Lyons v. St. Joseph Belt Railway Co.
Decision Date | 15 September 1937 |
Docket Number | No. 18303.,18303. |
Citation | 84 S.W.2d 933 |
Parties | J H. LYONS, RESPONDENT, v. ST. JOSEPH BELT RAILWAY COMPANY, APPELLANT. |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Buchanan Circuit Court. — Hon. Sam Wilcox, Judge.
AFFIRMED.
Randolph & Randolph and Niles L. Vermillion for respondent.
Brown, Douglas & Brown for appellant.
On September 1, 1933, plaintiff filed his petition in the circuit court of Buchanan county, seeking the recovery from defendant of actual and punitive damages. The petition was in two counts, the first of which is based upon the alleged and unlawful refusal and failure of defendant to give plaintiff a service letter, in violation of Section 4588, Revised Statutes 1929; and said first count sought the recovery of $2,448.00 actual and $10,000.00 punitive damages. The second count is based upon the alleged wrongful discharge of plaintiff by defendant from its service as an engineman, without cause and in violation and breach of a certain contract and also sought the recovery of $2,448.00 actual and $10,000.00 punitive damages. In each count, the acts complained of by plaintiff were alleged to have been wrongful, malicious, wanton, willful, without legal justification or excuse on defendant's part, and to have been induced by malice, spite, and ill will on the part of defendant toward plaintiff.
The defendant is engaged in the business of operating a switch or terminal railroad in the city of St. Joseph, Missouri. After admitting its corporate capacity and plaintiff's former employment by it, as alleged in each count of the petition, the defendant made general denial of all other allegations of the petition and of each count thereof.
Upon a trial before the jury at the January, 1934, term of the court, verdicts were returned for plaintiff for one dollar actual damages upon each count and for $10,000 punitive damages upon the first count, upon which verdicts judgment was rendered for plaintiff in accordance therewith.
Thereafter, within the required time and at the same term of court, defendant filed motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment.
Upon consideration of the motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment, the court directed a remittitur, which was made; and the amount of the judgment was reduced in said sum; and final judgment as reduced and corrected was entered for $1.00 actual damages upon each count and for $4,000 punitive damages on the first count; and the motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment were overruled. From such judgment as finally entered, the defendant appealed.
There is evidence tending to show that plaintiff entered defendant's service September 8, 1902, as a roundhouseman; that he was soon thereafter promoted to be a fireman, then to be a roundhouse foreman, then in October, 1907, to be an engineer, from which time he continuously remained in defendant's service until June 13, 1932, when he was discharged by one Lawrenson, at that time roundhouse foreman and master mechanic for defendant, having authority to employ and discharge men in the service as enginemen. At or about the time of his discharge, he asked for a service letter and was told by Lawrenson that he would have to wait until his checks came in. When he returned for his checks, he was asked by Lawrenson if he wanted a letter, to which plaintiff replied. "Yes, if there is a letter there I want it." Thereupon, Lawrenson wrote the following letter and delivered it to plaintiff, stating to plaintiff at the time that he was acting under orders from higher up.
The evidence tends to show that the plaintiff, being dissatisfied with such letter, called upon A.C. Van Vliet, supervisor of defendant's railroad, activities, and affairs, and made complaint to him concerning the same, in an attempt to secure from defendant a proper letter and to ascertain the cause of his discharge. Van Vliet stated to him that he had all that he was going to get. Plaintiff, in turn, applied to one R.E. Hastings, the ranking executive officer actively in charge of defendant's business. He was sent from first one to the other and back again for a period of about one year. Hastings told plaintiff he would not override his inferior officers. The result was that the only letter that he was able to get was the letter written by Lawrenson. Lawrenson never held the position of superintendent or general manager of defendant corporation and had never, prior thereto, written a service letter for an engineman: nor did he know much about such duties. After his discharge, the plaintiff sought new employment, making numerous applications therefor, but was unable to obtain any. In some instances, he exhibited the letter which Lawrenson had given him. He afterwards returned to Van Vliet and asked him for a proper service letter, so that he might get a job, and one that would clarify what the cause of his discharge was. Van Vliet refused to give one.
There was evidence tending to show that in October, 1929, the defendant (hereinafter sometimes referred to as the Belt) and the Union Terminal Railway Company (hereinafter called the Union Terminal), both engaged in the operation of switch and terminal railroads at St. Joseph, came under the common ownership of the Allegheney Corporation, controlled by the Van Swearingens; and, as a means of economy in operation, the management and the operation of both roads were consolidated under one and the same management. About August 1, 1930. Hastings, vice president and ranking executive officer of the Union Terminal, and Van Vliet, vice president and general manager of the same, took charge of the affairs of the defendant. As vice president and general manager of the Union Terminal, Van Vliet's duties spread over the defendant until he was made general yard master and supervisor of both roads, J.O. Barclay, Superintendent, and L.R. Sack, manager, of defendant at the time of the consolidation, being retired. Lawrenson, who had been roundhouse foreman for defendant until the time of the consolidation, became master mechanic and mechanical superintendent under the new management; was placed in charge of all engine employees (including the plaintiff) working on both properties; and was given the authority to employ and discharge enginemen as well as supervise their duties. In July, 1930, the defendant posted a notice in its yards to the effect that the management of the Union Terminal would thereafter supervise defendant's operations. It would appear that, prior to the time of the consolidation of the management and operations of the two roads, the Union Terminal had made an agreement with the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen as to wages, rules, and working conditions to apply to the employment of its engineers and firemen, which was in force at the time of the consolidation and which continued in force up to and after the time of plaintiff's discharge. It does not appear that the two corporations were ever consolidated as such.
It appears that, for over twenty years preceding his discharge, the plaintiff acted as member of the grievance committee, representing the enginemen, employees of defendant, in their dealings with their employer. In this capacity, he had, in 1928, negotiated with defendant a working agreement governing the enginemen. Plaintiff remained a member of this grievance committee subsequent to the consolidation; and, in September, 1930, this grievance committee agreed with the defendant, through its supervisor, Van Vliet, to adopt for and in behalf of the enginemen in the employment of the defendant the contract theretofore in force on the Union Terminal property between the Union Terminal and its Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen. Copies of this contract were furnished to each of the defendant's men, and each man signed for his copy upon delivery thereof to him. This contract contained, among others, the following provisions:
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