showing (1) that the employer is subject to the statute under which the claim is brought, (2) that she is an individual with a disability within the meaning of the statute in question, (3) that, with or without reasonable accommodation, she could perform the essential functions of the job, and (4) that the employer had notice of the plaintiff's disability and failed to provide such accommodation. There is no question here with respect to the first, second, and fourth elements. The only question is whether Lyons's request that Legal Aid provide her with a parking space near work is, as a matter of law, not a request for a "reasonable" accommodation.

B. The Meaning of "Reasonable Accommodation"

Neither the ADA nor the Rehabilitation Act provides a closed-end definition of "reasonable accommodation." The ADA sets out a nonexclusive list of different methods of accommodation encompassed by that term, stating that

[t]he term ...