Lyons v. Wall

Decision Date24 August 2012
Docket NumberC.A. No. 08-498-M
PartiesOLIVER LYONS, Plaintiff, v. ASHBEL T. WALL, II, et al. Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOHN J. McCONNELL, JR., United States District Judge.

Oliver Lyons, a prisoner at the Adult Correctional Institution (AO),1 filed suit pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his Eighth Amendment rights and his Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights. In the operative Second Amended Complaint (Complaint), Mr. Lyons alleges that during his incarceration at the ACI, his constitutional rights were violated by numerous individuals affiliated with the ACI, including its director,2 several correctional officers (COs), and two doctors. (ECF No. 34.) The Complaint is organized into sixteen numbered incidents, and those incidents occurred between January 25, 2008 and July 9, 2009. Id.

This matter is before the Court on five motions for summary judgment, three filed by various defendants and two filed by Mr. Lyons. The motions filed by defendants Dr. Friedman and Dr. Matkovic (the Doctor Defendants) raise the same issues and will be analyzed together. (ECF Nos. 105, 107.) Another motion is pressed by the following seven defendants (hereinafter, the ACI Defendants): (i) Captain Aceto; (ii) Investigator Cabral; (iii) Lieutenant Doyle; (iv) COLeDuc; (v) Captain McDonough; (vi) Lieutenant Sayles; and (vii) CO Simpson. (ECF No. 143.)3 Two motions were filed by Mr. Lyons. (ECF Nos. 246, 286.)

In several submissions related to the pending summary judgment motions, Mr. Lyons complained that he lacked access to his own psychiatric records. On July 17, 2012, the Court granted Mr. Lyons' Motion to Compel his psychiatric records. (ECF No. 363.) The Court ordered Defendants to provide Mr. Lyons with all psychiatric records responsive to his request. Id. Mr. Lyons was permitted to supplement his objections to the defendants' pending summary judgment motions (ECF Nos. 105, 107, 143) and to supplement his own summary judgment motions (ECF Nos. 246, 286). Id. Mr. Lyons submitted supplemental materials in connection with his oppositions to the Doctor Defendants' motions for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 372, 373.)

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment's role in civil litigation is "to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial." Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir. 1990) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee's note). Summary judgment should be granted if the movant shows, based on materials in the record, "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (a), (c). "A dispute is genuine if the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in the favor of the non-moving party." Thompson v. Coca-Cola Co., 522 F.3d 168, 175 (1st Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). "A fact is material if it has the potential of determining the outcome of the litigation." Maymi v. Puerto Rico Ports Auth., 515 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). "Otherwise stated, [the Court's] task is todetermine 'whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.'" Zambrana-Marrero v. Suarez-Cruz, 172 F.3d 122, 125 (1st Cir. 1999) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986)).

When deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draws all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor. Cadle Co. v. Hayes, 116 F.3d 957, 959 (1st Cir. 1997). The Court's role is not to make credibility determinations or weigh evidence. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

Normally, the nonmoving party may not rely on the allegations in the complaint to oppose a properly supported summary judgment motion. See Ruiz-Rosa v. Rulldn, 485 F.3d 150, 156 (1st Cir. 2007). However, in the summary judgment context, a "verified complaint" that attests to the truth of the allegations therein "ought to be treated as the functional equivalent of an affidavit to the extent that it satisfies the standards explicated in Rule 56(e)...." Sheinkopf v. Stone, 921 F.2d 1259, 1262 (1st Cir. 1991). Here, the Court considers Mr. Lyons' Complaint to be verified based on Mr. Lyons' verification. (ECF No. 34 at 33.) In evaluating the pending motions, the Court therefore may consider as the functional equivalent of an affidavit any of the Complaint's factual allegations based on Mr. Lyons' personal knowledge that would be admissible in evidence, even if self-serving. See Sheinkopf, 927 F.2d at 1262; Veldzquez-Garcia v. Horizon Lines of Puerto Rico, Inc., 473 F.3d 11, 18 (1st Cir. 2007); Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 53 (1st Cir. 2000). Conclusory allegations in the Complaint, however, "do not pass muster, and hence, must be disregarded." Sheinkopf, 921 F.2d at 1262.

