Lyons v. Providence Washington Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 08 July 1881
• Citation: Lyons v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 13 R. I. 347 (R.I. 1881)
• Parties: MARY LYONS v. PROVIDENCE WASHINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

13 R.I. 347

MARY LYONS v. PROVIDENCE WASHINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

July 8, 1881

A policy of insurance against fire was issued on articles of furniture described as " all contained in house No McMillen Street, Providence, R.I."

The insured, without the knowledge of the insurer, removed these articles to a house in another street, where they were consumed.

Held, that the insured could recover on the policy.

EXCEPTIONS to the Court of Common Pleas. The facts involved are stated in the opinion of the court.

Household furniture described in an insurance policy as " all contained in house No.-, McMillen street," etc., was removed by the insured, without the insurer's knowledge to a house in another street, and there was destroyed by fire. Held, that the insured could recover.

Simon S. Lapham, for the plaintiff in support of the exceptions.

The words in the policy " all contained in house No McMillen Street" are merely descriptive, and are not a warranty that the goods insured shall not be moved, especially if a removal does not increase the risk. Schmidt v. Peoria Marine & Fire Ins. Co. 41 Ill. 295; Bryan v. Peabody Ins. Co. 8 W.Va. 605; Everett v. Continental Ins. Co. 21 Minn. 76, and cases cited; 8 Ins. Law Journal, 790, and cases cited; McCluer v. Girard Fire & Marine Ins. Co. 43 Iowa 349.

At any event the words can only be considered as a warranty of the state of affairs existing at the time the policy was given; Gilliat, Trustee, v. Pawtucket Mutual Fire Ins. Co. 8 R.I. 282; and cannot be extended by construction.

Abraham Payne & John F. Tobey, for the defendants, contra .

The removal of the goods insured from McMillen Street to Power Street without the written assent of the defendant company, terminated the insurance. Phillips on Insurance, § 757; Eddy Street Iron Foundry v. Hampden Ins. Co. 1 Cliff. 300; Wood v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. 13 Conn. 533, 544; Boynton v. Clinton & Essex Ins. Co. 16 Barb. S.C. 254; Fowler v. AEtna Fire Ins. Co. 6 Cow. 673; Wall v. East River Ins. Co. 7 N.Y. 370; Lycoming Ins. Co. v. Updegraff, 40 Pa. St. 311; Annapolis & Elkridge R. R. v. Baltimore Fire Ins. Co. 32 Md. 37; North American Fire Ins. Co. v. Throop, 22 Mich. 146; Severance v. Continental Ins. Co. 5 Bissell, 156; Liebenstein v. AEtna Ins. Co. 45 Ill. 303; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Farrish, 73 Ill. 166. See also Holbrook v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. 25 Minn. 229, and 8 Insurance Law Journal, 789-796.

POTTER J.

The plaintiff procured from the defendant a policy of insurance against fire on certain articles of furniture described in the policy as " all contained in house No. McMillen Street, Providence, R.I."

At the time of the fire the articles had been removed and were in another house. The defendants had never been informed of this removal. The plaintiff testified she did not think it was necessary to tell them.

On trial the judge nonsuited the plaintiff on the ground that the contract was that the goods should remain or be in the house on McMillen Street.

The question is were the words we have quoted merely a description of the property insured, or were they intended as a warranty that the goods should remain in the house where they then were, and that the liability of the company was limited to loss from a fire at that house.

The question seems to us to be how had a person of ordinary intelligence a right to understand it? And in deciding this it is to be considered that the officers of the companies are men skilled and practiced in a particular business, and are supposed to know how to express their meaning and to have used the language they deemed most adapted to the purpose. It would have been easy to have provided in plain language that the insurance should be void if the goods were removed without their consent or without notice to them from the house where they then were. The property being household furniture, it would have amounted in the plaintiff's case to an agreement not to change her dwelling-place for five years without the insurers' consent. Whether it is probable...