Lyons v. Mesa Pub. Sch. Dist.
| Decision Date | 30 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | CV-19-05880-PHX-GMS |
| Parties | Annastaisha Lyons, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Mesa Public School District, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Arizona |
G-. Murray Snow, Chief United States District Judge.
Before the Court is Defendant Mesa Public School District's (“the District”) Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 88), and Defendant Joshua A. Bribiescas's (“Defendant Bribiescas”) Motion for Summary Judgment, (Doc. 90.) Defendant Bribiescas further joins the District's Motion for Summary Judgement regarding Plaintiffs' loss of consortium claims. (Doc. 92.) For the following reasons, both Motions are granted in part and denied in part.
Plaintiff Annastaisha Lyons (“Plaintiff AL”) was seventeen years old during the 2018-2019 school year. She was a junior in high school and a junior varsity basketball player at Dobson High School in the Mesa Public School District. (Doc 89 at 2); (Doc. 99 at 2.) Defendant Kyler Ashley (“Defendant Ashley”) was the school's junior varsity basketball coach. Defendant Bribiescas was an assistant junior varsity basketball coach. (Doc. 89 at 2) (Doc. 99 at 2.)
Between approximately August and December 2018, Defendant Ashley and Plaintiff AL had several sexual encounters. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Bribiescas was aware of these encounters. (Doc. 99 at 4.)
In May 2019, Defendant Ashley was arrested for attempting to initiate an inappropriate relationship with another student. (Doc. 89 at 2); (Doc. 99 at 2.) In an interview with police Defendant Ashley admitted to sexual encounters with two other students, including Plaintiff AL. He ultimately pled guilty to four counts, including three counts of attempted sexual conduct with a minor and one count of luring a minor for sexual exploitation. (Docs. 89 at 3); (Doc. 99 at 2.) Plaintiffs brought suit in December 2019, alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment; Title IX; and Common Law Failure to Protect, Assault and Battery, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Loss of Consortium, and Negligence. (Doc. 1.)
The purpose of summary judgment is “to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit will preclude the entry of summary judgment, and the disputed evidence must be “such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
“[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Parties opposing summary judgment are required to “cit[e] to particular parts of materials in the record” establishing a genuine dispute or “show[ ] that the materials cited do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). A district court has no independent duty “to scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact[.]” Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996).
Under § 1983, a municipality cannot be held liable for the acts of its employees based solely on a respondeat superior theory. Rather, municipalities are only responsible for “their own illegal acts.” Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986). Further, “to establish municipal liability, a plaintiff must show that a ‘policy or custom' led to the plaintiff's injury.” Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1073 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). “[I]n some circumstances[, ] a policy of inaction, such as a policy of failing to properly train employees, may form the basis for municipal liability.” Hunter v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 652 F.3d 1225, 1234 n.8 (9th Cir. 2011). In other words, “a local government's decision not to train certain employees about their legal duty to avoid violating citizens' rights may rise to the level of an official government policy for purposes of § 1983.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011). To prove a failure to train claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must show that “(1) the existing training program is inadequate in relation to the tasks the particular officers must perform; (2) the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the [employees] came into contact; and (3) the inadequacy of the training actually caused the deprivation of the alleged constitutional right.” Hollandsworth v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 440 F.Supp.3d 1163, 1181 (D. Haw. 2020) (citing Merritt v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 875 F.2d 765, 770 (9th Cir. 1989)).
Plaintiffs have established a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the District provided adequate training on mandatory reporting to part-time coaches. The District argues that because it has a written policy, requires employees to watch a video on mandatory reporting, and requires employees to sign statements of awareness of school policies, Plaintiffs have failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact. (Doc. 106 at 4); (Doc. 89-2 at 5-6.) However, as Plaintiffs point out, the District was unable to produce a statement of awareness for either Defendant Bribiescas or Defendant Ashley. (Doc. 99-2 at 16); (Doc. 99 at 4.). Moreover, Mr. Moore, the Director of School Safety, provided the District's cited testimony as to the statement of awareness but also explicitly stated that he did not train part-time employees, including coaches. (Doc. 99-2 at 22-24.) In addition to the missing statements of awareness, Defendant Bribiescas testified that he was never trained on his duties as a mandatory reporter.[1] (Doc. 99-2 at 9-10.) Mr. Mohn, the Athletic Director, testified that he never talked with Defendant about his duties as a mandatory reporter. (Doc. 99-6 at 16); (Doc. 98 at 17.) Henry Bribiescas (“Coach Bribiescas”), the varsity basketball head coach, testified that he did not know of any training other than what he provided that part-time coaches would have received. (Doc. 99-5 at 26-27, 30-31). The District conceded as much at oral argument, when it stated that “the training was provided from district and school-level administrators to head coaches to assistant coaches.”[2] But Coach Bribiescas testified that his job was not to train the coaches but to “go over what we're going to do for the season, what it is, expectations.” (Doc. 99-5 at 26.)[3] Although a close issue, the Court finds that Defendant Bribiescas's testimony, the lack of a statement of awareness for both Defendant Bribiescas and Defendant Ashley, and the testimony of Mr. Moore, Mr. Mohn, and Coach Bribiescas about the District's mandatory reporting training is sufficient for a jury to reasonably believe that part-time coaches were not properly trained on their duties as mandatory reporters. Therefore, based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs have created a genuine issue of material fact.
“‘[D]eliberate indifference' is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 61. “A pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is ‘ordinarily necessary' to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train.” Id. (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Cmm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997)). However, such a pattern is not always necessary: “it may happen that in light of the duties assigned to specific officers or employees[, ] the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989). For example, in light of the “moral certainty” that police officers will be armed and confronted by fleeing felons, the failure to train police officers on the “constitutional limits on the use of deadly force could reflect the city's deliberate indifference to [a] ‘highly predictable consequence.'” Connick, 563 U.S. at 63-64; Canton, 489 U.S. at 390 n.10.
“Whether a local government has displayed a policy of deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of its citizens is generally a jury question.” Berry v. Boca, 379 F.3d 764, 769 (9th Cir. 2004). Here, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the District's alleged failure to train assistant coaches on mandatory reporting amounts to deliberate indifference to a “highly predictable consequence.”[4] Connick, 563 U.S. at 63-64. One district court has stated that whether sexual harassment was an obvious consequence of a failure to train on reporting requirements is a “close question.” Wadsworth v. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. 40, No 2:19-cv-00577-JAW, 2020 WL 6370725, at *19 (D. Me. Oct. 29, 2020). Because the “failure to train school employees about how to report sexual harassment will almost certainly result in a circumstance of sexual harassment being reported incorrectly and not handled quickly or at all, ” the risk may be sufficiently obvious that the lack of training amounts to deliberate indifference. Id. Another district court has...
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