Lyons v. Providence Washington Ins. Co.

• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: CARPENTER, J.
• Citation: Lyons v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 14 R. I. 109 (R.I. 1883)
• Decision Date: 10 February 1883
• Parties: MARY LYONS v. PROVIDENCE WASHINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY.

14 R.I. 109

MARY LYONS v. PROVIDENCE WASHINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

February 10, 1883

A policy of insurance against fire was issued on articles of furniture described as " all contained in house No McMillen Street, Providence, R.I."

The insured, without the knowledge of the insurer, removed these articles to a house in another street, where they were consumed.

Held, that the statement of the locality of the furniture was to be construed as a continuing warranty.

Held, further, reversing Lyons v. Providence Washington Insurance Company, 13 R.I. 347, that the insured could not recover.

EXCEPTIONS to the Court of Common Pleas.

A policy was issued on furniture described as " contained in" a certain house. Held, that a removal to another house without the knowledge of the insurer vitiated the policy.

Simon S. Lapham, for plaintiff.

Abraham Payne & John F. Tobey, for defendant.

CARPENTER J.

The plaintiff proved in the trial of this case in the Court of Common Pleas that she procured from the defendant a policy of insurance against fire, on certain articles of furniture and wearing apparel, described in the policy as " all contained in house No. McMillen Street, Providence, R.I." ; that at the time of the fire the articles had been removed and were in a house on Power Street, where the fire occurred; that the defendants had never been informed of the removal; that she never told them of the removal, and did not think it was necessary to tell them, and that at the time she procured the policy of insurance she owned the house on McMillen Street, in which the articles insured then were. In this state of the proof the defendant requested the presiding justice to instruct the jury that the permanent removal of the goods insured from the house on McMillen Street to the house on Power Street, without the knowledge and assent of the defendant corporation, terminated the contract of insurance, and that the plaintiff could not recover. The presiding justice refused such instruction, whereupon a verdict was returned for the plaintiff, and the defendant brings this bill of exceptions.

On a former trial of this case the plaintiff was nonsuited, and on exceptions the case was remanded for a new trial. Lyons v. Providence Washington Insurance Company, 13 R.I. 347. On the first trial there was no proof that the house on McMillen Street was owned by the plaintiff, but on the second trial that fact was proved. The defendant argues that, inasmuch as this fact was presumably known to the defendant corporation at the time of the issue of the policy, there arises a presumption of intention by the parties to the contract sufficient to distinguish the case now presented from that formerly decided in this action. We do not find it necessary to pass on this question. This bill of exceptions, except for the fact above referred to, is in substance a motion for leave to reargue the exceptions formerly sustained by the court; and we have accordingly considered the whole question anew, both on principle and authority.

There seems to be no doubt that if this question were to be decided on authority, it must be taken as the general rule that all the material statements of the policy of insurance, including...