Furthermore, because Mr. Lyons is pro se, the Court holds the Complaint to a less stringent standard than if drafted by an attorney. Dutil v. Murphy, 550 F.3d 154, 158 (1st Cir. 2008). A pro se complaint is "read liberally." Pavilonis v. King, 626 F.2d 1075, 1078 (1st Cir. 1980) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)). Nevertheless, the Court's "duty to be 'less stringent' with pro se complaints does not require [the Court] to conjure up unpled allegations." McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (quoting Hurney v. Carver, 602 F.2d 993, 995 (1st Cir. 1979)).

II. CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS

Mr. Lyons filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a statute providing "remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere." City of Okla. v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985). A constitutional claim under § 1983 must allege that a person acting under color of state law4committed conduct that deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right. Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 559 (1st Cir. 1989) (quoting Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981) {overruled on other grounds)). A plaintiff "must show that the defendants' conduct was the cause in fact of the alleged deprivation." Rodriguez-Cirilo v. Garcia, 115 F.3d 50, 52 (1st Cir. 1997). "As an additional corollary, only those individuals who participated in the conduct that deprived the plaintiff of his rights can be held liable." Cepero-Rivera v. Fagundo, AlA F.3d 124, 129 (1st Cir. 2005). Here, Mr. Lyons seeks to use § 1983 to remedy alleged violations of his Eighth Amendment rights and his Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights.

A. Eighth Amendment

The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners against the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments." U.S. Const. Amend. VIII. Mr. Lyons' first cause of action alleges that thedefendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights.5 (ECF No. 34 at 28-30.) "The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but neither does it permit inhumane ones; accordingly, it is now settled that the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment." Leavitt v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 645 F.3d 484, 497 (1st Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Supreme Court has "indicated that the Eighth Amendment prevents only conditions of confinement that involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, that deny basic human needs or that are grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime warranting imprisonment." Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1179 (1st Cir. 1983) (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347(1981)).

To survive a summary judgment motion, Mr. Lyons' Eighth Amendment violation must satisfy two requirements. Leavitt, 645 F.3d at 497. There is an objective requirement: he must demonstrate "that the deprivation alleged was 'objectively, sufficiently serious.'" Id. (quoting Burrell v. Hampshire Cnty., 307 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2002)). And there is a subjective requirement: he must establish "that prison officials possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind, namely one of 'deliberate indifference' to [his] health or safety." Burrell, 307 F.3d at 8 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). "In order to be found 'deliberately indifferent,' prison officials must be shown to have been subjectively aware of a condition requiring their intervention." Mahan v. Plymouth Cnty. House of Corrs., 64 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 1995) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 840-44). The First Circuit has explained that the requisite mental state could "aptly be described as 'recklessness,' . . . not in the tort-law sense but in theappreciably stricter criminal-law sense, requiring actual knowledge of impending harm, easily preventable." DesRosiers v. Moran, 949 F.2d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 1991) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298-303 (1991)).

The contours of the aforementioned two-part analysis differ depending on the particular Eighth Amendment claim at issue. As set forth below, for example, the analysis of an Eighth Amendment claim of inadequate health care differs somewhat from the analysis of an Eighth Amendment claim of excessive force.

B. Fourteenth Amendment

"The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause protects persons against deprivations of life, liberty, or property; and those who seek to invoke its procedural protection must establish that one of these interests is at stake." Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). The second cause of action in the Complaint alleges that defendants violated Mr. Lyons' Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights. (ECF No. 34 at 30-31.) Courts "examine procedural due process questions in two steps: the first asks whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the State; the second examines whether the procedures...

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