Lyons v. State

• Citation: 735 N.E.2d 1179
• Decision Date: 25 July 2000
• Docket Number: No. 49A02-9911-CR-779.,49A02-9911-CR-779.
• Parties: Macio D. LYONS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana

735 N.E.2d 1179

Macio D. LYONS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.

No. 49A02-9911-CR-779.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

July 25, 2000.

Publication Ordered September 18, 2000.

Jan B. Berg, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorney for Appellant.

Karen M. Freeman-Wilson, Attorney General of Indiana, Janet Parsanko, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

RILEY, Judge

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant-Defendant Macio D. Lyons (Lyons) appeals his convictions of dealing in cocaine, a Class A felony, Ind.Code § 35-48-4-1, and resisting law enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor, Ind.Code § 35-44-3-3.

We affirm.

ISSUES

Lyons raises four issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as follows:

1. Whether the trial court improperly admitted the cocaine into evidence because the officers lacked a reasonable suspicion to stop Lyons.

2. Whether Lyons' consent to search his person and his luggage was valid and voluntary.

3. Whether Lyons' sentence was manifestly unreasonable.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 28, 1998, Officer Janet Cotton of the Indianapolis Police Department was on duty at the Indianapolis Airport. Officer Cotton received a telephone call from Agent Bruce Gellar of the Minneapolis Task Force notifying Officer Cotton that Lyons was on a flight from San Francisco to Indianapolis via Minneapolis and that he appeared to be a possible drug courier. After Lyons' plane landed in Indianapolis, Officer Cotton approached Lyons and identified herself as a drug task force agent and asked Lyons if she could search his person and his luggage. Officer Cotton later testified that Lyons gave consent to the search. Sergeant Gerald Ross also of the Indianapolis Police Department approached Lyons and asked him if he would like to be searched out of public view, and Lyons stated that he wished for Sergeant Ross to perform the search where they stood in public view at the airport. Lyons then changed his mind and Sergeant Ross and Lyons proceeded to the restroom to perform the search. Inside the restroom, Sergeant Ross performed a search of Lyons' person and discovered a controlled substance on Lyons' person later identified as cocaine in the amount of 474.51 grams. When Sergeant Ross discovered the cocaine, Lyons attempted to flee the restroom, injuring two police officers.

On September 29, 1998, Lyons was charged with Count I, dealing in cocaine, a Class A felony, Count II, possession of cocaine, a Class C felony, and Count III, resisting law enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor.

Before his trial, Lyons filed a motion to suppress the evidence of the cocaine because the police did not have probable cause for the search, he did not consent to the search, and the search was not valid. On January 29, 1999, the trial court conducted a suppression hearing, and on March 22, 1999, the trial court denied Lyons' motion to suppress.

On June 1, 1999, the trial court conducted a bench trial and found Lyons guilty on all three counts. On August 3, 1999, the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing. The trial court found four aggravating factors and two mitigating factors and sentenced Lyons to the presumptive sentence of thirty years for Count I, dealing in cocaine, enhanced by ten years for a sentence of forty years for Count I. Further, the trial court sentenced Lyons to one year for Count III, resisting law enforcement, and ordered the sentences to be served concurrently. The trial court stated that there was not a judgment or a sentence on Count II, possession of cocaine, and the Abstract of Judgment does not reflect any conviction with respect to Count II. Therefore, Lyons received a total sentence of forty years. Additional facts will be supplied when necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Reasonable Suspicion to Stop

Lyons argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the admission of the cocaine into evidence. Specifically, Lyons contends that the airport police lacked a reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop, and therefore the cocaine discovered as a result of the stop should have been excluded.

The trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence. Drake v. State, 655 N.E.2d 574, 575 (Ind.Ct.App.1995). We will reverse a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence only when it has been shown that the trial court abused its discretion. Carter v. State, 692 N.E.2d 464, 465 (Ind.Ct. App.1997). A trial court's decision to deny a motion to suppress is reviewed as a matter of sufficiency. Wilson v. State, 670 N.E.2d 27, 29 (Ind.Ct.App.1996). Thus, in reviewing a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses, but determine if there was substantial evidence of probative value to support the trial court's ruling. Whitfield v. State, 699 N.E.2d 666, 668 (Ind.Ct.App. 1998), trans. denied. However, when evaluating determinations of reasonable suspicion, we accept the factual findings of the trial court unless they are clearly erroneous. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996); L.A.F. v. State, 698 N.E.2d 355, 356 (Ind.Ct.App.1998). We review de novo the ultimate determination of reasonable suspicion. Ornelas, 116 S.Ct. at 1663; L.A.F., 698 N.E.2d at 356.

Lyons argues that the officers' investigatory stop at the airport was not based upon sufficient information in order to create a reasonable suspicion that he was carrying drugs. Before considering the issue of Lyons' consent to search his person and his luggage, we first must consider the propriety of his being stopped at the airport.

At the time Lyons left the airplane and entered the Indianapolis airport, the officers did not have probable cause to arrest him. However, in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), the Supreme Court of the United States held that law enforcement officers have a right to make a brief investigatory stop of a person provided they have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in breaking the law. Specifically, in Terry, the Supreme Court established the rule that a police officer can, without a warrant or probable cause, briefly detain a person for investigatory purposes if, based on specific and articulable facts together with rational inferences from those facts, "official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests" of private citizens is reasonably warranted, Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S.Ct. at 1879-80, and the officer has a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity "may be afoot." Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. at 1884. Indiana courts follow the Terry guidelines. Taylor v. State, 639 N.E.2d 1052, 1054 (Ind.Ct.App. 1994); Platt v. State, 589 N.E.2d 222, 225-26 (Ind.1992); Garrett v. State, 466 N.E.2d 8, 10 (Ind.1984). Whether a particular fact situation justifies an investigatory stop is determined on a case by case basis. Platt, 589 N.E.2d at 226. The requirements of the Fourth Amendment are satisfied if the facts known to the officer at the moment of the stop are such that a person "of reasonable caution" would believe that the "action taken was appropriate." Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S.Ct. at 1880. Indiana has adopted this test. Gipson v. State, 459 N.E.2d 366, 368 (Ind.1984).

In addition, our supreme in Garrett, citing Terry, stated:

It has been established that police have a right to make an investigatory stop of a vehicle or of an individual on foot if, at the time of such stop, a man of reasonable caution would believe that further investigation was appropriate. It is not necessary that police have probable cause for an arrest when making such an investigatory stop. The reasonableness of the warrantless intrusion depends upon specifically articulable facts and reasonable inferences from those facts which warrant the suspicion of unlawful conduct.

Garrett, 466 N.E.2d at 10.

Therefore, the reasonable suspicion requirement is satisfied where the facts known to the officer, together with the reasonable inferences arising from such facts, would cause an ordinarily prudent person to believe that criminal activity has occurred or is about to occur. Carter, 692 N.E.2d at 466. Reasonable suspicion entails something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch, but considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence. Luster v. State, 578 N.E.2d 740, 743 (Ind.Ct.App.1991). Consideration of the totality of the circumstances necessarily includes a determination of whether the defendant's own actions were suspicious. Carter, 692 N.E.2d at 467.

Here, based upon information provided by a Minneapolis airport police officer, Officer Cotton of the Indianapolis Police Department had specific or articulable facts justifying a reasonable suspicion that Lyons had been engaging in or was about to engage in criminal activity. Specifically, Officer Cotton testified that she received information from the Minneapolis Airport Task Force about Lyons that matched the characteristics that the Indianapolis Airport Task Force uses to determine whether an individual is a possible drug courier. Shortly before Lyons' arrival at the Indianapolis airport, Officer Bruce Gellar (Gellar), a Minneapolis airport police officer, notified Officer Cotton that there was an individual that he considered to be a possible drug courier. Officer Gellar identified the possible drug courier as Lyons, and gave Officer Cotton Lyons' airline, seat number, flight number, and approximate arrival time in Indianapolis. In addition, Officer Gellar notified Officer Cotton that Lyons had a criminal history involving firearms and controlled substances, Lyons purchased his airline ticket at the airport just prior to boarding his flight in San Francisco, and Lyons had checked no luggage. Therefore,...